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In response to grower claims of a serious farm labor
shortage during World War H, the United States government
initiated a bracero (Mexican labor) program providing for
the temporary employment of Mexican nationals in the United
States. Once the war ended, new justifications were found
for continuing the program and it lasted through 1964.
Although the whole matter of importing Mexican labor
was rife with political conflict, only two or three political
scientists have paid any serious attention to it.
Most of this dissertation is a case study of the
political underpinnings of these programs and their ad-
ministration. Because the final four years of the Mexican
labor system have been least studied, they receive dis-
proportionate emphasis in the present study. Particular
attention is devoted to political forces leading to the
congressional decision to end bracero employment on
American farms. Among the most important of these was
the reform thrust of the Kennedy administration.
Few studies of the bracero program pay any serious
attention to its earlier historical roots. This
- 2 -
dissertation explores the Mexican labor issue over a
period of several decades prior to 1942. it is found
that Mexican workers were widely used on southwestern
farms from the early years of this century. The issue
was continuously controversial and many of the political
patterns of the l 942-6 3 bracero era were more or less
crystallized in those early years. By failing to con-
sider these historical foundations, most studies depict
the bracero program as more innovative than does this
dissertation.
Unlike most of the available literature, this
study presents the bracero program as one phase of the
broad struggle over Mexican labor which transcends the
program itself. The conflict existed long before 1942
and it continues to the present day. Nevertheless, the
sparse literature gives the impression that the death of
the Mexican labor system more or less solved the controversy.
This dissertation is apparently the only study to
consider the political aftermath of the bracero program,
and it considers both the Johnson and Nixon eras. It
finds that the conflict was simply re-oriented to focus
more on other types of Mexican workers, particularly so-
called "wetbacks," regular immigrants, Mexicans living in
Mexico and commuting to jobs in the United States, and
those authorized to enter as temporary farm workers under
the general immigration laws which were not affected by
- 3-
termination of the bracero program. It is concluded
that termination of the program was the prelude to
an increasing reliance on Mexican labor, especially
in the form of wetbacks.
Once the case study has been presented, the
findings are integrated and interpreted in the frame-
work of pluralist theory. Particular attention is
devoted to pluralist propositions relating group
characteristics to political power at the legislative
and administrative levels. It is concluded that these
propositions provide generally useful explanations of
the development, termination, and political aftermath
of the bracero program. No other study has systematically
applied pluralist theory to this subject. Some major
criticisms of pluralism are also considered, and it is
found that some aspects of the program are more
satisfactorily explained by them.
PREFACE
The broad interest motivating me to undertake
this study of the politics of Mexican agricultural
labor in the United States dates from 1958. During
the summer of that year, I was employed as a harvest
worker by one of the largest corporate farms in the
United States. Although braceros were not used in
our camp, some farms in that section of Illinois hired
substantial numbers of foreign laborers.
My casual interest in Mexican workers dates
from 1964, the final year of the bracero program. In
the fall of that year, I accepted a teaching position
in southern Colorado. Inasmuch as agriculture in that
region had long used substantial numbers of Mexican
workers, termination of the bracero program generated
substantial publicity in the Colorado press.
My interest in Spanish-speaking workers was also
stimulated by several of my Chicano students at
Southern Colorado State College. Long after the news-
papers reported that the state had lost its Mexican
workers, some of my students talked about the widespread
v
use of "wetbacks” by farmers in that area. 1 Also,
since the mid-1960's, more and more of the Chicano
students at Southern Colorado State have been
raising questions about why academicians have paid
so little attention to the Spanish-speaking.
The politics of Mexican labor is a far more
complex subject area than it might at first appear.
Richard Craig, one of only two other political
scientists to devote serious attention to it, wrote
in 1971:
In many respects, the entire question ofimported Mexican farm labor was akin to an ice-berg . . . . Lying beneath the surface
. . .
was a virtual labyrinth of interrelated and
multidimensional processes. One could spend alifetime and never thoroughly trace each^ primary
component of the bracero question, let alone
analyze the multitude of secondarily related
ingredients
.
2
As Craig recognizes, we must start somewhere
despite the enormity of the task, 3 and to focus on
certain dimensions means that others must be ignored
1 Scholars, including Chicanos, commonly use the
term wetbacks" to refer to Mexicans who have entered
the United States illegally. For the purpose of con-
sistency, this dissertation follows that practice. No
negative value- judgment is intended. See Julian
Samora, Los Mojados: The Wetback Story (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 6.
2 .Richard B. Craig, The Bracero Program:
Interest Groups and Foreign Policy (Austin:
University of Texas Press, 1971), p. 12.
3 Ibid.
,
pp. 12-13.
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for the time being. As with his book, this disser-
tation is written with a clear recognition that its
coverage is in no sense comprehensive. Perhaps
hundreds of additional aspects of bracero politics
might have been usefully studied. For example, not
included in the present study but fully deserving
serious research attention are such matters as the
dynamics of the bracero program in the context of the
Mexican political system and the literature produced
by Mexican scholars. Other important dimensions of
the bracero program which are not studied in this
dissertation are outlined in the "Epilogue."
I am indebted to several individuals and
institutions for their contributions to this study. I
am deeply grateful to Dr. Howard J. Wiarda, chairman
of my dissertation committee, for his consistently
constructive and courteous criticism of the manuscript
and for his prompt return of the chapters despite his
own busy schedule. I appreciate his enthusiasm about
the project and the encouragment he offered. Most of
the dissertation was written off-campus. This
necessarily adds to the burdens of the dissertation
chairman, and I appreciate Dr. Wiarda’ s willingness to
direct the study under these conditions.
vn
I am also grateful to Dr. Lewis Hanke,
Dr. Harvey Kline, and Dr. George Sulzner for agreeing
to serve as readers. Their useful suggestions have
been taken into account in the preparation of the final
draft.
In addition to the usual burdens which the
preparation of a dissertation imposes upon the writer's
spouse, my wife, Martha, played a particularly positive
role in my research. It ranged from helping me search
the available literature for relevant sources to
reading a considerable amount of it and exchanging
ideas with me. She served as an informed critic. She
influenced more than a few of the themes developed in
the dissertation. For her help, sacrifice, and constant
encouragement, I am profoundly grateful.
Research materials were obtained in the libraries
of the following colleges and universities, and their
services are gratefully acknowledged: the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst, the University of Colorado at
Boulder, Colorado College, the University of Texas at
Austin, and Southern Colorado State College. In the
latter library, I am particularly indebted to Mrs. Norma
Janes and Mrs. Eloise Phelps. I also made considerable
use of the Pueblo (Colorado) Regional Library.
vm
I Wish to express my appreciation to two
colleagues at Southern Colorado State College.
Dr. Dwain Ervin and David Silverman read and commented
on part of this dissertation. Their questions helped
me to clarify my own thinking. To Dr. Ervin, I am
indebted also for much-needed encouragement and his
friendly advice that doctoral dissertations should
not turn out to be lifetime projects.
Finally, I wish to thank Southern Colorado
State College for granting my sabbatical leave and
making it possible to complete this study.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION. THE RESEARCH PROBLEM AND THE CONTEXT
This dissertation is a politically oriented study
of the bracero program (also known as the Mexican labor
system), under which millions of Mexican workers entered
the United States between 1942 and 1964. It focuses
especially on the final four years of the program, on
the reasons for its termination by Congress, and on the
post-termination struggle over importing Mexican labor.
Considerable attention is paid to the impact of domestic
interest group activity on each of these facets of
bracero politics.
Background of the Bracero Program
The American economy has long attracted Mexican
workers, 1 and during much of this century particular
regions and crops have been overwhelmingly dependent upon
them. The poor and politically unsophisticated Mexican
national, rarely seeking more than a living for his family
and himself, became the center of one of the most
1
,
_
T .
See John H
;
Burma, Spanish-Speaking Groups in
Tb®—bnited States (Durham, N.C.i Duke Univ. Press. 10 ^4 )
pp. 38-71. ’ ^
2bitterly fought American political struggles of this
century. Numerous employers, especially large-scale
oouthweo tern farmers, gained a powerful vested interest
in the use of cheap Mexican labor and increasingly
demanded it as a right. However, this position was
eventually challenged by a growing number of domestic
interests, including Mexican-Americans who found them-
selves in competition with the foreign migrants,
organized labor, various religious organizations, civil
rights groups, many liberal publications, and a growing
number of important politicians.
The problem was obviously a political one inas-
much as the regulation of immigration is the national
government's responsibility. Therefore, in their long
and bitter struggle with each other, these rival interest
groups fed the issue into the American political system.
In a broad sense, the concern of this dissertation is
with these groups and with the responses of the political
decision-makers
.
During most of this century, southwestern growers
have been relatively free to use Mexican workers regard-
less of what the law has said. By always keeping the
size of the Border Patrol small, Congress has made it
impossible to faithfully enforce the laws which it has
3passed. Perhaps the most plausible explanation for
this paradox has been the congressional goal of
satisfying, at least minimally, the demands of both
the friends and foes of Mexican labor. While the laws
grew tough, the user of Mexican nationals continued to
enjoy his inexpensive and often illegal labor supply.
The settlement provided something for everybody.
As one looks at the historical pattern, the
compelling conclusion is that, with some exceptions,
when employers wanted Mexican labor the American govern-
ment did not often stand in the way. Before World War I,
by largely ignoring the immigration laws, the authorities
informally provided a supply of cheap labor for south-
western employers. 3 The outbreak of war brought claims
of a labor shortage in that region and the American
government relied on a special provision of the immi-
gration laws to admit tens of thousands of ordinarily
inadmissible Mexican workers. 4 Even while the emergency
program was in effect, vast numbers of Mexicans entered
2See Howard F. Cline,
Mexico (N.Y.: Atheneum Press
The United States and
1966), p. 16.
3Art Leibson, "The Wetback Invasion," Common
Ground
.
X (Autumn, 1949), 12.
Harry Schwartz, Seasonal Farm Labor in the
Uni te d^States (N.Y.j Columbia University Press, 1945 ),
4illegally. With the close of the war, the main justi-
fication for the Mexican labor arrangement disappeared
and the government announced that it was being
terminated
.
5
However, the claim of a policy change was
little more than a formality. Rather than vigorously
enforcing the immigration laws, the administrations of
the 1920's reverted to the government's pre-war, hands-
off stance, and unprecedented numbers of Mexican workers
entered illegally.^ Only with the coming of the Great
Depression and the declining demand for the foreign
laborers did the government begin serious enforcement
of the immigration laws . 7
Prior to 1942, political decisions to bring in
Mexican laborers were unilaterally reached by the
American government. Not until that year was a bilateral
agreement governing the short-term employment of Mexican
nationals reached with their government. The resulting
5U.S., Congressional Record
. 68 th Cong.,
1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 7, 6476.
^For example, see U.S., Congressional Record
,
68 th Cong., 1st Sess., 1924, LXV, Part 6
, 6129, 6133 .
n
Schwartz, op. cit ., p. 6 l
;
Leo Grebler,
Mexican Immigration to the United States (Los Angeles:
University of California Press, 1966 )
,
p. 25 ;
George Kiser and David Silverman, "Mexican Repatriation
During the Great Depression," The Journal of Mexican
American History (Forthcoming)
.
5arrangement was popularly known as "the braoero program"
or "the Mexican labor system." 8 Although it was revised
periodically and sometimes temporarily suspended for
brief periods, the United States continued to use
braceros until December 31. 1964. Millions of Mexicans
entered under the agreement and vast numbers of their
fellow-nationals entered the United States illegally
while the agreement was in effect.
Following common scholarly practice, Mexican
nationals entering under the series of bilateral agree-
ments will be called "braceros" to distinguish them from
other Mexican workers. Those entering illegally are
referred to as "wetbacks." Both should be distinguished
from regular "immigrants" and from "commuters," who are
Mexicans commuting to jobs in the United States. It
should be noted that the death of the bracero program did
not end reliance on these other types of Mexican workers.
In terms of domestic politics and economics as
well as the foreign policy processes of both nations,
the bracero program was of major importance. It was a
O
For details of the original agreement, see
u.cj., Department of State, Temporary Migration of
Mexican Agricultural Workers
. Effected bv Exohsnp-P 0 fNotes August 4, 1 942 (Executive Agreement Series
No. 278) (Washington, D.C., 1943); "Bilateral AgreementConcerning the Temporary Migration of Mexican Farm
Workers to the United States," International Labour
Review
,
Vol. XLVI, No. 4 (1942), 469-71
.
6significant exercise in international relations between
the United States and one of the most important Latin
American nations. The agreements were one strand of the
broader evolving trends in United States-Mexican
relations. Many observers in both countries have
interpreted the agreement as a logical manifestation
of the maturing Good Neighbor Policy
,
9
which became even
more important when the two nations became allies in
World War II
.
10
Although tens of thousands of Mexican
workers had entered the United States in past decades,
not until the 1942 agreement was Mexico’s substantial
interest in her temporarily absent citizens recognized.
Through negotiations she was able to obtain unprecedented
guarantees for them, including agreements covering wages
and living conditions.
The good-neighbor, wartime cooperation summarizes
only one side of the complex United States-Mexican re-
lations pertaining to the bracero program. For example,
o
For example, see Otey M. Scruggs, "Evolution of
the Mexican Farm Labor Agreement of 1942," Agricultural
History
.
XXXIV (July, i 960 ), 144.
10Otey M. Scruggs, "Texas and the Bracero Program,
1942-1947," Pacific Historical Review
.
XXXII (August,
1963) » 257; Dorothy M. Tercero, "Workers from Mexico,"
Bulletin of the Pan American Union
.
Vol. LXXVIII, No. 9
(1944), 503 .
7Mexico, claiming intolerable discrimination against
American^ in Texas, banned braceros for a time
from that state. She saw in the agreement more than a
mere arrangement for providing workers to American em-
ployers. She sought to transform it into a lever for
pressuring the United States to end discrimination
against Mexican-Amerloans. 1
1
Particularly with the
ebbing of the war crisis, Mexico raised critical
questions about the conditions of braceros working in
this country and of those who might come here in the
future
.
The Mexican political system had to cope with the
demands of interest groups favoring and opposing her
series of labor agreements with the United States. In
Mexico supporters and opponents alike recognized the
major impact of the agreements on their country. As in
the United States, a long and bitter political struggle
developed. Opponents ranged from the Mexican Communist
Party to labor unions. In the national administration,
support for the labor arrangement was generally hedged
11
q
° te
Z
M * Scruggs, "Texas, Good Neighbor?"4ge Southwes tern Social Science Quarterly . XXXXIII(September, 1962;, H8-25.
8by reservations
.
12
Among the politically powerful elements in Mexico,
there was adequate support to keep their country in the
program until the United States Congress permitted it to
lapse in December, 1964. In his careful study. Richard
Hancock concluded that Mexico benefitted considerably
from the arrangement. He reported that for at least two
years of its duration, money earned by Mexican nationals
in the United States was Mexico's third most important
source of dollars, outdistanced only by receipts from
tourism and cotton exports
.
13 Hancock found that
numerous small businesses relied heavily on bracero
spending
.
14
Inasmuch as the workers tended to come from
the most depressed areas of Mexico, the program pumped
money into the Mexican economy at the most urgent point.
12
David G. Pfeiffer, "The Mexican Farm LaborSupply. Program- Its Friends and Foes,” (unpublishedaster s dissertation, Department of GovernmentUniversity of Texas at Austin, 1963 ), pp. 90 - 117 .
1 3 •
„
Richard H. Hancock, The Role of the Bracero inthe Ec °nDm ic and Cultura l Dynamics of Mexico (StanfWd~
alifornia: Hispanic American Society of StanfordUniversity, 1959), p. 129.
14
Ibid
.
.
p. 122 .
1 ' Ibid
.
.
p. 129.
9m summary, for Mexico the labor arrangement was
a very significant economic and domestic political
isoue. Furthermore, it was an important strand of her
relations with a major world power which had often been
suspect from the Mexican point of view but which was now
committed to the Good Neighbor Policy.
Gaps in the Literature and the Focus
of this Dissertation
Considering the great significance of the worker
arrangement to one of our most important Latin American
neighbors and the bitter political controversy it sparked
in Mexico, one would expect that our decision to termi-
nate the bracero program would have been thoroughly
studied in the nine years that have now passed. However,
this is not the case. In fact, our decision to end the
program has hardly been studied at all.
Aside from its great impact on Mexico, the develop-
ment, termination, and aftermath of the bracero program
is a fascinating exercise in the use of interest group
power in American policy-making. The long and bitter
struggle revolved around some of the most emotion-laden
concepts and ideas in the English language.
The struggle resurrected ancient divisions in
American political life. It brought many interest groups
10
into the public arena as each sought to use the
political process to leave its own imprint on public
policy. Churches, organizations of Mexican-Americans,
labor unions, newspapers, farm associations, farmers,
business organizations, politicians, and others
took part.
House and Senate hearings provided the arena for
perhaps the clearest interest group clashes. Congressional
committees played their usual powerful roles. Presidents
formulated their own positions and left their impact.
The Department of Labor and the Agriculture Department
were important participants.
It is around the American interest group struggle
and the response of national political decision-makers
that this dissertation centers. After tracing the
historical roots of Mexican labor in the United States,
it provides a case study of the political dynamics of the
program s final years. The primary concern is with the
interest group struggle, as opponents and friends of the
Mexican labor policy sought to pull the federal govern-
ment decisively to their respective positions. While
considering the group maneuvering for power but not
limiting explanation to it, an attempt is made to
explain why governmental policy was reversed and the
program terminated. Why did the political process
maintain the policy for 22 years only to abruptly end
it in 1964?
11
In a democratic society, passage or repeal of a
law rarely if ever definitively settles the issue in
dispute. The common pattern is that the old group
struggle continues. However, this writer knows of no
serious effort to study the continuing group conflict
once the bracero program had ended. Yet its old friends
pressured the government to permit large numbers of
Mexican workers to enter under other legal provisions
which had not been repealed while reformers sought
retention of the new status quo. An overview of this
post- termination group maneuvering is another contri-
bution of this dissertation.
Finally, certain common assumptions of pluralist
theory and some criticisms of it will be used as a
sounding-board for theoretical considerations.
The decision to focus primarily on those aspects
of the bracero program outlined above was made after a
survey of the scholarly literature indicated that they
had been relatively neglected. Although several theses
and dissertations have been written on the Mexican labor
arrangement, most pay little attention to political
12
considerations Those that are politically oriented
have given little notice to forces leading up to termi-
nation. 1 ? Perhaps one reason is that scholarly interest
m the program apparently waned with its death in 1964
and has only recently shown signs of revival.
To this writer's knowledge, only a few books have
been published on any aspect of the bracero program. In
his book released in 1959. Hancock analysed the braceros'
role in the cultural and economic dynamics of Mexico.
1
6
~
.. T
Examples include Ruth Parker Graves. "A Historvo. the Inter-Relationship between Imported Mexican laborDomestic Migrants, and the Texas Agricultural E oLv °(unpublished Master's dissertation, University of Tex^sat Austin, I960); Grace West, "Health Insurance for the
under^ublic^Law^R ^"
1
?
3 De
^
loPment and Implementationder P c aw ? 8 , (unpublished Ph.D. dissertationClaremont Graduate School, 1966 ), Ronald Geenen,Economic Adjustments to the Termination of the Bracero
0f°ArkaAsasri96?)?
hed Ph,D- dissertation
' University
17Examples include Richard Hancock, "The Role
S
r
?S!!
r
o ^.
the Ecoi
?
omic and Cultural Dynamics of
iv.c x ico, (Ih.D. dissertation, Stanford University, 1959 ) •Robert Dennis Tomasek, "The Political and Economic
Implications of Mexican Labor in the U.S. under theNon-Quota^System
,
Contract Labor Program, and Wetback
Wi
2
V
?n
™en
^' (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Michigan, 1965); Nelson Gage Copp, "Wetbacks and
raceros: Mexican Migrant Laborers and American Immi-gration Policy, 1930-1960," (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Boston University, 1963 ).
13
Three years later, Taylor’s work entitled God’s
Messengers to Mexico’s Masse s. A Sti.lv of the
S ignificance of the Braceros was published by a religious
press. The following year McBride’s Vanishing Bracero
appeared. It is a heavily opinionated, folksy presen-
tation by a cotton ginner bitterly opposed to termination
of the Mexican labor program . 19 Published in 1964
,
Galarza ' s Merchants of I.aw told the story of the
bracero in California between 1942 and 1960 .^
Apparently only one book analyzing the Mexican
labor program has been released since its termination in
1964. That is Richard Craig's work entitled
Th e Bracero Program: Interest Groups and Foreign Po1iny
r
published in 1971 . 21 There are important differences
between his worthwhile book and this dissertation. The
1
8
A s tun,,
T
Sy 1
1
?
r
.’ —
—
d * s Messengers to Mexico's Masses iJLfudy of the Re ligious Significance of the Brace-
!iUj9T0riG • Or^PTin t T nc + i -fn nTT773rZ""iI r»~ “TT *Tv
—---- ui me
-oracerc(Eugene, egoru Institute of Church Growth, 1962 ).
Rtp
19
^
hn G
;JS?ride ' Vanishing Bracero (San Antoniotby the author, 1963 ).
20Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor i Thp
Mexican Bracero Storv ( S anti" Barbara
, California:McNally and Loftin, 1964).
21 .Richard Craig, The Bracero Prograrrn InterestGroups and Foreign Policy (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1971).
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book pays little attention to the much under-studied
Secondly, Craig credits molding of the Mexican
labor program and the dec is
i
l ion to end it to interaction
between four interest groups: "labor, agricultural
employers, Mexico ... and the United States ." 23 The
present study pays attention to other interests as well
as these.
Thirdly, there are major theoretical differences
group theory and systems analysis," Craig’s book makes
his work could be fitted readily into the interest group
framework, he devotes less than a dozen pages to
explicitly making the connection
.
25 Very few assumptions
of the theory are outlined. In contrast, the present
study devotes a chapter to outlining some important
assumptions of both interest group theory and its critics.
Another chapter is devoted to relating these theoretical
assumptions to the bracero program.
22 otmd., pp. 6 - 7 , 37 , 46, 55 . J Ibid.
,
p. 81 .
24 .
. 2 ^
2-bid . , xi. J Ibid .
.
pp. 6l-64, 148-50, 204,
in the two projects. After promising to use "interest-
no more references to the latter . 24 Although much of
15
Fourthly, Craig s book is not concerned with the
post-termination group struggle while the present study
devotes a chapter to it.
In summary, several justifications have been
offered for this dissertation. First, the bracero
program was of immense importance to both the United
States and Mexico. Yet, relatively little has been
published on it. Secondly, political aspects have been
especially under-studied. Thirdly, interest in the pro-
gram waned with its demise, resulting in scholarly
neglect of its final phase. Fourthly, the single serious
effort to explain the end of the program is significantly
different from the approach of this dissertation.
I ifthly, the present study breaks some new ground in
studying the continuing, post- termination group
struggle. Sixthly, the attempt to relate interest group
theory to the bracero program is more explicit and
more thorough than the single previous effort.
A Look Ahead
This dissertation is divided into seven chapters
and an epilogue. Chapter II presents a broad outline of
pluralist theory from which propositions particularly
relevant to bracero politics are isolated.
Most studies of the bracero program pay almost no
16
attention to its pre-l 942 roots. Chapter III outlines
some of the important developments surrounding the use of
Mexican labor before World War n. In later chapters, it
is shown that several of these early patterns had an
important impact on the bracero program. By taking them
into account, this dissertation depicts the program as
less innovative than do most studies. Chapter IV dis-
cusses historical developments between 1941 and i960,
several of which are important for understanding the
later struggle over termination of the bracero program
and its political aftermath.
Chapter V covers the final four years of the pro-
gram with an emphasis on reasons for its termination.
Chapter VI is an overview of the continuing group
struggle in the post- termination period.
Although interest group activity is emphasized in
Chapters III-VI, the task of explicitly and systematically
relating pluralist theory to the bracero program is re-
served for Chapter VII. In that chapter, pluralist theory
provides the theme around which the highlights of earlier
chapters are integrated and explained. Particularly
Chapters III, V, and VI focus on neglected facets of
bracero politics. The Epilogue turns attention to other
important gaps in the literature which are not covered
in this dissertation.
17
CHAPTER II
THE THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE
Introduction and Justification
Pluralism, an introductory summary
. This chap-
ter turns attention to theoretical considerations of
relevance to the inauguration, operation, termination,
and political aftermath of the Mexican labor system.
The main focus is on pluralist theory, other terms or
concepts commonly used to refer to roughly the same
theoretical model are group theory, analytic pluralism,
polyarchy, interest group theory, interest group
liberalism, and broker rule.
A primary concern of pluralism is the location of
political power. It rejects elitist theory 1 which lo-
cates power in fairly permanent and small elites. It
also denies the validity of the majority rule model which
claims that in democratic societies the government trans-
lates, or should translate, majority opinion into public
policy. The pluralist model depicts widely dispersed
political power which is mobilized and exercised through
I
D u ^ A classic presentation of elitist theory isRobert Michels, Political Parties (New Yorks CollierBooks, 1962).
18
interest groups rather than through electoral majorities
or prevailing public opinion. Typically, a public
policy will be most influenced by the most active and
most interested organized groups. There are no permanent
power elites, whether consisting of individuals or
interest groups. Political power is always shifting
from one combination of interests to another. Nor is
there anything permanent about the composition of the
coalitions themselves. Some disintegrate while new ones
form. An interest group may leave one and join another
as either its goals or political conditions change.
Relevance of the pluralist model
. Several
considerations suggest the relevance of group theory for
understanding the politics of the bracero program. First
although pluralists acknowledge its relative inapplica-
bility to many political systems, they claim that it is
especially descriptive of the policy process in the
United States. 2
Secondly, Theodore Lowi, a leading critic of the
group model, has found that the tendency for the most
2Several pluralists have applied the model to the
American political system, or particular policy areas
within.it, and concluded that the fit between theory andfacts is close. Examples include David B. Truman,
Th e Governmental Process (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
1962); Earl Latham, The Group Basis of Politics (Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 1952).
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powerful and most interested groups to dominate public
policies governing them is particularly characteristic
of the farm segment of American society
.
3 m an im-
portant pluralist study published in 1951
, David Truman
refers generously to the politically relevant activity
Of agricultural groups
.
4
Finally, even a casual reading of the literature
on the Mexican labor system makes it obvious that
numerous groups were intensely interested in the program.
Perhaps the dominant characteristic of newspaper
accounts of it was their recognition of the spirited
group competition to dominate bracero policy.
Despite the apparent relevance of group theory,
only two previous studies have attempted to relate it to
bracero politics. Craig's book was discussed in Chapter I.
In an analysis of the bracero program in California,
Galarza considered the "countervailing power" hypothesis
from the group model. J However, neither he nor Craig
outlined the broader model from which their isolated
propositions were taken. That would have made the
w \u tvt ^
heodo
^
e Lowi, The End of Liberalism (New York:W.W. Norton and Co., 1969), p. 102.
4
Truman, op. cit
.. pp. 8?-93, 468-78.
^Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor (Charlotte:
McNally and Loftin, Publishers
,
1964 )
,
pp. 219- 28 .
20
propositions and the studies more meaningful.
In order to avoid presenting a third pluralist
approaoh which fails to explain what pluralism is. most
of this chapter is devoted to a general discussion of
the main tenets of group theory. Toward the end. a
manageable number of those most relevant to the bracero
program are summarized and re-emphasized. Hopefully,
the earlier discussion of the larger model from which
they come will make them more meaningful.
Pluralisms An Overview
The nature of man and groups. Pluralists assume
that the average individual is selfish and not
necesoarily very rational.^ Consequently
,
they have
been particularly critical of such optimistic theorists
as Lord Bryce. For instance, Earl Latham, an important
pluralist, rejects Bryce’s assertion that "in the ideal
democracy, every citizen is intelligent, patriotic, dis-
interested. His sole wish is to discover the right side
m each contested issue and to fix upon the best man
,
.
The pluralist conclusion that man tends to be
thflTfv 13 reached by a radically different route fromhe one taken by many other theorists who have reachedthe same conclusion. In the pluralist model, one's goalsand values. do not make him irrational. Man’sirrationality lies in his failure to maximize his oppor-tunities to reach his goals. P
21
among the competing candidates." 7
The pluralist claims that the typical citizen
knows and cares little about politics. Those that do
care tend to be dominated by "irrational prejudice and
impulse." The citizen's political involvement is mini-
mal. However, his apathy is not total for he is selfish
and seeks fulfillment of his personal desires. 8
Despite his selfishness, the average person, as
an individual.
, is in no position to defend his political
interests. He is too uninformed and cares too little
about politics. The way out of the dilemma lies in group
membership
.
In order to defend their interests, people
naturally form various types of groups. David Truman
identifies three kinds which are especially relevant to
pluralist interpretations of politics. An interest
group is "any group that, on the basis of one or more
shared attitudes, makes certain claims upon other groups
in the society for the establishment, maintenance, or
enhancement of forms of behavior that are implied by the
Latham, op. cit
.. p. 6.
Joseph A. Schumpeter, Capitalism. Socialism, and
g^g? rac y ^rd ed. ; New York: ^Trper and Row, Publisher s,lWTTTp. 2 56-64.
22
shared attitude.”? When interest groups
governmental institutions.” they are called
"political
interest groups. 10
Finally, there will be many interests around which
no interest groups have formed but which would become
activated should individuals sharing those interests per-
ceive them to be seriously threatened. Truman refers to
them as "potential interest groups." 11 The prospect of
activating them motivates actual interest groups to
moderate their political demands. Therefore, even unor-
ganized interests will have an impact on public policy. 12
Interest group membership solves the problems of
individual apathy and ignorance by decreasing both their
incidence and relevance.
Taking on membership in a political interest group
is related to an increase in political concern and infor-
mation. Interaction with other members who share the
same grievance and with politically sophisticated leaders
tends to intensify both the dissatisfaction and awareness
of political alternatives as solutions.
Although group membership reduces apathy and
q
Truman, op. cit .. p. 33.
Ibid., pp. 37-39. 11 Ibid
.
.
p. 34 .
12
Ibid
.
* PP* 114-15, 507 .
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ignorance
members
.
both remain
However, the
widespread even among group
pluralist sees this as no barrier
to the group's adequate defense of the interests of its
members. The
nature of the
and-f ile
.
answer to the apparent dilemma lies in the
relationship between leaders and the rank-
Aocording to David Truman, interest groups develop
an "active minority” which wields predominant influence
on the organization. He claims this is natural because
it is virtually impossible for any considerable body of
people to solve directly all the problems that may con-
front it." 13 Because group leaders take command, the
ignorance and apathy of the rank-and-file are rendered
less relevant.
While emphasizing the need for leadership and
recognizing the necessary inequality of power within the
interest group, pluralists stress the influence of ordi-
nary members, their apathy and ignorance notwithstanding.
Leaders are not free to do whatever they please. To
illustrate that point, Truman quotes, with approval,
the conclusions of Arthur Ross about the role of
rank-and-file labor union members:
13 Ibid
.
,
p. 140.
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remains
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important m the reckoning of the union officials. 14
Several of the preceding pluralist assumptions
about the nature of man and groups may be used to ancici-
pate later findings in this dissertation. They lead to
the expectation that the mass of American citizens would
not be actively involved in the struggle over the bracero
program. As we shall see, most of the activity centered
m interest groups supporting and opposing the Mexican
labor system. They made most of the news, offered the
bulk of testimony at congressional hearings, and sent
most of the letters and telegrams to congressmen.
The pluralist model leads to the expectation that
not all interests threatened by the Mexican labor system
would organize. In fact, few American farm workers did.
However, we shall see that growers' fear of activating
this potential interest group apparently did not have
the moderating effect postulated in the pluralist model.
The model suggests that most of the active
political struggle over the Mexican labor system would
.
, p. 155, quoting Arthur M. Ross,
Trade Union Wage Policy (Berkeleyt University of
California Press, 1948 ), p. 38.
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take the form of clashes between leaders of pro-bracero
and anti-bracero interest groups rather than between
rank-and-file members. We shall see that that expec-
tation is generally borne out.
Prerequisites of pluralist system., The
existence of interest groups which actively champion
the interests of their members by no means creates a
pluralist system. There are numerous other requirements,
a few of which are discussed below.
Pluralist systems are characterized by an open-
ness allowing participation in the political process by
a great diversity of groups. No small elite sets policy
and a mass of organized interests are free to join the
competition through which public policy is set.
According to Robert Dahl, a prominent pluralist, "a cen-
tral guiding thread of American constitutional development
has been the evolution of a political system in which
all the active and legitimate groups in the population can
make themselves heard at some crucial stage in the pro-
cess of decision." 1 ^
Ihe necessity for the system's openness to broad
group participation is logically derived from the
15
(Chicago »
Robert A. Dahl, A Preface to Democratic Theory
The University of Chicago Press, 1956)
,
p. 137.
26
pluralist commitment to political stability. Frus-
trations motivating the formation of new interest groups
may threaten the well-being of the system if their ac-
tivities are not channeled into the orderly political
process. Dahl notes that "a group excluded from the
normal political arena by prohibitions against normal
political activity” may violently pursue its goals. 16
Despite the necessity for the system to permit
broad group participation, not all interest groups
actually compete to shape public policy. Only
legitimate" ones, or "those whose activity is accepted
as right and proper by a preponderant portion of the
active, may participate. During the 1950's, the
Communist Party, for example, was excluded because of
its illegitimacy. 17
Even some legitimate groups are politically in-
active. This minimizes their political influence. 18
Pluralist systems cannot exist without a high
degree of group self-control. Each group's claims must
be tempered by tolerance for the claims of others. Once
a decision has been made by the proper authorities, all
groups must be willing to abide by it. 19
p. 138. 17 Ibid . l8 Ibid.
1
9
Schumpeter, op. cit .. p. 294.
2 ?
The pluralist system cannot survive when all
issues are open to question. 20 Even where national
habits of tolerance for the demands of others have de-
veloped. the system may break down if fundamental
principles rather than technical questions about how to
translate them into policy come under debate. Compro-
mise is easier on technical matters than on the most
basic principles.
From these postulated prerequisites we may de-
rive further expectations about the politics of the
bracero program. We would anticipate that a great
variety of political interest groups had at least some
impact on policy. However, less legitimate groups
should have had less influence. Farm organizations,
which were the major supporters of the bracero program,
had been fully legitimate throughout the nation* s history.
Their status should have maximized their influence. Among
the leading critics of the Mexican labor system was
organized labor. Historically, it had been less legiti-
mate than farm interests. In 1951, Truman wrote that
it is only within recent years that labor organizations
have been able to expect a hearing from most government
20
Ibid. 9 p. 291.
28
officials.
"
2l
or many years, critics of the bracero program
were weakened by the fact that many of their most likely
allies failed to meet the pluralist prerequisite of
political activity. Although farm workers were the most
threatened domestic interest, they were one of the most
unorganized and inactive employee groups in American
soc iety. 22
The pluralist model leads to the expectation that
the demands of bracero-users and their political allies
would be moderate and that they would be compatible with
the interests of American farm workers.
Finally, as we shall see in later chapters, debate
over the bracero program was almost always limited to
such technical matters as how it should be administered
and whether it should be reformed or terminated. It
never touched on such fundamental principles as the
desirability of capitalism and democracy.
The, national interest and the moral implication*
ofjLaw. There are many different views about the ulti-
mate purpose of politics. Traditional American thought
21
Truman, op. cit
.
,
p. 265.
22
.
For example, see Harry Schwartz
Labor in the United States (New York: C
University Press, 1945 ), pp. 90-101.
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has been strongly influenced hv +-w Q-Luence by the proposition that the
aim of democratic politics is the realization of a
national interest transcending narrow individual and
group interests.
Pluralists have sharply challenged this idea. In
only a very narrow sense could they be said to accept the
idea of a national interest at all. Their pursuit of
political stability and harmony among organized groups
seems to qualify until it is realized that these are
secondary goals whose only purpose is to enhance group
interests. For pluralists there is no national interest
tranocending the outcome of the group struggle. 2 ^
Interests cannot be objectively ranked "for when men's
desires and interests are at stake, one man's opinions
are as good as another's, one man's interests as legiti-
mate as any other’s.'"' 4 Consequently, in group theory,
the pursuit of self-interest is no longer forbidden. It
is accepted as part of human nature, and it is the only
force to which democratic governments should be respon-
sive. Of course, it should be kept in mind that one's
self-interest is to be pursued in accordance with the
23
_
Wilfred Binkley and Malcolm Moos, A Grammar
.21 Ame r ican Politics (New York} Alfred
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John G * Llvingston and Robert G. Thompson,
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New York: The
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rules of the game. One who pursues selfish goals out-
side the rules commits the sin of denying others the
right to seek their own selfish goals on equal terms.
Pluralists refuse to consider the broad moral
implications of public policy. 25 They are essentially
Social Darwinists. 26 The system is most responsive to
the demands of the powerful and that is as it should
be. 2 7
The refusal of pluralists to evaluate public
policy in terms of the national interest or to assess
its moral implications means that the model cannot
serve as the basis for any critique of the bracero
program. If the Mexican labor system displaced American
farm workers and brought hardships to their families,
the pluralist would see nothing immoral about it. After
all, in a pluralist system, no group has a moral right
to victory. Policy victories are won by the successful
25Lowi, op. cit .. p. x.
2 6Myron Q. Hale, "The Cosmology of Arthur F.
Bentley," The Bias of Pluralism
, ed. William E. Connolly(New York: Atherton Press, 1969), 36.
27
Latham, op . cit .. p. 36.
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I do not agree with pluralists on this point.
I chose to use the pluralist model not because I believe
that public policies have no moral implications but
because it contains various assumptions which provide
useful descriptions of how the political process
apparently works.
31
exerc ise of power
.
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6 P luralist view of gover-nmpnt The more ex _
treme pluralist statements suggest that the main function
of government is to ratify the dominance of stronger
groups over weaker ones. This view is illustrated by
Latham's famous statement about the function of
legislatures j
The legislature referees the group struggle
^Jlfles the victories of the successful coalitionsand records the terms of the surrenders, compromisesand .conquests m the form of statutes. ! . . ?helegislative vote on any issue tends to represent
power^amnri^+h
°f s *ren?th > i.e., the balance of
of vn+inS gwJ
h
?
cont
?
nding groups at the momentot g. What may be called public policy isthe equilibrium reached in this struggle at anygiven moment, and it represents a balance whichthe contending factions or groups constantly
strive to weight in their favor. 2 9 y
Latham does not mean to imply that the legislature
sits completely above the group struggle. While it is
a referee, it is also a participant. It, too, is a group
with its own interests to pursue. 30 The group struggle
which it referees includes those interests.
A more radical aspect of the pluralist model of
government is its premise that law enforcement officials,
no less than legislators, serve as representatives of
29
Latham, op. cit .. pp. 35-36.
3 ° Ibid .
, p. 37.
32
group interests. The traditional view that law enforce-
ment involves nothing more than "personal honesty on
the part of the executive and strict adherence to the
letter of the law" is said to be seriously misleading
.
31
Even "if „e take the President in 'routine- work of
administration, we still’ ii find him representing interest
groups ." 32 According to David Trumans
Winning a major party nomination and a president;,!election rests upon building and operating anorganization of local and State elites thatrepresent or are supplemented by a Variety of
Part
10
tacii
n
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reSt™ s
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E *
u 1 J overt
* m his reaching the WhiteHou^e, these party cliques and interest groups11 enjoy privileged access to the president
. 33
When pluralists say that the executive branch and
other units of government represent interest groups,
they do not mean to imply that all officials of that
unit represent the same interests. Factions develop
within Congress, legislative committees, and the execu-
tive branch. This increases the likelihood that a
particular set of interests will find at least some
government officials who will be receptive to their
demands, ior instance, some congressional committees
, ^
Arthur F. Bentley, The Process of Government(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press ofHarvard University Press, 1967 ), p. 359.
32
'Ibid.
33Truman, op. cit .. pp. 399-400.
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tend to be pro-labor while others are tore reoeptive to
business interests. 3 One department of the national
government may be more reoeptive to farm labor interests
while another is more sympathetio to wealthy growers
-om this brief outline of the pluralilt view,
government, the following patterns and hypotheses as
regards the bracero program are suggested. Braoero
legislation will probably include concessions to a variety
of interests. Underlying the congressional decision to
terminate the program will likely be important shifts in
the characteristics of groups supporting and opposing
the use of Mexican labor. Once Congress has enacted
bracero legislation, competing groups will not cease
political activity. They will shift their demands to
the executive branch to acquire favorable administration
of the law. Both sides will enjoy favorable access to
certain officials within both the executive and
legislative branches.
The relation of government officials to the
Eeo^le. As the ordinary person, government officials
are motivated by self-interest. Their goal is election
and re-election. It is achieved by representing the
interests of groups powerful enough to defeat them.
34Latham, op. cit
.
,
P- 47.
34
Traditional American thought has idealized the
leader willing to sacrifice his position in defense of
his principles. Pluralists reject this type of leader-
ship. The leader who does not worry about his political
future cannot be restrained by the electorate. 35
The power of the electorate to restrain officials
should not be confused with the power to dictate policy
decisions to them. According to Schumpeteri
Voters do not decide issues. ... in all normal
SK: with the candidal
fine themselves to accepting' thto bW to
C °n\preference to others or refusing to accept it. 3 ^
Robert Dahl has also paid particular attention
to the relationship between the government and the
people in pluralist systems. He claims that the out-
come of an election reveals little more than "the first
preferences of some citizens among the candidates
standing for office." 37 For several reasons, the
winning candidates cannot be assumed to have been given
a mandate to enact specific policies. First, many of
their votes will have come from persons indifferent to
the issues. Secondly, citizens who disagree on the
35 •Livingston and Thompson, op. cit .. p. 116.
360
ochumpeter, op. cit
.. p. 282.
3 ?Dahl, op. cit
.. p. 125 ,
35
issues often support the same candidate. 38 Thirdly
candidates typically fail to take a clear position on
controversial matters. 39
It thus becomes clear' +v> 0 +rear that the concept of
"majority rule" has little relevance to the pluralist
model. Dahl has written that most policies are
"determined by the efforts of relatively small but
relatively active minorities." These are political
interest groups.^0
These pluralist postulates lead, once again.
to the expectation that bracero policy will have been
predominantly shaped by a limited number of particularly
active and interested groups.
group correlates of Because ^
Pluralist model assigns interest groups the central role
m policy making, it is necessary to briefly consider
why some groups are powerful and others are not.
As noted earlier in this chapter, even unorganized
interests will have an impact on public policy. However,
the pluralist model assigns them minimal influence. To
maximize power, it is essential for interests to organize.
38
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Truman claims that "organization is presumptive
evidence of strength in the short run." 41 The mere
fact of organization means that the group is charac-
terized by a number of politically relevant strengths.
Truman notes that a prerequisite of organization is at
least a minimal level of cohesion. 42 and that "cohesion
in turn ... is a crucial determinant of the effective-
ness with which the group may assert its claims." 43
Truman observes that organization further pre-
supposes some degree of permanence or at least an
expectation of it. 44 This means +s=+ „„„ . .ms that organized interests
enjoy the advantage of planning long-term strategy and
developing useful political skills in the meantime.
Finally, Truman notes that organization pre-
supposes acceptance of a division of labor by the group's
members. This makes it easier for leaders to develop
politically necessary knowledge and skills.
Although organization is an important correlate
of group power, it is only the beginning. Even among
organized groups, political influence will vary. More
will go to those with large memberships, adequate
4l Truman, op. cit
.. p. n 4 ,
42
Ibid
.
, pp. 112-13
^4
Ibid
.
,
p. 113. ^5 Ibid.
4l
Ibid
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,
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finances, and the most skillful leaders.
^
Government officials will be most receptive to
the demands of high-status groups. 4? To be sought as
an ally by such organizations is likely to flatter the
Official's ego. Also, the fact that officials them-
selves come from higher class backgrounds means that
th„.ir values, manners, and preconceptions" will pre-
dispose them to favor the higher status interest
48groups
.
Groups will have greater political power if
they are able to form coalitions with other powerful
49 .groups
, if their goals are consistent with widely
shared social values, 50 if they are self-confident,
and if their goals are pursued vigorously
.
For an interest group to wield substantial
political influence, it must achieve "access to one or
more key points of decision in the government."-^ 2 To
have access means that government officials will at
46
48
50
Ibid., pp. 269-70, 507. 4 7 Ibid
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51 Ibid.
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least give the group's position a hearing. The most
avorahle access occurs when officials are sympathetic
to the position of the group.
well
AC ' SSS 13 Ukely t0 bS greater if ^e group ranks
on a 1 of the group correlates of political power
already discussed. That is to say that officials are
generally more accessible to interests which are
organized, to groups with large memberships, to high-
status groups, etc.
A group's access to officials is also affected
biases which are buil+c nt into the structure of govern-
ment. According to Truman:
ments fs not always wha t°i t^dls
tUrab arranSe -
these formalities
y
are rarely Sa^}»cap some efforts and favor others ' fy han<Jl -
by sue h°arrangements^tha
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to influence key points of decCfon^n'do^rs.SS
An example of structural bias is the malapportion-
ment of the House of Representatives which lasted until
the mid-1960's> As the nation had^ increasingly
urban and metropolitan, farm area representation had not
decreased proportionately. 55 As we shall see in later
Hid., p. 322. ^ Ibid
.
. p. 323.
m, t • ^
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chapters, greatest support for the hracero program, came
from rural congressmen. Failure to reapportion kept
thexr numbers high and the „ouse especiaUy reoeptlve ^
the demands of Mexican labor employers. Beginning in
1962. a series of Supreme Court rulings requiring
reapportionment decreased this structural bias. 56
Truman notes that a similar bias favoring grower
interests is also found in the Senate. Rural areas are
favored by the constitutional provision that each state
be represented equally regardless of population.
Truman writes:
This has allowed agricultural interest frrour^ +ho +
points
6
of""ace e ss ^in”the c
hin
iy Populated States more
Shose me^r^eTo^enS I ^op^s
oiLiCs -
;shas been over the years. It is obvious? moreover
FeIeratfon
UP
wh?oh
aS the Araerica" ^rm Bureau
’
f d i , ic can cover a great m^nv r'nv>cT +
any SSe^^icTIf tha"^™
measure ^of cohesion. 5?
°an a° hleVe a satisfactory
As we shall see in later chapters, greatest
opposition to the bracero program came from urban based
interest groups whereas sugar beet interests and the
American Farm Bureau were two of its most avid supporters.
Ibid.
, pp. 99-104.
57Truman, op. cit
.
,
pp. 322-23.
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A third structural bias in Congress is found in
the committee system. Because, with rare exceptions. 58
proposed legislation must first be cleared by committees . 59
access to them is crucial. Refusal of the committee to
report out" a bill almost always kills it. Although
bracero legislation might have been assigned to the labor
committees of each house, it was assigned to the more
conservative agriculture committees. Consisting heavily
of farm state, pro-grower congressmen, the agriculture
committees were much more sympathetic to the demands of
pro-bracero groups than to reform interests. 60
While the structural bias in Congress increases
its accessibility to rural interests, the electoral
college system makes the President heavily dependent on
urban interests. 61 Consequently, we would expect grower
supported policies such as the bracero program to have
received more support from Congress than from the
President. While this was not inevitably the case,
For some of
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the Mexican labor system lost the effective support of
the executive branch before a majority of Congress
turned against it.
Some Problems with the Pluralist Model
The purpose of this section is to outline several
of the most common criticisms of pluralism. Later in
this dissertation, we shall find that some of these seem
to provide more adequate explanations of certain aspects
of the bracero program than does the pluralist model.
The pluralist system is essentially corporativist.
That is to say that government regularly delegates
important legal powers to private groups. Although
pluralists idealize this decentralization of policy-
making and equate it with grass-roots democracy, critics
such as Theodore Lowi deplore it. They charge that in
the interest of reducing conflict, government abdicates
its responsibility and permits powerful groups to more
or less have their way on matters about which they feel
strongly. Although Americans have always feared that
government would expropriate the private domain, Lowi
charges that what has really occurred is "private
expropriation of public authority," ^ the "parceling
62 tLowi, op. cit .. p. 102.
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out to private parties the power to make pub i ic policyt „6 3
'the gift of sovereignty of private satrapies." 6^
This domination of government by special interests
is nowhere better illustrated than by the committee
system in Congress. Committee members typically repre-
sent constituencies with particularly intense interests
in bills assigned to their committee. Lowi notes, for
instance, that "throughout the 1950’s
. . . Victor
Anfuso of Brooklyn was the only member of the House
Committee on Agriculture from a non- farm constituency.
”
6 5
Because committees have almost the power of life-and-
death over legislation, farm-bloc congressmen really
write the nation's agriculture laws. For example, not
until the 1960's did the full Congress add any signifi-
cant amendments to bracero legislation reported out of
the agriculture committees.
Critics of pluralism deplore this process on the
grounds that it abandons the national interest. Agri-
cultural legislation affects such non-agricultural matters
as the nation's foreign policy, tax levels, and unemploy-
ment. Turning farm legislation over to farm state
congressmen means that these broader interests are likely
63 Ibid.
,
p. 58. 64Ibid
.
.
p. 289. 65 Ibid
.
,
p. 112 .
43
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‘ T^e most immediate concern of com-
mittee members is to cleaqpp se the P ower f’uI interest groups
of thexr constituency because rural congressmen
recruxted by and owe their elections to’' the best
organized farm interests
.
66
Policy-making is further
"parceled out to the
most interested parties" 6? by statutes delegatlng
power to non-congressional bodies. Lowi acknowledges
that "the practice of delegation itself can hardly be
criticized ,” 68 becauspB e there are certain tasks which
the legislature cannot practically undertake. 6? How-
ever, the practxce xs now "pathological" because it
has come "to be considered a good thing in itself,"
often giving power to bureaucrats
"without guides,
checks, safeguards ."? 0 From administrators such as
the Secretary of Agriculture and the Labor Secretary,
the broad delegation of power drains to the best
organxzed groups
,
1 because "the administrators are
accountable primarily to the groups, only secondarily
to the President or Congress as institutions ."? 2
66
68
72
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, p. 124. 6? Ibid.
, d. 123.
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This drainage of legal power to private groups
may be illustrated by various aspects of the bracero
program’s administration. For instance, as discussed in
later chapters, legislation provided that braceros could
be imported only in the event of a domestic farm labor
shortage. But for years the Labor Department tended to
rubber-stamp grower claims of labor shortages without
making its own independent determination
.
73
What is wrong with such broad delegation of legal
decision-making power to private groups? Lowi charges
that "besides making conflict-of-interest a principle
of government rather than a criminal act, participatory
programs shut out the public ." 74 Secondly, he claims
that broad delegations of legal power to private groups
cause "the atrophy of institutions of popular control"
because public officials are no longer in charge. 7 ^
Critics of pluralism dispute the claim that
there is no public interest transcending narrow group
goals. Schattschneider defines it as "general or
common interests shared by all or by substantially all
73N. Ray Gilmore and Gladys W. Gilmore, "The
J^acero in California," Pacific Historical Review .
XXXII (August, 1963), 2703
74Lowi, op. cit .. p. 86 . 7 ^Ibid
.
76Baskin, op. cit
.. pp. 175- 76 .
members of the community." He nffpr>cy rte oi fers as an example
"the common interest in national survival." 7 ? The
Structure of pluralist systems, however, minimises the
likelihood that public policy will be consistent with
the national interest. The reason is that they dele-
gate legal power to the groups whose members are most
likely to benefit personally and directly from the
policies which emerge. Farmers, for example, could not
he expected to impartially develop farm policies maxi-
mally consistent with the national interest. Too many
of their narrow interests are at stake. Almost all
non-farm groups are denied significant influence on
agriculture policy. Yet the less direct interest that
a group has in agriculture, the more impartial it
could be.
Contrary to the pluralist model, some groups
organize around interests which will not personally
benefit their members. According to Brian Barry:
People may want policies other than those calculated
Ml^?S?d th61^ °PP°rtunities—hence the possi-l ity of disinterested action'.
. . . Similarlva man may definitely not want a policy which will'
th°inbf?h
hf + a°PP0^Unities (perh^ s because h*
1^ 1
t at the policy is unfair and that othersshould get the increase instead ). 78
77
to
^ * Schattschne ider
,
The Semi-Sovere i p-n
— -°P le Holt, Rinehart andTinston, 196o),^p. 23 .
7 8Brian Barry, "The Public Interest," ed. WilliamE. Connolly, op. cit .. p. 164.
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These more detached groups are excluded from any
predominant role in policy making in the pluralist
system precisely because they are more impartial. To
recapitulate, the basic assumption of pluralism is that
power in a particular policy area should be delegated
to those powerful groups with the most immediate and
personal interest in the policy outcome.
This arrangement deprives public officials of
meaningful power. Yet. one of their most important
purposes should be to ruard thP + ^6 a e national interest from
infringement by narrow, special interests. In the
pluralist model, they reinforce the position of the
privileged by blessing it with "the symbolism of
the state.
Critics of pluralism claim that it exaggerates
the scope of interests to which the political system is
responsive. Although pluralists explicitly reject the
elitist model, their critics charge them with re-
establishing a type of elitism under a different name,
while insisting that power is widely dispersed.
Critics claim that the pluralist model exaggerates
the extent to which interests are in fact organized.
Schattschneider notes that "the range of organized,
79Lowi, op. cit
.. pp. 8?-88.
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identifiable, known ground ic.S Ups 13 amazingly narrow, there13 n° thlng rem° te1^ universal about it. "80 Purther_
already advantaged interests are much more
frequently organized than the less advantaged. For
example
, Schattschneider claims that "the business
community is by a wide margin the most highly organized
society. Membership in voluntary organi-
zations is far more common for upper status people.'82
Prosperous farmers are more likely than low income ones
to belong to growers' organizations
.
8 3 Farm laborers
are much less likely than farmers to belong to organi-
zations. * Based on these and similar findings.
Schattschneider concludes:
the most significant
P
aspect"°of ^
that U °°^als
flaw in the pluraSst heaven is Thechorus sin^s with _+ 1S ^a t the heavenly
Probably^outlS upper-dass accent.
V
get into the pressure system^!
people oannot
Although some pluralists acknowledge this upper
class bias, they pay little attention to its implications
for the overall distribution of political power. They
80
8l
84
i
schattschneider, op. cit .. p. 30,
Ibid- 82IMd.. p. 32. 8 3 Ibid ,. p . 33
Ibid., pp. 33-34. 85 lbid. ( p. 35.
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attempt to solve the problem through the proposition
that organized interests will speak for unorganized ones
and represent them in the political arena. Thus. Truman
quotes V. o. Key to the effect that Mississippi planters
"speak for their Negroes." 8* Critics of pluralism
question the extent to which the unorganized are meaning-
fully represented by the organized. For example,
Connolly suggests that unorganized blue collar workers
are only marginally
"represented" by labor unions. 8 ?
It is not only academic pluralists who exaggerate
the representativeness of organized groups. Government
falls into the same trap, and this further disadvantages
the unorganized. Connolly charges, for instance, that
the national government treats the American Farm Bureau
Federation as if it speaks for farmers in general. 88
Yet, the Federation represents mostly wealthy farmers and
is one of the most conservative of all farm organizations
in the United States. By accepting it as the spokesman
for farmers, the government isolates itself from the
viewpoint of less wealthy farmers.
86
87
,
Truman, op, cit
.. p. 511,
Theory " ed^niforr
G
Snn° lly
*
"
The Challenge to Pluralistin , d. W lliam E. Connolly, op. cit
.. p. 16.
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Ibid.
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several of the preceding considerations leadCrX*“" t0 the ° 0nClUSl0
" ** Pluralist m0del hasProfoundly conservative implications, 89 that
extent to which the system fails to he responsive
thp
P °Ple * In thlS UnresP°nsiveness of the system,
pl
1CS 366 ^ aUenati0n that
-t recognized hyuralist claims of almost universal r • +
system.? 0
commitment to that
Theoretical Application
The present chapter has been devoted to a loose
discussion of the main tenets of pluralism and its
critics. Chapters III-VI turn to a case study of the
bracero program’s initiation, operation, termination, and
political aftermath. The scope and purpose of this
dissertation preclude any attempt to systematically re-
late all of the preceding pluralist tenets to the
Mexican labor system. Consequently, Chapter VII dis-
cusses the highlights of these developments in terms of
some of the most relevant propositions outlined in the
present chapter. These propositions are summarised below.
^
m°St fundamental assumption of the pluralist
89 .
I^id-
.
pp. 18-19.
90. .bowl, pp. Clt,. pp. 291 - 92 .
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-del is that public policy is shaped by competinginterest groups. Consequently. Chapter VII is heavlly
oriented toward group political activity. Particular
attention is paid to the assumption that public policy
will represent concessions to groups with the greatest
interest in that policy.
The pluralist model postulates certain group
correlates of political power. Eight have been outlined
earlier in this chapter. They have to do with member-
ohip size, organization, the ability to build coalitions,
access to government, prestige, the consistency of group
goals with broad social values, self-confidence, and the
vigorous pursuit of political goals. The bulk of
Chapter VII is devoted to assessing the power of groups
opposing and supporting the bracero program in terms
of these power-related group characteristics. Grower ad-
vantages on these correlates should be useful for
explaining initiation and continuation of the bracero
program. If the pluralist model really explains the
demise of the program, then we should expect the loss of
grower advantages on these correlates during the early
1960-s and a simultaneous change in the group characteris-
tics of reform forces. These correlates should also be
useful for explaining the failure to re-institute a
51
post- 1964 bracero program.
The growing advantage of reform groups on these
correlates of influence during the early 196o . s tends to
vindicate the pluralist proposition of countervailing
Power. The weaker coalition did grow and gain political
power. It eventually succeeded in reversing a long-
established public policy.
Chapter VII considers the pluralist assumption
that different units of government will not be equally
accessible to competing interest groups. The relevance
of this proposition is suggested by previous studies of
the bracero program which have found the executive branch
more sympathetic to reformers snHx a d Congress more attuned
to grower interests.
Chapter VII also turns attention to the pluralist
assumption that the administration of statutory law is
subject to group influence. If iaw is important because
of what it does rather than how it reads, it is essential
that this post-congressional stage be considered. The
traditional and widespread use of wetback labor should
alert us to the fact that statutory victories for reform
forces may be less important than whose interests are
accomodated by administrators of the law.
Chapter VII also returns to the critics of pluralism.
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Their position on seven pluralist propositions is
specifically applied to selected aspects of the Mexican
labor system. The pluralist assumptions, summarised
below, maintain that;
1.
No interest groups are capable of disinterested
action.
2. The actions of public officials can be com-
pletely explained in terms of group dynamics.
3. Powerful interest groups will voluntarily
moderate their claims.
4. oenously threatened interests will organize.
5. Unorganized interests will be adequately
represented by those that are organized.
6. Compromises written into public policy as
concessions to a variety of groups will be meaningful.
7* Ihe pluralist system's responsiveness to
unorganized interests maintains their commitment to it.
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CHAPTER ij
j
PRE-1942 MEXICAN LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES
1
Introduction
Mexico has long furnished cheap labor for the
American Southwest. However, popular and scholarly
interest in this labor supply has been uneven. Peaks of
interest have coincided with such dramatic developments
as crackdowns on illegal Mexican workers and the estab-
lishment of the bracero program during World War XI.
Most of the long history of Mexican labor in the United
States is more ordinary and has been less studied.
Studies of post-1941 Mexican labor in the United
States have generally paid little attention to its his-
torical antecedents. One result is that the government
programs which furnished braceros to American farmers
from 1942 until l 964 have sometimes been portrayed as
more innovative than they were. In fact, rather than
1
A slightly different version of this chantpr
on
S
it
S
at that^staee r°
r offe
£
inS he lpful suggestions
and Dr. D^n ^ fe^cV ^Sca^Lab
? r * b
.
e:
fore World War II," The Journal nf
__
exican
__
American History
. II (Spring, 1972), 122-42.
54
providing a new source of labor, they merely formalized
an old one. Also, the basic arguments of both advocates
and opponents of Mexican labor were introduced long ago.
Many of the political alignments were established early
m this century and have been remarkably stable.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an
historical overview of the problem during the pre-
mi era from a predominantly political perspective.
Gaps in the literature include not only historical
vacuums, but available studies have not often directed
attention to the political dynamics which have shaped
the course of Mexican labor in the United States.
The Nineteenth Century
Because little Mexican labor entered the United
States during the nineteenth century, it did not become
an important political issue here. Mexico was
essentially a feudalistic society. Even under the Dfaz
regime with its veneer of industrialization and moderni-
zation, the masses remained very traditional and
dominated by feudal bonds. As late as 1900, the Mexican
population remained overwhelmingly rural, landless, and
locked in debt peonage on the haciendas. 2
Charles C.
Modernity (New York
p. 202.
Cumberland, Mexicot The Struggle for
j Oxford University Press, 1968),
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Far from wanting to export labor, a number of
Official surveys concluded that Mexico was suffering
from a labor shortage. 3 Unlike American farmers,
Mexican landowners mechanized little and the demand for
farm labor remained high. U Big farmers complained that
rural Mexicans were migrating to the cities and
leaving the farms short-handed. 5 The Mexican Government
made considerable effort to import agricultural workers,
and a system of Chinese contract labor was established. 6
Conditions in the United States during the nine-
teenth century did not favor large movements of Mexican
labor. Industries and farms were heavily dependent
upon generally ample supplies of European and Asian
workers, 7 and Mexican workers were simply not needed in
large numbers. Also, unpacified Indian tribes in the
borderlands discouraged population movements.^
Despite the barriers in both Mexico and the
United States, some Mexican laborers entered the United
States before the turn of the century. The post-
dates
1966 ),
Cliffs:
3Ibid*. p. 194. 4Ibid .
. p. 195.
5 Ibid., p. 194. 6 Ibid
.
. p. 197.
7Leo Grebler
,
Mexican Immigration to the United(Los Angeles: University of California Press,
pp. 19-21.
Q
Joan W. Moore, Mexican-Americans (Englewood
Prentice-Hall, 1970 ), pp. 16, 39.
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' rapid industrialization north of the border
heightened the contrast between the poor southern
neighbor and the increasingly wealthy United States.
Well before the end of the nineteenth century, some
southwestern farms had been transformed into large-scale
enterprises with a demand for large pools of cheap
seasonal labor which was not always supplied by
European and Asian immigration. 9 A number of dramatic
developments dating from before the turn of the century
opened up the arid Southwest to big, highly productive
farms. Mechanization was introduced early, and marked
progress in irrigation dates from around 1885. Vast
eastern markets were opened through a combination of
cross-continental railroads and new methods of preserving
fruits and vegetables. 10
Developing simultaneously with this gradual
opening of economic opportunities in the southwestern
United States were improvements in Mexican transportation.
Dfaz prided himself on railroad construction, and by
1884 one could travel by train from Mexico City to
Chicago. 11
^Carey McWilliams
Little-Brown, 1939 ), pp.
Factories in the Field (Boston:
b9^5U
10
Ibid
.
, pp . 60-63
•
li
Cumberland, op . c it
.
.
p. 215.
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For most of the nineteenth century, American immi-
gration laws posed no barrier at all to the Mexican
immigrant. Some were passed toward the century's end,
but they were scarcely enforced
.
12
However, nineteenth
century developments brought only a trickle of Mexicans.
The importance of those developments was that they were
laying the foundation for a massive entry of Mexican
laborers during the twentieth century.
Early Twentieth Century
By about 1900, the growth of agricultural enter-
prises and railroad construction in the Southwest was
even more dramatic, and with this expansion came a
pressing need for low-paid, unskilled migrant workers
.
13
The formerly abundant supply of Asian laborers was
shrinking as a result of the Chinese Exclusion Act of
1882
* and increasing numbers of Mexicans filled the
growing vacuum. During the first decade of the twentieth
century, some 24,000 Mexicans entered the United States
as immigrants, while numerous others came for temporary
wortv. Most stuck close to the border, harvesting, cul-
tivating, and packing agricultural products, working for
12 Grebler, op. cit .. p. 19 .
13Maldwyn Allen Jones, American Immigration(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, i 960 ), p~] 290 .
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the railroads and the mining companies, or doing other
unskilled work. 1 ^
Sometimes the Mexicans entered the United States
on their own initiative, but southwestern farmers, rail-
roads, and other economic interests often recruited di-
ly in Mexico. Although the pay was better than in
Mexico, the Mexicans were often ill-treated. Wage
promises were not always kept. Even when paid, the
earnings were frequently too little to support the fami-
lies which had come along. This encouraged job-shifting,
a pattern of yearly recruitment in Mexico, and an
expansion of the Mexican population in the American
Southwest. 1 -5
Many of the Mexican laborers entering in these
years did so illegally, and various economic interests
encouraged violation of the immigration laws which
Congress had been pressured to pass before 1900.
Throughout much of the nineteenth century, organized labor
had led the fight to protect American workers from
foreign competition. 1 ^
14Grebler, op. cit .. p. 19.
f
^Pauline R. Kibbe, "The American Standard--
1 °r A11 Americans, Common Ground
. X (Autumn, 1949), 21.
T .
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congress responded to these pressures
1885 the Alien Contract Labn t
^
tation of , •
Whi° h banned the
altens under work contracts 17 q
•
P
x
* Six years laterCongress prohibited immigration i
..
in response to adver-
lsements promising work in the United states «
„ow_
these laws were little more than formalities. Assoon as the demand for substantial Mexican labor developed
“ Sarly yearS °f thS ^*-th century, the restric-ts laws were violated as agents for big farmers and
railroads traveled to Mexico and recruited cheap labor,
ongress and the immigration authorities paid little
attention, and their inaction had the effect, whether in-
tended or not, of establishing a policy through which
cheap Mexican labor was furnished to southwestern eco-
nomic interests.
Few demands were made on the government to enforce
the immigration laws at the Mexican border. Although un-
popular and wielding little political power, organized
labor took the main initiative. By 1910, substantial
numbers of Mexicans were working in the United States,
and labor leaders saw them as a growing threat to native
Bracero in California
r
" Pacific^ +’ ? ll l?ore >
" The
XXXII (August, 1963)
,
26rr
Histories 1 Review,
l8Grebler, op. cit .. D4-D6.
6o
In that year, the convention of the Texas State
Federation of Labor unanimously passed a resolution
charging that the immigration authorities were indiffer-
ently permitting "wholesale admission" of Mexicans who
"are displacing
. . . citizen labor at less than
living wages.
similar resolutions and protests continued to
come from labor unions, but they had little effect on
public policy. One reason was that public opinion con-
cerning immigration had consistently been oriented
toward the massive population movement from Europe and
Asia while the pre-1900 trickle of Mexicans across the
southern border had been all but ignored. Once Mexican
entry gained momentum, public opinion was slow to respond
and the union viewpoint remained very much a minority one
As noted in Chapter II, pluralists claim that the
prestige of an interest group affects its influence on
public policy. Farmers enjoyed an excellent public
image. Although the image of the railroads was less en-
viable, it was widely recognized that they were playing
a vital role in opening up the nation. Powerful economic
1
9
Art Leibson, "The Wetback Invasion," Common
Ground
, X (Autumn, 1949), 12.
20
David B. Truman, The Governmental Process
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962), p. 506.
6l
interests such as these encouraged the notion that the
use Of Mexican labor was an essential element of the
American employer's freedom to run hi- ent»x n s enterprise free
of government interference. But their infixn influence was notlimited to public opinion. These economic interests
were also well represented at all levels of government.
On the other hand, labor unions had not succeeded
" thr°Wing °ff thSir image
, and their political
power remained markedly limited. The idea that unions
were foreign inventions and threatened the American way
of life was deeply rooted in United States history. From
time to time union members had experimented with such
ideologies as socialism, anarchism, and communism.
Atypical as these members were, such occasional calls for
abolition of the wage system and capitalism left a bad
public image in the increasingly capitalistic society.
Although unions such as the American Federation of Labor
made a sustained effort to disassociate themselves from
such anti-capitalist rhetoric, public opinion was slow to
change
. Consequently, when organized labor sought to
influence public policy toward the use of Mexican laborers,
it was not on an equal footing with such preferred
interests as the farmers and railroads.
^
already slim chance for limiting Mexican labor
21
126-49.
Beard, op,, cit., pp. 52 -53 , 85 , 107, 116-18,
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was diminished even more during the second decade of
this century. Far-reaching, complementary changes in
Mexico and the United States brought a dramatic increase
in Mexican entry. The vast destruction of Mexico's
Revolution, beginning in 1910, burst many of the feudal
bonds and tens of thousands of Mexicans fled the horror
and insecurity of war for the United States. 22
Traditional sources of cheap labor for the United
began to dry up. Japanese immigration had been
cut off in 1907. The outbreak of World War I drastically
curtailed the European immigration on which the American
economy had been so dependent.
^
As foreign labor supplies shrank, so did the
supply Of native labor available for low-paying jobs.
The marked curtailment of immigration opened more indus-
trial jobs to Americans. Many left the farms for the
better pay, more favorable working conditions, and the
security of city jobs, especially those in the booming,
new defense industries. At the very time the labor pool
was shrinking, national demands for farm productivity
was growing by leaps and bounds. Crop acreage was in-
creased dramatically to meet the growing food needs of
22
Cumberland, op. cit .. p. 245.
2?
Grebler, op . cit .. p. 21
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the friendly European countries involved in the war. 24
The Bracero Program of World War I
The obvious source of additional labor for the
Southwest was revolution-ravaged Mexico. Until the
national government arrived at a special war-time policy
regarding Mexican labor, the employer faced three options.
irst. he could bring Mexicans in legally. „owever, as
already noted, immigration laws had grown increasingly
nctive. In 190?, Congress had banned the entry of
transients
"detrimental to labor conditions" in this
country. Exclusionist sentiment had grown rapidly
during the early years of the twentieth century,
reaching a climax with the outbreak of World War I.
Although the growing distrust of foreigners had been
directed mostly toward Europeans and Asians, it had re-
sulted in new, restrictive immigration laws which made
the legal entry of Mexican labor much more difficult. The
191? Immigration Act had been the most restrictive in
American history. 26 The head tax increase from $4.00 to
$8.00 had probably been enough to deter thousands of
24
May 19. 1 917. **§7 ill*
TlrneS
‘ Af>ril 3°’ 1917
’ P* 14 and
25Gilmore and Gilmore, op. cit.. n.
26 '
U,S,
» Statutes at LargP. XXXIX, Part 1, 874-98.
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poverty-stricken Mexicans fro, legally entering the
United States to seek work. The fact that the contract
labor law prohibiting previous contracts had been re-
newed made the head tax relatively more burdensome
inasmuch as the Mexican paying it would still have no
assurance of work in the United States. Another
barrier to obtaining legal Mexican labor had been the
provision of the 1917 act barring illiterates from
the United States.^
A second alternative was to evade the substantial
legal barriers altogether by using illegal Mexican immi-
grants. Although their docility and willingness to work
for extremely low wages made them attractive to some em
ployers, their economic value was diminished by the
absence of any contract binding them to the job. This
was an especially important problem for the farmer be-
cause inadequate labor at peak seasons could bring the
loss of the entire crop. Although illegal Mexicans
were employed extensively during the war, this weakness
encouraged some employers to seek a legal labor supply.
The third option was to seek some flexibility in
the rigid laws then on the books. It is not surprising
that would-be users of Mexican labor were successful in
2 ? Ibid.
,
pp. 875-76.
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getting the desired legal changes
. After all> the goyern_
ent had done little to enforce the immigration laws at
the Mexican border even before the outbreak of war. The
wartime atmosphere brought arguments from top government
officials, as well as farmers, that food production was
no less important to the war effort than were soldiers
and guns. Consequently, warnings of labor shortages
from farmers and other employers met especially sympa-
the tic officials.
The case for Mexican labor was led by sugar beet
growers and the railroads, although it was widely
supported by other western economic interests 28 The
legal loophole was the ninth proviso in Section 3 of
the 1917 Immigration Act which specified that the
Commissioner of Immigration could temporarily admit
otherwise inadmissible aliens. Interested employers
appealed to the Secretary of Labor, W.B. Wilson, to ask
the Commissioner of Immigration to temporarily open this
loophole for Mexican workers to ease the labor shortage.
On May 23. 1917, the Secretary asked the immigration
authorities to ignore the literacy test, the head tax,
and the contract labor requirements of the immigration
laws for necessary Mexican labor. He explained that the
28
Gilmore and Gilmore, op. cit
.
,
p. 268.
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order was intended to solve a labor shortage in the
southwestern states. The Secretary promised a rigidly
delineated and carefully controlled program. The immi-
gration barriers were to be lowered only for Mexicans
who would engage in agricultural work. 2 * The laborers
were to return to Mexico immediately upon completion of
their assigned work in the United States. 30
A new order from Secretary Wilson issued in June.
1918, added railroad section hands and lignite coal
workers to the class of exempt Mexicans. 31 i„ December,
he rescinded all his orders to the immigration authorities,
only to face pressure from sugar beet growers and other
employers calling for unrestricted entry of Mexican labor
Consequently, the orders were re-issued. 32
Unlike during World War II, the American govern-
ment assumed no direct responsibility for recruitment.
Farmers and other employers traveled to Mexico and
recruited their own labor.
^
29New York Times
. May 24, 1917, p# 12.
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31New York Times. June 20, 1918, p. 4.
32Schwartz, op. cit .. pp. 110-11.
33Otey M. Scruggs,
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In Mexico there was no shortage of laborers eager
to leave for the United States. From the revolution-
ravaged economy, many simply headed for the border
without contacts of any kind in the United States. So
many left that concern began to be expressed in Mexico
that her own farms would be under-manned
.
34
Nevertheless, the Mexican government did not
stand m the way of emigration. The Revolution had been
fought in large part against the system of land tenure,
and big farmers did not enjoy the same prestige as did
American farmers in the United States. Also, the exodus
of Mexicans helped relieve the stress on the war-torn
economy, which could not support the population at even
the level of the Diaz era. In July, 1918, it was
announced that the Mexican government was providing
trains for transporting braceros to the American border. 35
The legal routine for obtaining Mexican workers,
although not always followed, was complex and involved
several governmental responsibilities. Because Mexicans
were to be used only for meeting labor shortages, em-
ployers were not free to hire them in unlimited numbers.
The channels established by the Labor Department
34New York Times
. June 6, 191 8, p. li.
35New York Times
. July 20, 1918, p. 11.
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may be illUStrated
the procedures generally
used to obtain far, labor. Farmers customarily formed
associations which channeled Mexican labor to them.
They reported their labor needs to the associations
which conveyed them to the Labor Department. A major
responsibility of the Department was to determine
whether a labor shortage in fact existed and had
prompted the specific requests. However, there is little
evidence that it took this responsibility seriously,
and its verification of labor shortages was apparently
more or less automatic. The Labor Department conveyed
the requests, with its certification, to the immigration
authorities. They then admitted Mexican workers in
numbers limited by the certified requests. 36
Before an employer could bring Mexicans in, he
was required to sign an agreement with the United States
government specifying conditions under which the braceros
could enter for employment with him. He was responsible
for feeding, transporting, and housing the Mexicans,
although these costs could be deducted from wages. 37
Each Mexican entering under the arrangement was
identified and photographed at the border. He was
Sess., 66thC °"S-. 3rd
37Gilmore and Gilmore, op
. c i
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required to confirm his understanding that he was to en-
gage solely in farm work and that violation of the
agreement would be grounds for his return to Mexico. 3 8
To facilitate the worker's return to Mexico at
end the war
’ the Labor Department required that
he invest a portion of his wages in a postal savings
account. The money, with interest, could be claimed by
the worker only as he left the country. 8? Also> ^
association requesting the worker formally accepted
ponsibility for his return to Mexico upon completion
Of his work.^ 0
Although it would be an oversimplification to de-
pict the bracero program as resulting solely from the
interest group struggle between its supporters and
opponents, the underlying interest group pattern is of
some explanatory value. As indicated earlier, powerful,
western economic groups with substantial political power
were major supporters of the Mexican labor system, and
without their demands for the program it would never have
come into being. Among the most important of these groups
were the railroads, coal mines, sugar beet growers, and
38
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39New York Times. June 20, 1918, p. 4.
40
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cotton and fruit farmer^ 4 l nw s. Congressmen such as
Representative Carl Hayden42 and other government
officials represented them well at the highest level
of government. While the major groups and spokesmen
supporting the Mexican labor program were from the West,
southern interests sometimes offered strong support, as
they would do again during World War H. The interests
of the South and West overlapped considerably. Certain
farm areas of the South claimed a labor shortage during
World War [, and farm labor was imported from the
Bahamas. Also, inauguration of the braoero program
for the western states meant that they were less likely
to compete with the South for its shrinking supply of
farm labor.
Opposition to the Mexican labor program was not
long m developing, and it grew throughout the war.
Steamship companies were among the earliest critics,
charging discriminatory application of the immigration
laws. While they were fined for transporting illiterates
to this country, they complained, the American government
4l
r, , V
* ^ Department of Labor, Reports of theDepartment of Labor
f 1918 . 692-93.
^
4554- 55 -
Congressional Record , op, cit .
. pp.
43 U.o., Department of Labor, op , cit .. p. 693.
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welcomed illiterates from Mexico. 44
Grass roots opposition in Mexico apparently de-
veloped from the very beginning. According to the
Secretary of Labor, rumors were widely circulated in
Mexico to the effect that Mexicans were harassed at
the border and mistreated in the United States. 45 in
his address to the opening session of the Mexican
Congress on September 1. 1919. President Carranza ex-
pressed dismay at the mistreatment of Mexican laborers
in the western United States. He voiced particular con-
cern about the alleged mistreatment of Mexicans by
American police. 46 The Mexican government became di-
rectly involved two weeks later when two railroad
section hands, both Mexican nationals, were lynched by
a mob in Pueblo, Colorado.
^
By 1919, organized labor in the United States had
stepped up its attack on immigration, including that
from Mexico. The unions had grown concerned that return-
ing servicemen would be unable to find work. 1*8
44New York Times. July 11, 1917, p . 8.
45New York Times. June 17, 1918, p. 13.
46
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• xth the war came a growing distrust of
oreigners. and there was a marked tendency to see the
emigrant as a threat to "the American way of life .
Fear of disloyalty was widespread, and it was fed hy
occasional violence committed by anarchists and mem-
bers of other extremist grouDS Tn tps. I June, 1919, the
New York Tim^R suggested tha+ ?t immigration might
threaten American "self ny,OP . , .self-preservation.” Although it
went on to recognize that the United Statesx b owed much to
oreign labor, the paper editorialized that "no eco-
nomic or financial consideration has any standing in
comparison with the imperative patriotic need of
guarding against the enemies of order and +h* 0 •uxu t e emissaries
of destruction.
Considerable opposition to foreign labor came
patriotic organizations concerned with keeping
the nation’s population "pure.” In testimony before the
Senate Committee on Immigration in 1920. a spokesman
for the Sons of America charged that the United States
flooded with immigrants, many of whom were illiterate
and could not speak English. This threat to "Americanism."
he warned, "ought not be further enlarged by importation
49New York Times, June 9, 1919, p , 12 .
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fr0m abroad or any other source, whatever may happen to
• • • the big cotton and sugar plantations of the
Southwest. ”-5°
Also opposing the Mexican labor program were per-
sons who charged that American employers took advantage
of the helpless foreign labor. In a heated exchange with
Representative Hayden in 1920. Representative Welty of
Ohio charged that the bracero program violated the con-
stitutional prohibition of slavery.-^ 1
As the war came to an end. justifications for
importing Mexican labor were undermined. Claims of
labor shortages grew less convincing. To a heavily
nationalistic public, concern about jobs for returning
servicemen loomed larger and larger. Formal govern-
mental policy adjusted to the new national mood. On
March 2, 1921. Secretary Wilson rescinded his orders to
the immigration authorities, and the special emergency,
Mexican labor program came to an end.^2
The extent and impact of the bracero program were
considerable. According to government reports, 72,862
pp. 4715-16?*'
Congressional Record, op. cit ..
jl Ibid
.
.
p. 4554.
52
0
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Mexican laborers entered under the special provisions.
The reports further indicate that the Labor Secretary's
cla ims of a carefully controlled program were exaggerated.
By June 30. 1921. only 34.922 of the nationals had been
returned to Mexico while thousands had deserted their
employers and disappeared. 53 Nor was this the only
failure to enforce the law. Evidence indicates that
during the war years, the overwhelming majority of
Mexican immigrants entered illegally. A government
report in 1920 acknowledged the problem and noted that
"for many weeks prior to this report every road leading
from the south into San Antonio ... had on it a
stream of these immigrants, many of them in rags ." 54
It is likely that this Mexican labor had a
seriously adverse impact on native workers. James J.
Davis, Wilson's successor as Labor Secretary, noted in
1920 that files left by his predecessor contained "many
reports
. . . that these Mexicans were crowding American
workmen out of their jobs because they were willing to
take employment at wages which would not permit the worker
53
„
U.S., Congressional Record.
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,
LXX, Part 2, 1177.
54
„
U.S., Congressional Record.
1 st Sess., 19247 LX V, Part 7 , 6476-77
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live on the basis of American standards." 55
The Decade of the Twenties
Mexican immigration during the 1920’s reached un-
precedented levels
. Some 500.000 entered on permanent
visas, and illegal entry was probably much greater.
During the decade the American economy boomed and con-
tinued to offer opportunities for cheap foreign labor.
On the other hand, Mexico’s economy failed to live up to
expectations generated during the years of revolution.
With some exceptions, it failed to compare favorably with
the Diaz era. Cumberland notes that in 1924, as "com-
pared to the pre-revolutionary period, the vast majority
of the Mexicans probably ate less well, had fewer
schools to attend and fewer job opportunities." 5 '!’ Al-
though the Mexican Constitution of 1917 put the Mexican
laborer on a level with any in the world, leaders such
as Carranza were essentially conservative and simply
did not carry out the more radical constitutional pro-
58visions. For example, although land reform was a
major theme of the Revolution, it went forward at a
snail # s pace throughout the 1920's.
55 • *56
—
— * Grebler
,
op. cit .
. pp. 21-22.
57Cumberland, on . cit .. p. 257.
58Ibid .
, pp. 269-72.
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Also pushing Mexicans from their, *
numerous, deer rant a
ry Were thep- oo ed conflicts which continued to splitthe society. Some of the •
P 1
around •
important ones centered
ZXZT* oflabor ’ land——
ofth
erUPted thrOU^out the decade. One
!
" m°St Mtter involved the
ovement, in which certain Catholics inoi a -wx x , cluding cries +q
engaged in violence which the government met with
counter-violence. Many people werg km#d ^
time civil war raged. 59
In the United States +h„> the question of Mexican
nUSd aS 3n lmportant political issue through-
the 1920 's, Opposition built during the bracero era
continued even more vigorously now that it did not have
to contend with the compelling argument of labor short-
g in wartime. The vast increase in Mexican
immigration, both legal and illegal, brought new
supporters to the opposition. Nor did the wartime
suspicion of foreigners subside. Also, the severe post-
war recession heightened organized labor's concern about
foreign labor in the United States. 60
of) _i
Grebler, op. cit .. d-5,
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Congressional
opposition to the use of Mexican
Jr;
Criti0S WaS ntative LaCuardia of New
.
0 1924> ^ Called for riSid enforcement of theimmigration laws at the Mexiro^ k
n .
can border. LaGuardia
C aimed that Mexican workers were underlining American
labor. The key to their entry. he charged. was the
act that employers could wort them for less than a
dollar a day. 2 He called for better funding of the
Border Patrol and suggested that co-ordination of the
Labor Department, the Immigration Service, the Customs
Service, and the Prohibition Service would reduce illegal
immigration. J
In the same session of Congress, Representative
Raker of California recalled committee hearings earlier
that year in which a spokesman for a sugar company tes-
tified that he had obtained Mexicans for $2.00 per
worker from labor agents in Texas. The congressman
charged that this was a clear violation of the pro-
vision of the immigration law denying entry to
"persons
.
. called contract laborers who have been
1st Sess
6
!y\
S
924r^ffi^fff^- =«*«..
62
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induced. assi«?tp^
' enC0Ura^d > - solicited to migratehlS °°Untry * *«*"
- Promises of employment."**
During the I920- s
, the Mexican labor^
centered around the effort n° t0 Place Mexico under the so-
called quota system. The fervent na + i , .nationalist feelings
Of wartime, the "red-scare- of the war years, and the
Post-war recession gave rise to the 1921 quota law
.
It restricted immigration each year to of the full
number of each nationality living in the United States
^ 1910. The Quota Act of 1924 was more obviously aimed
at the darker races inasmuch as it shifted the base year
to 1890 when relatively fewer persons of darker races
lived in the United States. 65 However, both acts ex-
cluded Western Hemisphere nations from the quota system,
and Mexican labor was. therefore, unaffected. Of course,
Mexican immigrants were still subject to the general
immigration laws.
Efforts to restrict Mexican labor by including
Mexico under the quota system were strong and determined.
Representative Box of Texa«? « a i «i xas called for such a bill in
64
Ibid
.
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the United°States?
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S
i§7oarw-’ History of Labor in
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1 H<w>-^? TNewTorki Macmillan;
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each of^several congressional sessions during the
1920 s. Predictably, western farm interests formed
the backbone of opposition to the "Box bills." Although
opposition to Mexican labor had grown, it did not
lessen the determination of the employers.
Hearings on one of the yearly Box bills were
held in 1926 by the House Committee on Immigration
and Naturalization. Witnesses appearing to oppose the
bill included various farmers, representatives of
Chambers of Commerce, and spokesmen for sugar beet
corporations. A Chamber representative claimed that
adequate numbers of Americans were simply unavailable
for certain types of farm work and the Mexican was used
"because there is nothing else available." He went on
to suggest that mere defeat of the Box bill was inade-
quate. He proposed that western growers be permitted
to import Mexican workers upon the mere demonstration of
need, unrestricted by all immigration laws. 67 A spokes-
man for sugar beet industries claimed that Americans
simply would not do the hardest types of farm work and
66
,,
Glay L * Coc hran, "Hired Farm Labor and theFederal Government" (mimeographed Ph.D. dissertation.University of North Carolina, 1950), p. 96.
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that to expect otherwise would “drive the*
agriculture. “68 ^ fr°m
In the committee hearings of 1926. only one
prominent witness appeared in behalf of the Mu< A
spokesman for the American Federation of Labor claimed
that agricultural surpluses were already a problem and
at additional labor merely compounded the problem.
In response to the claim + *that Americans were unwilling
to do hard agricultural work h*
,
, he answered that inadequate
wages were to blame. 69
Many of the opponents of Mexican labor had long
based their claims on a racial argument, and as the
controversy surfaced in Congress and elsewhere, this
theme grew more prevalent. In 1925. Secretary of
Labor Davis noted that he had been “fighting for
gislation to
. .
. keep intact the racial character-
istics of our great republic."™ i„ California, the
Santa Rosa Republican newspaper, referring to a sub-
division of Mexican Indians, charged that “if the rail-
roads and farms in southern California could be induced
to pay a decent living wage to white labor, there would
68 . 69-Ibid*
» P. 99.
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be no need to import this peon riffraff . "71
Despite the widespread sympathy for reducing
ex lean immigration, all such hills failed to make itthrough Congress. There are several possible reasons.
nganized labor remained weak whereas the wealthy
farmers and railroads had not yet been discredited by
the Great Depression. There was littlet co-ordination
of the opponents of Mexicanle labor, perhaps because their
motivation was so mixed. Probably another reason for
failure was the fact that Mexicans were entering some of
the least populated areas of the United States. Also
it was widely believed that the most serious threat to
Americanism" was persons with ancestry in the nations
at war with the United States during World War I.
The Depression Years
The economic crisis at the end of the 1920-s
markedly reduced immigration from Mexico. Whereas some
67.000 Mexicans entered legally in 1927, only 11,915
came in 1930 . 72 The wetback problem began to take care
of itself as jobs became unavailable. Not only did immi-
gration slow up. but a large exodus of Mexicans occurred.
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he Great Depression brought massive unemployment and a
vast native labor surplus. Former urban workers
^r1" emPl0yment t0 the, over the crisis. Job con-dition led to increasing ethnic tensions, and American
workers scenes turned violently upon their Mexican
ompetitors
. From 1931 to 1933. over 70,000 Mexicans
urned to their own country while around 100,000 left
during the decade. 74
Pressures for deporting the Mexicans grew rapidly
as the Depression worsened. For the first time in its
history, the national government began to rigorously apply
the immigration laws at the Mexican border. They pro-
vided for exclusion of those who might become "public
charges," and this provided a lever for keeping out many
exican workers. Also, substantial numbers of Mexicans
were expelled under the stricter enforcement procedures.
Although the enforcement of immigration laws is
a national responsibility, many Mexicans left under
pressure from local governments. As welfare rolls grew.
SOme reUe f found that they could save money by
76
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paying the Mexicans' transportation costs hack to the
border. Some local officials simply threatened to
drop Mexicans from the relief rolls.
It is commonly assumed that southwestern farmers
joined the movement to expel Mexican workers from the
United States. 78 However, numerous letters and tele-
grams in the National Archives indicate that even during
the depths of the Depression, many of these farmers con-
tinued to claim a serious shortage of domestic farm
labor. They opposed all efforts to reduce the number of
Mexican workers in the United States. 79
The decision to return Mexicans was a unilateral
one which created serious problems for Mexico. She was
only then beginning to recover from the Revolution and
from the continuing chaos that characterized the 1920’s
and, like the United States, she suffered from the De-
pression. About 15% of the returnees settled in largely
unsuccessful repatriation colonies established by the
Mexican government. Most of the other returnees went
mpn+ - S y -
S * B?gardus, "Repatriation and Readjust-
*® t
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George Kiser and David Silverman, "Mexican
Repatriation during the Great Depression,"
The Journal of Mex ican American History (Forthcoming).
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back to their native villages. Having often lived for
years in the United States and taken on American ways.
they were someti.es rejected by other Mexicans as
SOSgos who felt superior to their own people. 80
Both in Mexico and the United States, it was
suggested that fundamental principles of justice had
been disregarded in the “deportations." Many local
American agencies spent little nr ™ + <F o no time uncovering
facts about the "Mexicans.” For example, children born
in the United States were often sent to Mexico with no
regard for their rights as American citizens. 81
Bogardus suggested that employers who had profited from
and exploited Mexican workers should have assumed some
responsibilities toward them even when they were no
longer an economic asset.®2
Politically, one of the most important effects
of the events of the 1930’s was the impact they left
on Mexican-United States relations. The unilateral
American action left a bitterness which prompted
Mexico’s tough bargaining when the United States again
wanted Mexican labor during the 194o*s.
80
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Summary and Conclusions
One useful perspective for understanding the use
of Mexican labor in the United States before World War II
is the interest group pattern which has been discussed.
AS we have seen, certain economic interests in the
Southwest came to prefer Mexican labor because it was
cheap, docile, and plentiful. Organizations such as
big commercial farms, railroads, coal mines, sheep
ranches, and canning factories enjoyed substantial po-
litical access and power. On the other hand, opponents
of importing Mexican labor wielded much less influence.
Consequently, southwestern growers found their interests
especially accomodated by the governmental system. Some
times the concessions were legal and above-board while
some took the form of governmental inaction and in-
difference to enforcing the immigration laws.
One pattern that emerges from this chapter is the
consistent political influence of the employers of
Mexicans even when casual observation would suggest
that these interests were having less and less impact
on policy-making. For instance, the decision to end
the special emergency supply of Mexican labor in 1921
gave the impression that employer interests were
86
losing ground. Yet the p-r*«* + *great struggle to end the pro-gram br0Ught a hollow legal Victory to
opponents of the use of Mexican workers Even „
~
,
1 ft-
» £ when the
policy turned against the employers, their
interests were still informally accomodated. The
government continued to maintain an informal Mexican
labor program by simply refusing to apply the immi-
gration laws vigorously and systematically. Far from
reducing the number of Mexican workers, the end of the
emergency program marked the beginning of a decade
which brought Mexican workers to the United States in
vastly increased and unprecedented numbers.
This chapter includes useful historical material
for understanding the series of bracero programs lasting
from 1942 through 1964. Most scholars studying the
programs have looked at them in an historical vacuum.
Consequently, they have tended to portray them as
pretty innovative. Yet in many ways the policy in the
later period was a replay of the World War I program.
For example, comparing the program of 1942 with the
earlier ones reveals that the legal authorization was
identical, and interest groups opposing and supporting
the program lined up similarly. Most arguments used by
friends and foes of the programs since 1942 had been tried
87
out by the same groups during World War I. In both
eras, the use of wetbacks was widespread. Examples
such as these suggest that more recent bracero programs
should be re-evaluated in light 0f historical back-
ground such as that presented in this chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
THE BRACERO PROGRAM, 1942-60
The present chapter turns attention to the
Roosevelt. Truman, and Eisenhower years of the bracero
program. During these administrations, grower interests
rather thoroughly dominated Mexican labor policy. How-
ever, it will be seen that there was also considerable
opposition to the employment of braceros.
Among other themes, this chapter discusses the
broad meaning of farm labor shortages, reasons for re-
mauguration of the bracero program, the initial agree-
ment with Mexico, interest group activity, patterns of
regional and party support for the program among
congressmen, the post-World War II increase in oppo-
sition to the use of Mexican labor, the Truman
administration's resort to unilateral recruitment in
19b8, Eisenhower's attempt to cope with the wetback
problem in 1954, and his unilateral recruitment
legislation.
89
The Concept of a "Labor Shortage"
Throughout most of this century. American
growers have been claiming a shortage of domestic
farm labor. Although the problem itself is not po-
litical, they have often sought political solutions
to it. The pluralist pattern has been more or less
followed. Growers have experienced labor frustrations.
Many have sought solutions through interest groups
such as the American Farm Bureau Federation. These
organizations have often served as political interest
groups inasmuch as they have worked through govern-
mental institutions in an effort to solve the prob-
lems perceived by their members. Because from the
pluralist perspective, political activity cannot be
understood in isolation from the tensions giving rise
to it, it is necessary to discuss briefly the nature
Of the labor problem involved.
Most Mexican workers, both legal and illegal,
have been used in highly seasonal crops. Many of the
farms have been large. This means that the investment
has been great, and from the farmers' viewpoint much
is at stake. In addition to the basic cost of land
90
and machinery, new and substantial investments are
necessary each season for planting, cultivating, and
harvesting the crop. In farming, more than in most
enterprises, the labor needs are unsteady. Once
Planted, the crop may need little additional attention
for weeks
. But once it does need that attention, it
mUSt bS Pr°mpt or the entire crop may be lost. As
Schwartz notes*
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No one has disputed the general claim that an
adequate supply of workers is needed. The disagreement
between supporters and opponents of importing Mexican
labor has often centered around the question of just
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how large a labor supply must bo wi e before it is adequate.
r ecades many growers have taken thp
.
d x K b e position that
mencan agriculture has suffered from a critical
shortage of domestic labor. This argument was g^
eme of bracero advocates throughout the life 0f the
Mexican labor nrofrrpm t +p Srara - It was a continuous claim,
spanning not only years of economic prosperity but
recession and depression years in which millions of
Amertcans. including at least hundreds of thousands
of migrant farm workers, were unsuccessfully looking
for jobs. 2
Critics of the Mexican labor program inaugurated
ln 1942 t6n<led t0 assume ^at one able and willing
American for each farm job was adequate. Growers, on
the other hand, had a very strict conception of the
“ability needed for farm work. As in pre-Depression
years, they were often critical of available farm work,
charging it with shiftlessness, dislike for stoop
labor, drunkenness and plain ineptness. Throughout
the twentieth century, southwestern growers have com-
pared American migrants unfavorably to the extremely
hard working, able, and uncomplaining Mexican.
Policy Consolations*'^."Nationa! Agriculture Labor
XLVIII (December! 1966)
°f ^ Ecnnomif~*.
92
Growers
worker- for- one- Job-argument
.notber
apparently assume that as long as the i >.g labor supply,
matter how large, contains any element of uncer-
tainty, it is inadequate. In their dealings with
workers
,
growers have constantly sought to increase
the predictability and dependability of the labor
Pool. One person for one job does not meet the stand-
ard. because if for any reason he is not fully reliable
at the crucial moment, the farmer’s huge initial in-
vestment may bring no return and the cost of this
year’s crop may simply be wasted.
Perhaps the greatest threat of uncertainty is
seen in strikes. From the grower's perspective, they
are especially intolerable in agriculture because they
can be so much more damaging than in other industries
where a work stoppage does not mean destruction of the
partially developed product. Therefore, if there is
a chance of strikes, the argument may be easily ex-
tended to assume that even in a society with tens of
thousands of migrants unemployed, the labor supply is
inadequate and foreign workers are desperately needed
to save the endangered crops.
The need to have labor for planting, cultivating.
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and harvesting the crops at the crucial time •L i is notthe only motivation of growers for
labor supply. Themost
"anting a large
are set
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in a hook entitled Factories in the
cwuitams describes the corporate farm which halincreasingly become the prototype of American agri-
culture. Many farm costs such as expense for
machinery, gasoline, seed, and fertilizer continue
o increase and are largely beyond the control of
the gr0Wer> The ““ bi« -t ^=tor that has been
““t 633117 contr°Had by farmers has been that of
labor. Largely unorganized, relatively uneducated,
often politically disenfranchised by their constant
movement from place to place, and excluded from most
important social welfare legislation of this century
the migrant workers have been largely at the mercy of
farmer. He has set wages low and found that from
manipulating this cost factor, profits could often
be high,
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and l0W in a number of ways. First as •
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The issue of a farm worker shortage underlies
the whole Mexican labor program. It is the single
without Which the importation of braeeros during
11
The Bracero Program under Roosevelt
Even before the outbreak of World War II. farm-
ers were growing increasingly apprehensive about the
l!!l
lab0r SUPPly
- Fr0ra viewpoint, the situation
Schwartz, o^cit., pp . 90 - 101 .
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a ifornia, unionization of agricultural workers
was undertaken. A number of strikes culminated in
-olence as growers mounted a full-scale offensive oftheir own.
Although efforts to organize farm workers had
Pretty much failed by the end of the decade, growers
were increasingly fearful that the tradition of low-
Pard. docile, unorganized migrant labor might be coming
PerhaPs the greatest threat was the examP leof industrial unionization and the decreasing ability
of industrial managers to unilaterally establish wages
and working conditions. Although the trends of the
had not yet caught uP with growers, they were
growing political and economic voice for the
workingman. Merely as an example to farm workers, the
trends could be dangerous. Perhaps even more serious
was the possibility that they were an omen of intentions
umj
-nis oration had about workers in
"'ibid . PP. 99-100.
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general, and that its encouragement of unions in in-
dustry was a preview of reform plans it had for
agricultural labor. Finally, as industry expanded in
the late 1930’s, workers began to leave the farms.
There was the possibility that enough of these would
drift back to farm work with new ideas about the role
of the workingman to cause unprecedented trouble and
unpredictability in the agricultural labor force.
By the late 1930’ s, the tenseness of growers
was further exacerbated by the shrinking surplus labor
pool. By 1940, the unemployment rate had been reduced
to about 15* from a Depression high of perhaps twice
that figure. This trend added to apprehensions borne
of worker unrest during the 1930’s led a growing num-
ber of farmers to decide that the labor supply was
inadequate
.
These fears were accentuated as United States
involvement in World War II appeared more and more
likely. In September of 1940, Congress passed the
Selective Service Act and in March of 1941, the
National Defense Act became law. The draft and new
defense industries served as a constant drain on
the farm labor supply.
6U.S., Bureau of the Census, Sixteenth Census
of the United States: 1940. Population
. III. T~.
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Farmers and "their orpan^a + iganiz t ons perceived the
worsening labor picture as a political problem well be-
fore the attack on Pearl Harbor and the United States
declaration of War in December, 19*1 .? One source of
their impressive impact on policy during the war was
their organization. Oriani.ojo g zed into many associations,
councils, and federations, the growers spoke with a
great deal of unity. As early as May of 1941
, for
example, various Farm Bureau Associations were warning
congressmen that the labor supply would be exhausted. 8
Various state and local officials became part
of the drive to warn both federal officials and the
public that the farmers needed help. For example, in
July, 1941, an official report from the Washington
State Office of Unemployment Compensation noted that
harvest labor was already scarce in that state. 9 In
June of the following year, Governor Culbert Olson sent
a telegram to the secretaries of Labor, Agriculture,
States during inte^nT La?°Tur the United
LII (December, ig^n’blTT-
^ 10”31 Labn,lr
Seas.. 1941
^
C °ng
‘ ’ lst
J uly 1^1941, pp
^of^astungton during 1941
.
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-d State appealing for imported Mexioan ^bolster farm production. 10
Even before the Roosevelt administration's
dec is ion to inaugurate a bracero program, a number ofgrowers and various farm organizations directed re-
quests for Mexican labor to +ho 4t e immigration officials.
in the spring of l 94l, a group of farmers ^
southern Texas asked the Immigration Service to lift
the main restrictions of the Immigration Act of 1917
so the movement of Mexican workers into the United
States would be facilitated. In July. a group of
Arizona cotton growers repeated the appeal. 11 In
September of the same year, various farm* * organizations
in California asked the Immigration Service to import
30.000 Mexican nationals to meet their labor shortage. 12
In April of 1942. an association of important sugar
refining companies known as California Field Crops
notified the Immigration Service that it wanted 4.000
10
Intpracf ^
ic bard B. Craig, The Braearn Program
t
iity of Texas
P
Press,
F
°97if"
Uustin^ u"ive r-
Farm Labi
t
IIre;mfnrff
S
,
,
94f
V
?
1r i?n ?£ the
XXXIV (July, 1960)? 1M.
* Mricultural History,
12
Ibid.
99
Mexicans for the sugar beet crop. 13
WlU te reCalled that Pluralist theory pos -
ulates that the demands of political interest groups
e SeneraUy °halle"-d ^ -val groups which feel
reatened by these demands. Before the bracero pro-gram WaS inaU^a^d - August. 1942, either outright
opposition or serious reservations came from several
quarters.
in 1941, organized labor tool a stand against
e importation of Mexican nationals, it claimed that
e domestic labor supply was adequate. Also speaking
of Mexican-Americans. The National Spanish-Speaking
People's Congress and the Federation of Spanish-
American Voters of California expressed the view that
Mexican-Americans were already unemployed and should
not be further disadvantaged by foreign competition.
Scruggs notes that Mexican-Americans sometimes feared
that a bracero program would harm intergroup relations
m the United States, 1 "* presumably by triggering
latent hostility toward people of Mexican ancestry.
Before the bracero program was actually
13 Ibid
.
14
Ibid.
,
p. 142.
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negotiated with Mexico it appeared that she might
oppose it. we have already discussed the iu-willlett from the events of the Depression years. Also>the Mexican government had long been concerned about
discrimination against persons of Mexican ancestry
« the United States. According to ScruggS(^
opinion in Mexico had been inflamed by such events
to the extent that the government probably would have
o.md it politically most inexpedient to send workers
to the United States without guarantees concerning
their treatment. In fact, the Mexican Constitution
required such guarantees although they had been com-
pletely disregarded by the United States government
and American farmers prior to 1942. Article 123 con-
tained the requirement that contract workers be
guaranteed return transportation. Agitated over the
deportations of the Depression, the Mexican Congress
wrote into the Labor Law of 1931 the requirements
that the transportation costs of workers must be paid
by employers, that the employers deposit funds in
Mexican banks to cover the expenses of repatriation,
that the workers be paid pre-agreed wages, and that
written contracts be issued and approved by Mexican
101
offic ials , * ^
Probably most American farmers were opposed to
e braoero program as finally formulated. As indi-
cated by the applications to the immigration
authorities, what the growers wanted was a lowering
of the immigration barriers so they could bring in
their own workers from Mexico. In May of 19h2. Farm
Bureau representatives from California. Arisona. and
Texas suggested that was the proDer wavi p y to cope with
the labor problem. I„ June of the previous year.
Texas congressman Kleberg, an important champion of
grower interests, wrote a letter to President Roosevelt
suggesting that the braoero program of World War I
should simply be re-opened.
Before the Roosevelt administration announced
inauguration of the braoero program in 1942. various
letters from individuals opposing the importation of
Mexican labor were inserted in the Congressional
Grounds for opposition included "the threat of radicals
coming into the country, to make our burdens worse.”
"the take-over of our men’s jobs by un-Americans,"
"unnecessary government expense." and the allegation
15
pp. 142 -43 .
16 ibid
.
,
p. 143,
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that surplus labor could be released from New Deal
make
-work
" programs
.
1 ?
Despite these several manifestations of oppo-
°" ^ the iraminSnt P-gram. there was no
naUOnal debat6 °n the iss
-
-ntil after the
Roosevelt administration had announced its response!
that time, for example, Congress had held nohearings on the possibility of importing Mexican
nationals. Friends and foes of +hoi t e program did not
really clash head-on until after tho ^ •l e administration
had already set policy.
Apparently the Roosevelt administration did not
give serious consideration to the importation of
Mexican workers before the spring of 1942 . A11 re _
quests were turned down, sometimes with the answer
that an adequate supply of domestic labor was avail-
Scruggs notes that before early 1942 "govern-
ment officials felt that the introduction of Mexicans
Might pave the way for the exploitation of both
foreign and domestic workers and lead to violent
opposition from American labor." 1 ®
17
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Another reason for delay was the necessity for
consultation and agreement with the Mexican govern-
ment. During World War 1 and after the rr *a I > ^ United States
unilaterally establish a braoero program with-
out doing violence to her broader foreign policy
objectives. As Scruggs notes, those were days of
economic imperialism. But these foreign policy ob-jectives were to change. In the 1930's. President
Roosevelt formulated his Good Neighbor Policy on the
is of mutual respect and understanding. A repe-
tition of the World War T1 Practices would have been
completely out of character with the new United States
foreign policy so carefully cultivated by the
Roosevelt administration. 19
As the United States actively entered the war
and farmers continued claiming a crucial labor short-
age. the Department of Immigration established a so-
called
"interagency committee" to study the farm labor
situation. Represented on the committee were several
governmental departments including Labor. Agriculture.
State. Justice, and the War Manpower Commission. The
agency was instructed to gather facts concerning the
possible need for foreign labor and to establish
19Ibid.
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tentative standards for importation should it become
necessary. The group met for ^ weekg ^ ^
April and early May, 191*2. and established oriteria
for a possible bracero program. The standards took in-
to account three main sets of interests, (l ) the
growers' possible need for foreign workers. ( 2 ) the
concern of labor that domestic workers not be under-
mined. (3) the interest of Mexico in protecting her
citizens. 21
The interagency committee decided that the
question of labor shortages should be left up to the
United States Employment Service. 22 Around the
middle of May. it certified the need for 10,500
Mexicans for use in California. Montana, and Idaho.
Claude Wickard, Secretary of Agriculture, then
took active steps to establish a bracero program. On
May 28, 1942, he requested Attorney General Biddle to
set aside the literacy test, head tax, and contract
labor requirements of the Immigration Act of 1917 to
provide a temporary supply of Mexican labor. The next
day the Attorney General announced his willingness to
cooperate. Four days later Mexico announced her
20
22
Ibid -
.
p. l4l . 21 Ibid.
,
Ibid.
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declaration of war on the Axis nations, an, on the
same day Attorney General Biddle asked the American
Secretary of State to hegin discussions with Mexico
in regard to inauguration of a bracero program.
alists note that each department of the
government will have its own special interests.
arged with the agricultural program of the admini-
stration. the Department of Agriculture had a set of
rests centering around such problems as production
and agricultural labor »v +v.„i x D . By the nature of its duties,
the interests of the State Department were quite dif-
ferent. Its responsibilities, of course, lay with
the foreign policy of the United States. However,
steps that would increase farm production would not
necessarily further the foreign policy of the United
States. The War Manpower Commission also had its own
interest in making sure that industry and farms were
well staffed during the war. In 1942. some difference
of outlook concerning foreign labor existed between
the three departments.
On May 22, the chairman of the War Manpower
Commission had given a copy of the standards worked
23 Ibid
.
. p. 1^5.
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out by the interagency committee to Secretary of State
Cordell Hull "as a suggested guide in negotiations with
the Government of Mexico concerning this matter." How-
ever, the State Department made no immediate effort to
raise the matter with the Mexican government. Foreign
policy considerations predominated in the Department.
Scruggs notes that many in the State Department felt
that a bracero program might undermine United States
relations with Mexico,
they insisted that it
workers
.
Should it become necessary,
safeguard the rights of Mexican
After Attorney General Biddle's request, the
State Department agreed to cooperate and raise the
question with the Mexican government. United States
Ambassador Messersmith met with Mexico's Foreign
Minister Padilla on June 15, 19^2, and stated the Ameri
can case. His main plea was pitched in terms of the
contribution Mexico could make to victory over the Axis
powers by supplying farm labor to the United States. 25
Anticipating the American request, the Mexican
government had already established a committee to study
the issue. Between the middle of June and the middle
of July, the committee studied Ambassador Messersmith's
24
I£.id ‘ » PP. 145-46. 25 ibid
.
.
p. 146.
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proposal. It weighed many factors, including a number
related to various interest groups. 26 Receiving great
weight was the knowledge that nothing short of solid
guarantees for any workers sent to the United States
would meet the approval of several important interest
groups in Mexico such as organized labor. Also of im-
portance was the demand of Mexican industry and growers
that their own labor supply not be depleted. Their
need for labor had increased with the war as United
States trade with Mexico had expanded dramatically.
In early July. Agriculture Secretary Wickard was
m Mexico City on other business but met with the
Mexican Ministers of Agriculture and Foreign Affairs
to discuss the labor issue. As he testified later
before a House committee!
When I arrived there, I found that there was muchopposition because of previous experience the Mexican Government had had with a large number ofMexicans left stranded in this country.
.
. Thevsaid they had to spend a lot of moneyto get them
7
during the Depression. They also
pnn+ho
hat were Promised one kind of wage or
. .,
r » an<^ when they got up here they were left
any^ousingfaf
the »*y ^ not havT
26
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Wickard also noted that the Mexicans were ada-
mantly opposed to the growers' request that they be
allowed to recruit their own workers in Mexico as
during World War I. It had “no chance” of being
accepted.
After several weeks of negotiations, the Mexi-
can government decided to provide the United States
With workers on a temporary basis. Although many fac-
tors contributed to her decision, three were especially
important. One was her commitment to the war effort.
Secondly, Mexico did not wish to jeopardize her growing
export market in the United States. 29 Finally, the
Mexican officials realized that the booming wartime
industry of the United States was bound to draw Mexican
workers. Mexico would be in a better position to pro-
tect them if a favorable agreement could be reached.
An executive agreement (EAS 278) between Mexico
and the United States was reached on July 20, 19h2,
and became effective on August 4. 30 it should be noted
28
Ikld-. p. 15. 29Scruggs, op. cit
.. p. 146.
30
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that this agreement inaugurating the bracero programdid not take the form of a treaty, so the oonsent of
the United States Senate was not necessary. Wth only
-nor modifications, EAS 2 7 8 served as the basis for
the bracero program until the end of 1947. 31
The legal basis for American participation in
the agreement was identical to that relied upon for
the World War I bracero program 1 the ninth proviso
of the third section of the 1917 Immigration Act. To
recapitulate, that provision permits the Commissioner
of Immigration and Naturalization to admit otherwise
inadmissible aliens.
The agreement was a compromise measure which
reflected the interests of various important groups in
both the United States and Mexico. The stipulation
that "the Government of Mexico shall determine in each
case the number of workers who may leave the country
without detriment to its national economy" was appar-
ently a concession to the employers of Mexico.
eIs
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The agreement contained a number of protections
for the bracero which helped to satisfy such groups
as organized labor in Mexico. For the Mexican workers
EAS 278 gUaranteSd “-trip transportation to the
United States, subsistence en route, adequate housing,
minimum wages, and a minimum number of working days.
Braceros were to receive the "prevailing wages" being
paid in the work areas if these rates were higher than
the minimum stated in the agreement. Prevailing wages
were to be determined in public hearings. Mexicans
were not to be discriminated against. Finally, at the
insistence of the Mexican government, it was agreed
that all of these guarantees would be written into
the contracts each bracero would receive
.
32
Some provisions of EAS 278 were designed to
minimize the opposition of organized labor in the
United States. This was consistent with the pluralist
expectation that once groups become better organized
they will have greater impact on policy. Labor had
had little influence on the World War I program, but
in those years it was less well organized. Also, during
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the interwar years, the labor movement had grown more
respectable and legitimate in American society.
As noted in the previous chapter, organised
labor had long feared the adverse effects of cheap
foreign labor. Consequently, the guarantee that
braceros would be paid the same as domestic workers
was a concession not only to Mexico but to organized
labor as well. Another important concession to unions
was the agreement that Mexican workers were not to be
used as strike-breakers. Also, braceros were to be
used only in case of a shortage of domestic labor.
Finally, they were to be employed only in agriculture.
The Mexican officials insisted that the Ameri-
can government act as the formal employer of the
braceros. This demand was a result of Mexican distrust
of big growers in the United States and the ill-will
left over from the earlier years. The Farm Security
Administration (FSA) signed the contracts as employer,
and in turn contracted the workers to American growers.
The FSA transported the braceros from Mexico to employ-
ment centers in the United States. The FSA was also
in charge of returning them to Mexico at the expense
of the United States government.
Many American growers were intensely critical
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Of the bracero program. Much less laho
availahi= °r was madele than they had antic
i
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n . ,
ip d and wanted.
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Rather than a closely regulated program, growershad sought government approval for th •
Mexican labor on their o t
emPl0y”ent °f
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- »hat they got were
JP rSStriCti°- « the historically more orfree flow of labor across the Mexican border
.vi»e P„„„„a ». f.aml
° SXClUde d0mestl° fa™ workers from the benefits of
minimum wage legislation, unemployment compensation
and legislation regulating working conditions, growers
now found themselves saddled with all of these responsi-
bilities and more toward the Mexican workers.
Farmer unrest with EAS 278 was immediate.
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ays, growers and farm organizations were pres
r::
ongress to
t0 jr
[
a action,
. special committee was appointed bythe United States Senate in n., uOctober, 1942, for theP^ose of bolding bearings and investigating the
status of the farm labor problem* 0nly^^tors were appointed and all were •±L from important farmfates. Sheriden Downey of California was the chair-
The other members were Ernest McFarland of
Arizona and Charles McNary of Oregon.
The Downey committee held hearings in Phoenix
and Sacramento in November. Except for a few govern-
ment officials, witnesses were overwhelmingly discon-
tented farmers and farm organizations. The hearings
»ere structured to favor grower interests. No con-
gressman closely identified with organized labor was
appointed to serve on the committee. Few persons
opposed to the importation of Mexican labor appeared
to testify. Yet the committee had invited a great
many farmers and representatives of farm organizations
to give testimony.
The biaS of the hearings is also obvious from
Invest igate^Farm °Labor
S
C ond
^ ’ S?eoial Committee to
Hearings West*™ itions m the West,
2d Sess.j 19/12.
F Labor Condl tions
, 77th Cong.,
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the style of questioning and hvby the comments from
Chairman Downey. For in<5ta n« Qy l s ce
» at one point in the
hearings, he saidi
body here who is
U
a Marine
r°Wn
?
nd talk with everY-
of farmers at length becanL^0? an orSanizationhelping myself very greatlv in^^ I 1 wouldthe situation. 37 Y y ln knowledge of
Only two persons testified in opposition to the
importation of Mexican labor. Their testify was com-
Pletely omitted from the published hearings. 3® However,
chairman charged that one showed "a total lack of
knowledge of what is happening in the State of
California.
Compared to the many spokesmen for the use of
Mexican labor, the opponents gave the impression of
organizational weakness. A Mrs. Suchman represented
the Citizen's Welfare Council. Although it was a large
group, apparently no advance arrangement had been made
for her testimony. Unlike some grower representatives
who stayed for more than a day at the hearings, she
noted that her group must leave after a short period of
time. When asked for their official position, many
of the farm spokesmen went into great detail and
37
39
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spoke with great authority. in restore* +3 p nse to a question
from the committee chairman. Mrs. Suchman said.
is an individual ^roup ^ut^e
0131 group! this
at the civic centfr hL 1 !r? recognized
mostly on relief clients v!
certalh problems,
the level of plL loners'?^ 0 are J ust b^°w
The ability of the grower spokesmen to organize
and present a united front was impressive. The
president of the National Council of Farmer Coopera-
tives told the committee!
shortages
30
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be
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er'
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s
agricultural question ?n thif State 8l
USS an
At the joint meeting a number of resolutions
were passed and the spokesman presented them to the
committee. 42 He could thus claim to be speaking for
millions of people. Migrant farm workers and people
on relief were, of course, not able to present such
impressive credentials.
Grower spokesmen at the Downey hearings blasted
the federal government for making it so difficult to
^°Ibid.
, p. 260. 41 Ibid .
.
p. 24.
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import Mexican labor.^ Thev .
labor shortage existed.'*'* They T 3 Seri °US ^
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Farmers feared that the bracero program was being
a wedge by the Roosevelt administration for
44.
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introducing revolutionary changes in the African far.
labor situation. If foreign workers could ^^
benefits such as minimum wages, paid transportation
and a guaranteed number of wording days, would this
precedent not make it easier to extend the same pro-
visions to domestic workers? Indeed it would, and the
FSA was doing just that.
As was the case for many government departments,
the Department of Agriculture and its agency. FSA,
gained considerable powers as a result of the wartime
crisis. The legal basis for their enlarged powers
over farm labor can be briefly summarized. The War
Manpower Commission received broad authority from
President Roosevelt to mobilize manpower for the
war effort .
^
Paul V. McNutt, chairman of the War Manpower
Commission, found that reassigning primary responsi-
bility for farm labor to the Department of Agriculture
would "promote a more effective mobilization and utili-
zation of the farm labor resources in the prosecution
the war. in Directive XVII, the chairman specified
47
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that, subject only to the review of the War Manpower
Commission,
-the Secretary of Agriculture, through
such persons and employees
.
.
. of the Department of
Agriculture as he may designate shall have full oper-
ating responsibility for the recruitment, placement,
transfer, and utilization of agricultural workers."
The directive specifically stated that the Department
was being granted power to
fer " domestic farm workers,
"the importation of foreign
culture will be initiated
.
recruit, place, and trans-
Finally, it noted that
workers for use in agri-
•
. only after all local
resources are exhausted ." 2*8
Especially the last quoted section of the di-
rective seemed to give very broad authority to the
Department of Agriculture to make sure that domestic
farm workers were offered jobs under conditions simi-
lar to those offered braceros. How could "all local
resources" have been exhausted if braceros were offered
higher wages than domestic workers? When the Depart-
ment. at the insistence of Mexico and with the blessing
of the Roosevelt administration, delegated responsibility
for the labor program to the FSA, it became even more
48
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certain that the farmers' worst fears of ref
^ realized. 4? °™ Would
Even the briefest- j
Se„
St 00ns deration of the Farmounty Administration's history makes aDn
certainty that it would ohall
the
saw aa +h
c enge what large growers
thexr best interests. Established as a divi-
-on of the Department of Agriculture in 1937
. the
was concerned with the alleviation of rural pov-
erty. particularly that of small farmers. in line
w^h the pluralist expectation that governmental de-
partments will be internally divided because different
agencxes represent different interest groups. FSA was
suspect even within the Department of Agriculture.
The Department has long been seeng as concerned pri-
marily with the interests of relatively prosperous
farmers, whereas Grant McConnell has called the FSA
'a poor man's Department of Agriculture . "50
From the first. FSA made clear its reformist
goals. Programs it inaugurated were seen by many
people as outright socialistic. It loaned money to
the Farm Sec^rity^dmffistrJ??
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snail farmers too poor to qualify for bank loans.
Sometimes they were simply given outright grants of
money. The FSA furnished water
areas bypassed by the Bureau of
facilities for western
Reclamation. It estab-
Ushed health clinics for the poor and set up
purchasing and marketing cooperatives. It established
some large farms on a cooperative basis and urged the
participating farmers to compete with big growers.
Critics compared these cooperatives to Soviet collec-
tive farms. Because FSA maintained considerable
control over the projects, critics accused it of being
undemocratic
.
Although the pluralist claim that government
officials are spokesmen for interest groups may be ex-
aggerated, certainly there is some element of truth to
the assumption that the FSA was looking out especially
for the poor people which the Department of Agriculture
and other government departments had often found reason
to bypass.
After FSA was given responsibility for the farm
labor program, its reformist goals remained untempered.
In a number of disputes between braceros and growers,
51 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
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it sided with the Mexicans. 52
The FSA attempted to force farmers to give do-
mestic workers the same guarantees they gave braceros.
A grower claiming a labor shortage was not permitted
to import Mexican workers until the Farm Security
Administration had a chance to provide him with domes-
tic laborers. In order to qualify for the American
workers, he signed a contract drawn up by FSA. Among
other things, the contract guaranteed a minimum wage,
the quality of housing, and minimum sanitation con-
ditions.” In short, the FSA gained concessions from
farmers which they had never before had to grant to
domestic workers. The paradox was that this nightmare
for growers came as a by-product of their demands for
foreign labor which in other times would have served
to undermine rather than support the interests of Ameri-
can farm workers.
The FSA was harshly criticized by several
witnesses at the Downey hearings. Growing numbers of
politicians, especially at the state and local level,
52
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grower cause and accused the federal govern
men t of ^sensitivity to farm interests.
^
The crucial showdown came in April. 1943
.
when
Congress considered appropriations for the hracero
Program. The struggle of that year centered around
the so-called
"Dirksen RiiiS " BUI. „hlch provided appropri-
ations for securing and transporting farm labor.
Perhaps most importantly, that bill and the law as
finally passed (Public Law 45 ) ousted the Farm Security
Administration from supervision of the program. I„
their first major show-down, grower interests won out
over the Roosevelt administrations reform orientation.
In fact, the Dirksen Bill was written by officials of
the American Farm Bureau Federation, the most conserva-
tive of the major farm organizations. 55
The House vote on Public Law 45 was not re-
corded. However, the record of the debates indicates
that major supporters were Dirksen (Illinois),
Cannon (Missouri), O'Connor (Montana). Sheppard
(California). Dies (Texas), Lambertson (Kansas),
54
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and Wiggiesworth (Massachusetts). Speaking
of n- ,
s critically
(Oh' ) T
S6n BlU W6re H°ffman (MiohiSah). Brehm
O'Neal (Kentucky).
Debate in the House centered mostly around
issues brought out in the Downey hearings. Without
a bracero program. Dirksen thought American children
-night "go to bed without their suppers. "56 Cannon
laimed that there is not a farm anywhere in the
United States that is fully manned. "57 Sheppard
criticized
"screwballs" in the Agriculture Department
and promised that, if left aione
, California farmers
would get plenty of work from the Mexicans. 58 Dies
charged that the re* was run by
"socialistic and
crack-pot bureaucrats. "59 Wiggiesworth accused the
American workers furnished by the PSA of being charac-
terized by "drunkenness, debauchery, and refusal to
work." Describing himself as a farmer. Lambertson
asked that the bill cut out "social gains" for domes-
tlC W°rkers
-
1 Alth°«gh Dirksen was now sponsor of
5 Ibid., p. 20?8. 57 Ibid j < 206l.CQ58
60
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mShould have allowed the farmers
“to handle the situ-
a' 100 themS6lVeS
-" government should never have
reached any agreement with Mexico but should have just
continued to let i -uMexican labor “filter across the line
as it has done in other vearq +n 0 + . *y s t0 satisfy the labor
demand on this side of the Ri 0 Grande.” 62
House criticism of the Dirksen Bin included
several themes. Hoffman suggested that the policy of
the United States was to “let our boys fight and die
and let those fellows come and take their places at
h°“*" Brehm Pr°P0Sed that ^rm jobs be filled by
discharging some Americans from the military and moving
others from factory jobs to the farms. 64 Rogers was
concerned about
"undesirable refugees who are just
waiting for a chance to get into tViio « +.x his country under the
guise of being Mexican farmers .
”
65
Marcantonio told Dirksen that the bill was
"distinctly anti-labor.” 66 Klein refused to
62 T,. ,Ibid.
, p. 2079 .
64 T,.Ibid.
, p. 2071
.
66 t,.,Ibid.
, p. 2079.
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the bill on the grounds that although American agri-
culture was ™ore prosperous than in many years, the
bill made no provision for farm workers to share in
that prosperity by setting minimum standards for them
.
67
A few House members were outspokenly supportive
of the PSA. For example, Burdick said,
is the^only^organization we*^Vr^?^0"
foreclostd
d
and
e
dispossessed
t0
?{?
rlC who h^/been
been r.-e.tXliS£8°“' SS^iSd"^
t
haV6
payments to the Govsrnnont States, and
in many instan^es?^™"6"* have been over-paid
Debate in the Senate centered around basically
the same issues. Public Law 45 was passed by slightly
better than a 2-1 vote. There were 39 votes for the
bill, 18 against, and 39 senators failed to vote.
Among the supporters were Aiken (Vermont), Barkley
(Kentucky), Connally (Texas), Eastland (Mississippi),
Ellender (Louisiana), George (Georgia), Hayden
(Arizona), McClellan (Arkansas), Russell (Georgia),
Tydings (Maryland), and Vandenberg (Michigan). Num-
bered among the opponents were Bridges (New Hampshire),
Lodge (Massachusetts), and Taft (Ohio ). 69
67
IMd.. pp. 2070-71. 68 Ibid.. p. 2083.
69Ibid
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Inasmuch as this was a program benefiting cer-
tain rural interests, pluralists would expect its
heaviest support to come from senators representing
those areas. Calculations indicate 77% support
for the Dirksen Bill from the quartile of voting
senators representing the most rural states. 73%
from the next
from senators
states.
most rural quartile. and 60% support
representing the most urban half of the
Senate support for the bracero program varied
systematically by region. Strongest support came from
southern and southwestern senators. Senators repre-
senting more northerly states, whether located in the
West or East, were less likely to support the bracero
program.
Of the Republican senators voting on Public
Law E5. only 29* voted for it. Among the Democratic
senators voting, 98% supported the bill.
We have thus found that the bracero program was
most supported by Democratic senators from rural states,
particularly those in the South and Southwest.
?0Degree of urbanization of the various stateswas calculated from the 1940 census. See Bureau ofthe Census, Sixteenth Census of the United States.1940 . Population
. I. ?i ~ —
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with C
PerhaPS Partly aS 3 reSUlt °f l0Sing the battle
up tho°r
e3S
’ ^ R°°SeVelt adminiStrati0n s^ppe dUP he bracero program nP . During 1943, a total Qf
3 o 98 farm workers were^ in^
sot. The following year, 6 2 ,i 70 entered.
The Truman Years, 1 945-53
On April 12. m5 . Roosevelt died and Harry
Truman beoame President. There were few clues in
Truman’s record foretelling what stanrt *ft n x and he would take
on the bracero prop-mm as am. As a member of the Senate
Committee on Military Affairs in m3 . he was involvedm a set of hearings concerned with extending military
deferments for farm workers. Although he said little'
at the hearings, his comments give the impression that
he was not a grower spokesman. He noted that despite
the claims of labor shortages that year that more had
been planted than ever before. He stressed the need
for an adequate supply 0f soldiers and concluded.
"I don't think the seed planters are in such a bad
ShaPe ' M °St °f them in better shape than they
71Hancock, op
. c it
. f p, 17
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ever were before.
Senator Truman did not participate in debate
on the Dirksen Bin in the spring of 194 3 nor did he
Snate
;
h0ldlng hearings for the Special Committee to
Investigate National Defense.^
The bracero program reached a golden age under
Truman’s presidency. Althoup-hixnoug the program had been
justified to meet a wartime emergency, it not only
continued during the Truman years but unprecedented
numbers of braceros entered Th»mered. e bracero program led
to new controversies with Mexico. Conflict between
the supporters and opponents of imported labor reached
a new intensity.
_
ThS endlng °f the war bought the program under
new fire. After all, organized labor had only reluc-
tantly agreed to instituting the Mexican labor system,
only the assurance that the importation policy would
end with the war had brought its qualified support to
Affairs, Hearing^^Iflb . Comraittee °n Military
from Military Servic e of Pef! rment
occupations
, '/bth Cong., 1st Sess.
,
1 94j,
ist se SS
7
?^943^fixeLsrp^tR;r^7 r8th
c °ns-
129
Now
the grower cause. After tho o,i e surrender of Japan on
usust 14, m5 . it became obvious that growers had
no intention of giving up their Mexican workers. Itlooked to many like a breach of faith r + „01 l
. it began tolook more like the „ar was only an excuse.
When the war ended, new justifications were
found for the continued movement of Mexican workers
mto the United States. The Truman administration went
ahead and negotiated a new agreement with Mexico pro-
viding for new braceros to enter and for the ones
already here to have their contracts renewed
.
74
it was claimed that with the war having been won,
there could be no decrease in farm productivity. The
United States had obligations to those left starving
from the war. In 1946. President Truman called on
farmerS f°r rSCOrd Production. 75 Although the end of
the war brought rising unemployment, farm interests
used Truman's request as an excuse to continue the
bracero program.
In the spring of 1946, some estimated that un-
employment in California would climb to one million
74
ft'ew York Times, May 8
, 1946, p. 5 .
1
5
New York Times, April 21
, 1946, p. 32 .
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before the year was out. Yet spokesmen for the Cali-
°rnia chamber of Commerce and the California Farm
Bureau Federation claimed that a shortage of farm labor
was expected. 6
The growing unemployment brought union oppo-
sition to continuation of the bracero program, m
California the CIO noted that some 500.000 Americans
were unemployed in that state in April, it claimed
that if wages were adequate, this labor supply was more
than enough to fill all available farm jobs. The
California Federation of Labor expressed reservations
about the bracero program but took a less firm position.
Its spokesmen said that Mexicans should not be brought
m if the domestic labor supply „as adequate. 7 ?
The official position of the Truman admini-
stration was that braceros would be contracted only if
there was a shortage of domestic farm labor
.
78
in
1946
, the number of Mexicans contracted fell some
IV » 000 below the number for 1945.^^
^highlight of the Mexican labor program under
78 .76 Ibid,
79
77 Ibid. Ibid.
Hancock, op. c it .
. p. 17
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Truman was its transference to a peace ti w
, .
.
- me basis.
a rrilnis
’t :C’ation decided that then government’s
guarantee of the
the
bra0er° 00ntracts
end now that
war was over. in i oh.7 n1947, Congress failed to appro-priate any more money for the program. 8® Because
Mexico had insisted all along that the .g American govern-
ment serve as the employer the „y ' congressional decision
was bound to lead to difficulties inU_L ti
. a series of
meetings between renresenta +h, „p tives of the two countries
“ E1 PaS° fr°m November 2® to December 2. m?> no
agreement was reached. Mexico continued to insist that
the American government continue in its wartime role. 8 *
however, she agreed to permit braceros already in the
United States to remain pending a new agreement
.
82
Meanwhile, although unemployment rates in the
United States remained at substantial levels, various
farm groups urged the government to continue importing
braceros. For example, the National Canners Association
passed such a resolution at its national convention.
Its incoming vice president warned that without alien
8°
.
Program-- Its friends
f
and Foe-
»
M
?
xlCaP ?arm Labor Supplyi~.rw.ta, 3*?ain;b;st;:s8;:*p . ,5 .
Ibid.
,
Ibid
.
,
P- 32. p. 36.
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farra workers food production would fall in 1948 8 3
In the meantime
, unions continued to insist that
the domestic labor supply was adequate. 5*
Agreement between the United States and Mexico
WaS r6aChed °n Fet™ 17. 1948. 85 The deadlQck
_broken by Mexican concessions. Although guarantees
were agreed to for the braceros, the agreement was to
the effect that the United States government would
no longer be considered the employer. 86 Mexico had
thus lost one of the concessions she had always in-
sisted most strongly upon.
Perhaps the most serious development in United
States relations with Mexico since Roosevelt won the
presidency came in 1948. Early that year. Mexico
raised a series of objections concerning alleged mis-
treatment of braceros. Consequently, several states,
including Texas, were blacklisted and denied braceros.
Durmg 1948, Texas officials unsuccessfully tried to
get Mexico to lift the ban. 88
87
83New York Times
, January 22, 1948, p. 4i
Ibid.
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Pfeiffer, op. cit
.. p. 37 , 85
86
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.
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Farmers and various farm state politicians urged
administration to somehow provide Mexican
labor before harvest time. 3 ? in mid-October, the ad-
ministration took decisive action which undermined
Mexico
' s ban on braceros to Texas and some other states.
The immigration Service simply threw open the border
at El Paso while thousands of Mexicans crossed to work
m cotton and beet fields. Grover C. Wilmoth, dis-
trict immigration director at El Paso, later explained
the procedure. As each Mexican entered, he was placed
under "technical" arrest, then "paroled" to the
Employment Commission of Texas. Then the illegal
entries were put in trucks and transported to West
Texas and New Mexico fields. 9^
Mexico s response was swift and predictable.
The United States had encouraged Mexicans to commit
crimes and the illegal migrants would be brought back
to Mexico for "penal consequences ." 91 Mexico for-
mally protested that the American action had violated
the February agreement. 9 ^
89tLeibson, op. cit .. p. 13 ,
90New York Times. October 17
, 1948, p. 33 ,
91
92
Ibid.
New York Times. October 21, 1948, p. 14 .
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The American government then sought to calm
th;;°rr
rsy
' “ lssued a statement to
1
9 ,
ad 0rdered no "blanket opening" of the
border. Immigration 0ffieials in
claimed that thpir* _ •p-p*°ffl0ers at E1 were simply un-
- e to stop the determined Mexican laborers who
rushed the border in large numbers
.
94
Finally, the State Department apologized to
Mexico and agreed to send the ilia i
.
lllegal migrants home.
Mexico accepted the apology as
"satisfactory." The
United States promised to stop any further illegal
immigration
.
95
Mexican newspapers in the capitol pub-
lished the apology, and it was reported to be widely
accepted among the Mexican people
.
96
Acceptance of the official American explanation
was less common in the United States. With many Ameri-
cans out of work, union leaders issued some blunt
criticism. William Green, president of the American
Federation of Labor, publicly accused government offi-
cials of conspiring with growers to violate United
St3teS laWS and asked ^t both be prosecuted. In a
93 lbid
.
94lbid
.
^ 5Ne_w York Times, October 26
, 1948, p. 35 .
96Ibid
.
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- sent to the Attorney General and others, he
claimed that evidence indicated that American powers^ d6libera^ the Mexican entry. 97
Prior to about 1948 them
..
1 ere was a tendency fortho mass msdipuea a to more or less sov...„serve as spokesmen for
IT
657 int6reStS
- Th-e — *• abides investigating
migrants' viewpoint or that of organi Z ed labor.
news stories sometimes read as if they
were publicity releases *•„from corporate farmers. How-
ever. that paper and others began to look critically
at the grower rationale for foreign labor, m March
of 1948. the Times reported that many destitute farm
workers were unsuccessfully searching for work in
California, although the article was tempered by the
notation that it was between seasons. 98 On May i,
1949. the Times reported that although 65 .OOO fa™
laborers were unemployed in California, the state then
had about 5 . 000 braceros." Organised 1 wz labor did much
to emphasize the same nroblp™p em to the government and to
the public.
97 Ibid.
98New York Times
. March 28 1 Q/ifi Section IV,p. 6. ^ u 9 1 7*40 |
99
New York Times
.
May 1, 1949. P . 76.
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Union opposition to the bracero program was
Part of a broader effort to organise American farm
workers. Strikes were caliph +led at some California farmsm May of 1948 TIn the fan of the previous year,
he National Farm Labor Union had sought recognition
from the giant DiGiorgio farms in what would later
become a celebrated but losing cause. 101 Some Cali-
fornia growers began counter-organisations for the
purpose of setting their
-house in order so as to
nullify efforts of leftist unions. "I 02
In July, 1948, the National Farm Labor Union
stepped up its criticism of Mexican labor. The
union's president, H. L. Mitchell, asked the Truman
administration to curb the large stream of illegal
immigrants from Mexico whom he claimed were taking
Americans' jobs by working for less. He asked that
American employers hiring them be penalized. Mitchell
was also sharply critical of the bracero program.
He said his union was "opposed to foreign workers
being brought into the United States, legally or
illegally, when there are native Americans unemployed
p. 6 .
~w Y ° rlt Tlme
-2 ' June 13 , 1948, Section IV,
101
Ibid
.
102
Ibid.
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by ali
°
1Ce t0 AmeriCan w°rkers most affected
M. Tor
:
et
;
tion in
—- braceros were
. ,
y ' the government generally
* Slower claims of labor ch +
MitoH n
shortages at face value.chell also alleged tho+ i
the „ . +
g hat bra° er0S
exploited in
nated States. Finally, he accused big growers
o s lmply wanting labQr> iegai ^ iiiegai>
they could exploit
.
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^ring Truman
-s first year in office, 49 ,454braceros entered the United States. In m6
. 3^
Only 19.632 were admitted in m? .
dUrin§ the number c limbed to 33 . 288. 10(5 But by'
thS 6nd °f that year
' the T~ administration was
cautiously suggesting that the bracero program could
be cut back. However. Robert Goodwin, director of thebureau of Employment Security, noted that production
goals of the Marshall Plan would mean that the program
could not end altogether. 10 ?
The resP°nse of grower interests was that it
New York Times
, August 1, 1948
, p. 38
1 OLl * rs ^04
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,
Ikijd. 105Ibid.
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should be made easier nn+ u ^
,
.
.
’ 0t harder
-
t0 tring Mexican
/
°r lnt° thS UnUed StatSS
' Senator Cli«°n P.
Anderson (New Mexico) introduced such a bill and
omitted any standards tor minimum wages. housing . orea th. The State Department opposed the bill.
Assistant Secretary of State, Ernest r’ Gross, noted that
a in passe(j - it is highly probafcle that
our relations with Mexico would be adversely
affected.
"
10t
It is likely that the growers had been
emboldened by such apparently friendly acts of the
Truman administration as lowering the bars for Texas
continuing to call for braceros while tens of thousands
of American farm laborers unsuccessfully sought work.
and its failure to curb the vast inn,nflux of wetbacks.
Although the growers remained a powerful politi-
cal interest, they were now faced with an increase in
countervailing power. There was increasing public
suspicion that American farm workers who were willing
and able to work were not able to find jobs or were
offered work only under the most undesirable conditions.
Welfare agencies began to note that many domestic farm
workers faced misery or even starvation in the winter
108New York Times, July 13, 1949, p . 4-
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of 19 -4-9 . jn November of that year, the New Yor>v
" ai« °<
s„ ,mCounty, California
.
109
In mid-December, iq4q +>,- » j
-
.
-
I-- 1* 9 , the Federal Advisory
Council to the Bureau n-p v i
.
of E»Ployment Security voted toend the importation of palien farm labor. Although
r°le WaS mere1
^ “-y, the
-ted that its composition gave its decisions sub-
stantial weight. Its members came from the general
Pdblio, veterans, employers, and union members. It
- interesting to note that the foreign labor ban
introduced by a union member while the leader of
the opposition was an employer.
The resolution, adopted by a vote of 13-5,
noted that "sufficient numbers of American citizens
[are] available for farm work to meet any anticipated
requirements for manpower on the nation's farms during
the coming year."^®
Despite evidence of growing opposition to the
braoero program, the Truman administration brought in
109m
p. lu iiew_YortJku!^, November 6 , 1949, Section V,
New York Times
. December 17, 1949, p , 2.
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’ 455 Kexioan contract workers in 1949. HI
was more than twice pc m M
the ne k
33 WerS br°Ught in duringp a year of the braop^
War n
cero program during World
During 1950
, pressures to cease importing
workers from Mexico grew n„ 0 „ ,
,
Unemployment among American
i arm workers was nno n-p +uh® most used justifications
or ending the program. I„ early 1950, the New Yor]f.to reported that some 100 migrant childre^T
und starving m Arizona. In March of that year, the
~ drdmat;ized the plight of migrants in California:
in hundreds of farm labor camps, shanty towns, and
-mall rural communities, tens of. x thousands of people
are living on the ragged edge of poverty." 112
In parts of California, welfare officials found
that their rolls had doubled or tripled since the
previous year.
The mass media increasingly publicized such
statistics and emphasized the problems of American farm
workers more than ever before. They began to contrast
thS W6alth °f many of the western farmers with the
111„
Hancock, op, cit
.
,
p, 17,
112
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ow Times. March 17, 1950, p. 1.
I4i
poverty of the laborers m m
v .
In "arch
> 1950, the New
XQXlL Times commented:
denc| 0indthis valley PaPhetic evi-
or fudyp billboards boas?iny ^henGn^ shadowf Kern County
—
a Billion nfn he ?°-1-den Empire
on the edge of multi-minion don»i
n
-
S
^
Si
?
ine ’
!
owned ranches, beside private^ 1 individually
ranchers commute to work and r,
a
+
rp
?
rts from whichm fleets of airpianesfllf Patro1 the *n holdings
in contrast to this picture of wealth, the
I-es observed that some of the labor camps were
"dusters of squalid one and two-room plumbingless
shanties and tents
.
In such newspaper articles, the grower's old
image as a struggling farmer whose only interest in
foreign labor was to keep his crops from rotting and
to keep Americans well fed began to be questioned.
Many of the mass media began to "expose" shocking
facts about certain farmers. For example, the Times
and various other publications reported stories of
wetbacks who were told on payday that they would be
receiving no pay and were threatened by the grower with
exposure to the immigration authorities if they pro-
tested. News stories told of farmers who actually
113jjew^/ork Times
r March 18, 1950, p 10
114T . ..Ibid.
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reported their* il lp^oi ^
„ „
gal W°rkerS t0 authorities onPay ay to avoid paying them. 11 -5
The government iieet-p
attanIr
lf Came lnc reasingly underach, sometimes even from its own officials. InUSUSt ° f 195 °’ threS b °rder officials criticized
;;;
ican poiioy
-—
-y thathey were ordered not to enforce the law because
western growers wanted cheap labor. They referred toa powerful
"pressure groun"
....
g P ° f growers who manipulated
e lmmigration laws in their finpy, • i •mancial interest. One
"testified that forpixm -1 -ue gn labor was not needed and that
it was hurting American workers.
One Border Patrol inspector charged that for thelast five or six years "higher authority" had ordered
the border officials to stop enforcing the law against
illegal Mexican entrants:
pressure^groups'go^to^/ish ” 1 “stand various
their crops will
S
bedes?rovef
t°n
1
and rePort that
labor. This pressure
•
they get the
ranchers all over the count™
the big farmers and
go to Washington; Peon?e h?ve mone lr to
^ilbWLwh0 ,haven, t the money t^So^ffel ows o ' u tne J-ittthose from whom these peopled taking^M^'
llj
Leibson, op. cit
.. p. 16.
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The National Farm Labor Oni™ ,
..
.
U ion was Particularly
active in iq^o t+ j“ a~ced a goal of 10,000 new
members for the year. In January, i 950
, at its
1 convention, the union's executive board called
or an end to the importation of Mexican laborers,
claiming that they were brought in "for the sole
Purpose of aiding large farm operators to beat down
the wages of Americans." 117
Ernesto Galarza, the union's educational di-
. spoke out against the bracero program:
displaced
1
peSons
t
becaule
e
the
nt d°® S n0t oreate
imported Mexican nationals w1ifS^
e
+
m
?
nt says the
local labor is available ° Wh=+
"ot
.
be used where
that we have a new word "avan ^ happening isEnglish language, subiect ' in the
interpretations? We I 1° °r moredouble talk about avaHabiUt^ ^ °f the
He went on to say that availability could not
be meaningfully discussed unless related to wages.
When Americans were "unavailable." it was because
wages were inadequate.
At the convention, Galarza exhibited a contract
signed with a bracero for picking cotton at a wage less
than the union had won in collective bargaining a month
earlier. It had never been hard to demonstrate that
New York
_
Times
, January 14, 1950, p. 7.
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wetbacks were undercutting American labor. Now
Galarza seemed to have evidence that the braceros
were doing the same. He said, "I now say publicly
for the first time that Government officials have
deliberately misled the National Farm Labor Union on
the facts
.
In February of 1950
.
the mid-South meeting
of the National Farm Labor Union was held. Delegates
Charged that many cotton workers had been told by
growers that wages would be one or two dollars per
day and if they would not work for that, Mexicans
would be brought in. They claimed that the 20,000
Mexicans used in the mid-South in 1949 had been a
tool to help the plantation owners force down the
cos"t of labor. "^9
The pressure to end the bracero program reached
something of a peak in 1950 . The militance of opponents
was perhaps best illustrated by the National Farm Labor
Union. In hearings before a commission on migrant
labor appointed by Governor Warren of California,
officials of the union urged that government pay more
118
~ w York TimeH
» January 15, 1950, p. 44.
-^New York Times
. February 26, 1950, p. 45.
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attention to the unemployment and housing problems ofa™ W°rkerS
- “
- form of socialism, but as the
alternative to possible communism. •• 12° Union spo)ces _
""" charged that thousanda of farm children ttere
starving. 121 ln ts
.
_
charged before the United Nations with permitting slave
labor by its failure to oversee contracts between
braceros and farmers
.
122
President Truman's response was the appointment
of his Commission on Migratory Labor which evoked
great interest. It was directed to make a broad study
of conditions among migrants, including the effect of
foreign labor.^ Among the members Qf ^
( 1 ) the Right Reverend Robert E. Lucey, Catholic
Archbishop of San Antonios (2) Maurice T. Van Hecke,
Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina,
(3) Peter H. Odegard, Professor of Political Science
at the University of California
.
124
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The National Farm Labor Union announced that
^ had inspired President Truman to create the com-
mission. According to the union’s president, its
effort had enjoyed strong support from the following,
1) the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People, (2) Representative Helen Gahagan
Douglas. Democrat from California,
( 3 ) John F
.
Shelley, Democratic Representative from California,
(*0 William Green, President „<• u.’ resid of the American Federation
of Labor.
The commission held extensive hearings. The
arguments used by friends and foes of the Mexican
labor program were more or less the standard ones.
The CIO spokesman suggested that preference be given
to Puerto Ricans “in case labor from other territories
needed. He called for extending unionization
rights to imported labor. 12 ^
Clarence Mitchell testified for the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People. He
suggested that foreign labor was needed but claimed
125
126 ,
Ibid.
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Vol. Rep0rt °f
147
that the increasing reiiance on it was in part a
response to the fact that American agricultural
workers were fining unions and speaking out on
their problems. He was critical of the tendency to
assume the existence of a labor shortage with no
objective test of it.* 2 ?
Speaking for the National Catholic Rural
Life Conference, Rev. William tJ. Gibbons called for
the federal government to return to i
+
ai i ts wartime role
pervising the work contracts of imported labor,
goested that some workers were being exploited
by employers. However, he said that there should
certainly be no blanket attempt to keep Mexicans or
any other nationality out of the United States. 12 ?
Speaking for the National Farm Labor Union,
Edwin Mitchell suggested that government had been'
little concerned with farm workers, and the bracero
program was simply another manifestation of that
general insensitivity
i
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Mitchell contrasted this neglect of farm workers
with the large subsidies which Congress had given to
growers over the years. 1 3° The bracero program ^
making the situation even worse because it was holding
wages down and causing living and working conditions
to deteriorate. 1^
The spokesman for the National Grange claimed
that Mexicans were essential for growing and harvesting
crops because Americans "just don't like to get out in
the dust." 1 -^
The spokesman for the American Farm Bureau
Federation claimed that there was a domestic labor
shortage for certain farm tasks such as picking cotton.
He proposed that the way to reduce the wetback problem
130
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»as to make it easier for braoeros to enter the
Unitea States. The program then in effect, he charged,
was unfair to growers because it forced them to give
various benefits to braceros which were not "customarym the employment of domestic labor." There was too
mU°h r6d He
objected to the minimum
employment period guaranteed the braoeros . *33 There
was too much federal control, and the Farm Bureau
would prefer more "local responsibility" for the
program.
The commission issued its report on April 7 ,
1951, and it was especially critical of the grower’
viewpoint. It concluded that some farm laborers lived
w "virtual peonage." The commission found that
growers were willing to give more benefits to braceros
than to American workers. It found the worst exploi-
tation on large farms and noted that social legislation
exempting farm laborers from benefits had been justified
by the assumption that they worked on small farms.
The commission called for a phasing out of foreign
133
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labor and observed that it was not needed for theKorean war food effort f*^i -t. Pa™ workers were getting
to work fewer days each year. The commission 00n.
that any labor shortage could be met by
Permitting each American agricultural laborer to
work six and one-half more days per year.
The commission found that in negotiating
agreements with Mexico. fa™ interests were favored.
It noted that they were powerfully organized and
articulate while farm laborers had little organi-
zation and generally little chance to forcefully
and effectively express their views.
The commission noted a strong bias in the
means of determining whether a labor shortage existed.
luded that early m the season, growers simply
met and generally established a low, arbitrary “pre-
vailing wage Because the wage was low and because
the season had not begun, it was possible that too
few domestic workers applied. *35
Although the commission criticized the deterio-
ration of the bracero program under President Truman's
135New York Times
, April 8
, 1951, pp . 1( 35 .
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administration, ha sairi *4.ne id that its report made ”an im-
pressive contribution.
The increasing criticism of the Mexican labor
program did not deter the grower campaign to keep it
going. The new Justification was the labor shortage
caused by the Korean War Tn t. In January of 1951. a meet-ing of farm group leaders concluded that 300,000-
hOO.OOO Mexicans would be needed during the year.
At its meeting, the National Cotton Council decided
that at least 500.000 foreign workers would be
needed . *^7
Unlike labor during much of World War II, the
National Farm Labor Union was not prone to compromise
during the Korean War. It fought on many fronts. The
Truman administration had negotiated an agreement with
Mexico permitting the legalization of wetbacks, a
group of the union’s members followed a group of buses
transporting such Mexicans to the border to be legal-
ized. Galarza, the union’s vice president, protested
to the Mexican consul that the legalization was a
"fraud." and he demanded an end to the practice. The
136New York Times, April 8, 1951, p . 33.
137New York Times. January 27, 1951, p. 3.
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-can consul then discussed the problem with United
States immigration officials and announced that the
Mexicans would be deported. Galarza charged that
the American government was being used by the growers,
This is proof positive ,,
collaboration that goes* on
the ^aci* or active
the Immigration DeoartmoM+ tween ranchers and
branc he s to c ireumvenl^+hp
and
? ther Federal
labor shall be imnlr?ed ^
re<luirements that
specific certifications of needfl3§
ly Way °nly 0,1
In the summer of l 95l. members of the National
Farm Labor Union made citizens' arrests of Mexicans
whom they believed to have entered the country illegally.
They turned them over to immigration authorities and
demanded that they be deported. To their surprise,
the union members found that the strategy worked. 139
The legislative highlight of l 95l was return
of the bracero program to a wartime basis. It will
be recalled that the United States government guaran-
teed the braceros' contracts during World War II but
this practice ended in 194? on the grounds that the
emergency had ended and consequently the role of
government should be reduced. This remained the case
until 1951 and American involvement in the Korean War
138New York Times. March 3, 1951, p. 6.
139New York Times, June 1, 1951, p. 8.
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The pressure for re turn + ,
_
, .
g to the emergency wartimebasis came from Mexico. lZf0
The new law returning the bracero program to
a wartime Tooting (Public Law 78 ) took the form of
an amendment to the Agricultural Act of 1949. it „asintroduced by Senator Ellender (Louisiana), a long-
time spokesman for grower interests. The House version
was introduced by Representative W. R. Poage (Texas)
.By voice vote, the Senate approved the new law on
^ 7. 1951. On June 2 7 . it passed the House on a
roll call vote of 240-139. 141 Although the critics
of the bracero program were more vocal than ever be-
fore, it still enjoyed a very comfortable margin of
support in Congress.
Perhaps the most notable aspect of the House
vote in 1951 was that the bracero program was supported
more by Republicans than by Democrats. Among repre-
sentatives present and voting, 7k% of the Republicans
voted for the bill whereas only 5k% of the Democrats
supported it. Although there was no roll call vote in
1^0
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the House on the 1943 bill, it shm.i * v• ould be recalled that
“ thS Senate U re° eived far more support from Demo-
=rats than from Republicans. Thus from l 9h3 to l 951
,
the braoero program appears to have changed from a
Democratic one to a Republican one. We can only specu-
late as to the reasons for the change. Perhaps it has
something to do with the fact that the l 9h 3 debate
was not so much in terms of wealthy farmers versus
poor migrants. Much of the opposition to the braoero
program in l 9h3 was stated in rather right-wing terms.
However, by l 95 i discussion was more in terms of the
poverty of farm workers, exploitation of migrants,
and the need to unionize agricultural labor.
Public Law ?8 increased the role of the Ameri-
can government in the bracero program. Once again
the government itself, through the Department of Labor,
accepted the responsibility for recruiting and import-
ing Mexican workers. Braceros were transported from
Mexico at the expense of the American government. At
reception centers in the United States, they were hired
by American growers whose labor shortages had been
certified by the Labor Secretary. Finally, Public
Law 78 provided that the United States government would
be responsible for seeing that contracts entered into
155
between growers and braoeros were fulfilled. ^2
President Truman signed the new law but ex-
P ssed his reservations. He was particularly
concerned that it had made no provision for coping
with the wetback problem .
^
Mexico also was concerned that the United Stateshad not done more to rediif'o tduce illegal immigration. Her
argument had long been that the only solution was for
the American government to penalize those who used
this labor. Mexico's concern, of course, was that
r citizens enter legally as braoeros so they would
enjoy the many guarantees which she had negotiated.
In 1952. Congress acted to deal with the problem
by passing Public Law 283 . It imposed penalties on
those bringing illegal aliens into the United States
and on those harboring or concealing them. Unlike
previous legislation, the offense was defined as a
felony rather than a misdemeanor. The new law also
increased the authority of immigration officials to
search private property and make arrests.
In the Senate. the bill was passed by voice
142
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v°te. It passed overwhelmingly in the House with avote of 162-10. Howevpy* +uSVer
’ the vote is misleading iftt is interpreted to mean th=+ nthat Congress had solidly
turned against the use of mUS illegal Mexican labor. The
one-sidedness of thp Vn +0 ^ an Prot)ably be explained
y two factors. First, before signing Public Law 78President Truman had received promises from congres-
sional leaders that they would take action against
illegal entry. Secondly, Mexico had stepped up her
protests against United States failure to cope with
the problem, and there was increasing fear among
growers that if Congress did not act. Mexico might
decide to end the bracero program altogether. In
enate debate, there was strong support for the law
even from grower spokesmen
.
144
The Eisenhower Years
When Eisenhower became president in 1953 ,
chances for ending the bracero program were not good
Inaugurated during wartime, it had been given a new
lease on life by a second war. Despite his periodic
criticisms of the program. President Truman had made
1 44
(1952), IlU'?^
633101151 QUarterlv Almanac
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effort
"to srui i + ,
,
a it. On the contrarv +>, Q ,
iwr .
y
» the number ofMexicans entering the United States both^_
rac* and illegally had reached unprecedented heights,
unng World War II, the largest number of braceros
° e"ter ^ ^ Single 62,170. During
Truman * s last two years in n-r-r-office, about 200,000 werebrought in each year. l45
Of course, by 1953 the critics of the bracero
Program had expanded and had grown more vocal, some-
times militant. However, any chance they had of
ending the program was harmed by Eisenhower's election.
Although it was not well known at the time, his pro-
iness orientation was soon apparent. Richard
Nixon, his vice president, was similarly oriented.
Ezra Taft Benson, secretary of agriculture, had long
been a spokesman for the grower cause and would later
become a leader of the ultra-conservative John Birch
Soc ie ty
.
In 1953. Congress predictably extended the
bracero program until December 31. 1955. President
Eisenhower signed the law on August 8. Once again.
the braCer° pr°eram ha* received overwhelming support
145Hancock, op, cit
.. p. 17 .
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m Congress. It passed the Senate on a voice vote
and was approved in the House by a vote of 259-87. 148
The Committee on Agriculture and Forestry of
the United States Senate had held hearings on the
proposed legislation on March 23 and 24
, 1953.
Eisenhower's Undersecretary of Labor. Lloyd Mash-
burn. had called for an extension of the bracero
program. He had claimed that the supply of domestic
agricultural labor was inadequate and would remain so
in 1954 . Another official calling for extension had
been Arthur J. Holmaas. representing the Production
and Marketing Administration of the Department of
Agriculture. 147 Also calling for extension of the
Mexican labor program had been representatives of the
following organizations: (1) Texas Citrus and
Vegetable Growers and Shippers, 148 (2) National
Grange, (3) National Cotton Council of America, 1 -’ 11
(i 95J).
1
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W ln,perial Valley Farmers AssociatW 51 (5)
tional Farm Labor Users Committee
,
152
(6) Araerioan
Farm Bureau Federation. 153
Raising serious questions about the wisdom
bracero program had been representatives of
these organisations, (l ) the CI0 for Arizona ^
ew Mexico, ( 2 ) National Consumers League for
Labor Standards ^^5 /o\ A
,
1 3 ' American Federation of
Labor.
*
Many in the Eisenhower administration and
Congress felt that Mexico had long been too demandingm negotiations with the United States. Louisiana's
Senator Ellender was especially outspoken about what
he considered to be Mexico's unwillingness to meet
the United States halfway. 15 ? The Eisenhower admini-
stration seemed to be taking a cautious, wait-and-
see attitude. Lloyd Mashburn noted that Mexico would
likely be hard to negotiate with. He claimed that
MeXlC ° had the attitude that the United States needed
151 Ibid., p . 57 . 152 Ibid., p . 35 _
^Ibid.
,
p. 65. 154 Ibid
.
.
pp. 83-85.
155 Ibid.
, pp. 75.83. 156 lbid.
, pp . 95_ 99<
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.37New York Times. March 24
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labor and would come with her hand out. ln Maroh>
1953. Ellender charged that Mexico was demanding
-re f0r the braceros than they could get paid at
home. He suggested that the State Department simply
tell Mexican officials that they would have to cooper-
ate better with the United States. 158
In spite of the administration's display of
strength and unilateral action later that year, it
did do one thing which Mexican representatives had
long been demanding. Shortly after Eisenhower became
President, he began to crack down on illegal Mexican
migrants. Truman had already begun the action, but
it reached unprecedented levels under Eisenhower.
The Mexican government cooperated and for awhile
furnished military escorts for American trains trans-
porting the migrants back to Mexico. 159
In April of 1953, it was estimated that about
one illegal Mexican entered the United States every
thirty seconds. The 1952 law (Public Law 283) was
proving most ineffective, because it provided penalties
only for bringing illegal aliens into the United States,
harboring, or concealing them. The big loophole was
159
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that no penalty had been provided fQr
Although Public Law 283 had increased the
authority of Migration officialg> ^
service at the Mexican border remained hopelessly
under-staffed. There wo-o •_ere about 500 officers to
patrol a border some 1600 miles in length. 160
Although the law might not be adequate to
keeP the iUegal
“Ricans out, they could be prose-
cuted in federal court for violation of the
immigration laws. Almost immediately after taking
offace, the Eisenhower administration initiated an
unprecedented number of such prosecutions. Even
wealthy growers were caught up in court, and it be-
gan to look as if the pluralist claim that even the
courts represent the interests ofx the most powerfully
organized did not apply to this case.
During the first six months of 1953, some
80,000 illegal Mexicans were arrested. 1 ^ 1 During
a two day session in United States District Court in
El Paso, 350 were tried. Of these, 250 were first
Offenders and received suspended sentences. The
New York Times
, April 16, 1963, p . 31 .
New
,
York Times
, July 9, 1953, p. 3.
162
other 100 received short prison sentences. 162
Mexico, two prominent cotton farmers „ere caught
smuggling eight illegal migrants and were sent tojail for thirty days
.
l63 An Arizona grower was
indicted by a federal grand jury on grounds that hehad used a short-wave radio to warn illegal aliens
working in his fields that Migration officials
were approaching. The indictment specified that he
had conspired to violate the immigration laws.^
The response of growers, farm organizations.
and politicians from the Southwest was immediate
and determined. The New Yn-rV
— 10rk reported that the
efforts of growers from the Southwest and their
spokesmen in Congress to persuade the Justice Depart-
ment to "soft-pedal” enforcement of the law had
reached an "unprecedented pitch .
"
l65 Farmers olaimed
that application of the law would endanger their
crops
. Some charged that it would undermine the
whole economy of the United States. The president of
the Imperial County Labor Users Association and the
York Times
» August 27, 1953
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the problem farmers were facingi mg as a result oflosing their illegal helpers. l6 ? Snme
+u
P • ora growers asked
the government to release their Mexican workers whohad been arrested so they could get back to work 168
Farmers were joined by others who had lost their
laborers. A group of women's organisations in El
Paso announced that they were in favor of legalist
illegal Mexicans as a means n f* m • + • •o maintaining an ample
supply Of domestic servants
.
169
Powerful politicians began lining up to support
the demands of farmers that the law not be enforced.
Representatives Robert Wilson and John Phillips of
California charged that the immigration officers had
been over-zealous. 170 The Los Angeles -pi... announced
that Vice President Nixon would meet with officials in
the Justice Department and discuss the possibility of
"tempering " their actions so that the farmers of
167New York Times, September 26, 1953, p. 9.
Sf-ksf ITll.lf.'''
169New York Times. September 16, 1953, p. 31.
New York Times
. September 7, 1953, p. 1.
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California would have adequate labor. 171 Several
congressmen suggested that the problem could be
solved simply by legalizing the illegal migrants.
A-nong those making this proposal were Representatives
John Phillips, Robert Wilson, and James Utt. all from
alifornxa. Joining them was Representative Clark
Fisher of Texas. 172
the
Along with the
immigration offic
opposition came some support for
ers
- Business Week reported that
businessmen were opposed to illegal aliens because
they did not buy as much as domestic workers. 17 3
Also speaking out in favor of enforcing the
immigration laws were representatives of organized
labor. The National Farm Labor Union called for legis
lation which would make the employment of illegal
migrants a felony. Industrial labor unions also
called for enforcement of the law. 17i*
Although Business Week observed that there was
a shortage of domestic farm labor, it emphasized some
of the problems caused by illegal aliens. It claimed
171
172
173
174
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, 1953,
"Wetbacks in Middle of Border War,"
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a
was high. The magazine also
notea sene of the hardships faced by wetbacks. Por
example
, it observed that many of them died while
trying to evade the Border Patrol. 17 ^
Three factors we have been discussing appar-
ently coalesced to produce one of the most erratic
policy changes of any administration concerning
Mexican workers. First. Mexico was allegedly diffi-
cult to negotiate with. Secondly, vast numbers of
Mexicans were illegally entering the United States.
politics, President Eisenhower attempted to
enforce the laws. Thirdly, he ran into vigorous
opposition from well organised and politically
powerful interests.
After Eisenhower's law-and-order approach to
the wetback problem, it was suddenly announced in
early October. 1953. that the United States might
terminate the bracero program when it expired and
rely entirely on illegal Mexicans who would simply be
legalized. The administration was especially unhappy
with the practice of Mexicans consuls ordering
braceros to quit work until disputes with employers
175Ibid.
166
were settled. 176
In what appeared to some to ho0 be another effortto weaken Mexico’s h=.v.o- • •s bargaining position, it was an-
nounced that officials nr -m, .
.
.
l of the British West Indies
Visited California and had offeredil a more favorable
agreement than the United States arrangement with
exico. The British West Indies government had
agreed that the West Indlans pay their own trans-
P rtation one „ay
. However. the suspicion ^ ^
California growers were not really intending to give
UP their largely unbroken historical supply of Mexi-
can labor had been aroused by the fact that the
West indies government was interested only in year-
long employment for its people. 177 Southwestern
growers had been saying for decades that they needed
large supplies of seasonal workers, because they
could not afford to hire yearlong labor.
Although the Eisenhower administration was
not optimistic about reaching an acceptable agreement
With Mexico, negotiations proceeded during December,
1953 ‘ Th6 aSre®nent then in effect was due to expire
1 76New York Times
. October 8, 1953, p. 27.
New York Times
. November 29, 1953, p. 1.
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on the last day of the year.
In the spirit of the recommendations of the
President’s Commission on Migratory Labor, the AFL-
CIO requested that its representatives be allowed to
participate in the negotiations with Mexico. Accord-
ing to union spokesmen. Secretary of Labor Martin
Durkin agreed to give the proposal
’’serious consider-
ation. However. Durkin resigned before negotiations
held
’,^°r rePresentatives were excluded from
the talks.
By late December, there was little sign of
progress in the negotiations in Mexico City. The
United States was calling for a completely new agree-
ment which would give Mexico less authority over the
program. Especially deplorable to the Eisenhower ad-
ministration was the practice of Mexican consuls
advising braceros to stop work until their disagree-
ments With growers were settled. Seeing this as al-
most an infringement of national sovereignty, the ad-
ministration considered it to be the single most
important conflict with Mexico since the program
began in 1942.
1 78New York Times. December 17, 1953, p. 14.
179New York Times. December 22, 1953, p. 22.
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T T°“ ~ "* *1' °u *''**“«’ ^ end6d Wlth minor m°difications. However
once deadlock ensued, Mexico-s position became less
c ear. This was partly due ^ ^
ations „hich Her representatives Had to weigh
. On
the one Hand. Mexico needed the bracero program be-
oause it provided work for tens of thousands of
people which her economy could not absorb. Yet she
had been presented with very harsh demands by the
Eisenhower administration. The United States had
said in effect that Mexico must provide workers on
our terms or we would take action which would violate
both her Constitution and her Labor Law of 1931 .
While the United States was demanding that
Mexico agree to weaken her authority over the braceros
certain forces in Mexico were demanding a complete end
to the program. Various left-wing interests and Mexi-
can industries seeking cheap labor felt that the place
for the braceros was at home.
Responding to these various and conflicting
pressures, the Mexican reuresen+a+iv.op t t es announced that
pending a new agreement farm workers would still be
all0W6d t0 g0 t0 the United States. 180 The American
180iNew York Times. December 27, 1953
, p. 10.
169
° S
;
10n W3S 1633 COncil^ory. During the second
-e of January
, 19*. the United States
hat she had no interest in Mexico's continuing topermit braoeros to enter the United States while ne-gations were stalled. It was announced that the
ustice and Labor Departments were prepared to meet
the labor needs of Ampri^ow *e can farmers without Mexican
cooperation if necessary. To emphasize that getting
ex ic an labor was no insurmountable profe
States officials cited ,q« .* *.l 1952 statistics on the large
number of wetbacks. t®I
It became clear that Eisenhower lacked Roose-
restraint in dealing with Mexico. Whereas
the Good Neighbor Policy had renounced unilateral
action. Eisenhower's administration was threatening,
even while negotiations were proceeding, that the
United States would act unilaterally. It was a sharp
break from the Roosevelt tradition. It was more akin
to Truman's action in opening the border.
The Departments of Justice, State, and Labor
set up a program for unilateral recruitment to begin
°n JanUary 18 and *>
-"til agreement was reached
1 8lNew York Times, January 12, 1954
, p. 17.
170
with Mexico. Certain guarantees would still bP •
the braceros. 1 ®2
e glVen
Mexico's response was prompt and determined,
he officially closed her border to farm workers
seeking to enter the United States. The American
State Department announced that unilateral recruitment
would be carried out despite Mexico's opposition. *®3
The Mexican attempt to close the border did
not work. She stationed armed guards along a section
of her border with California where the recruiting was
occurring. Mexican border guards, soldiers, and immi-
gration officials cooperated in an effort to stop
flow of illegal immigration. However, the United
States continued recruiting Mexicans who swarmed
across the line. 18 **”
Although resentment of the American policy was
widespread in Mexico, the Mexican government attempted
to keep open the possibility of agreement. President
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines commented that the breakdown of
negotiations was "not a problem but only an incident."
Some Mexic an newspapers expressed the suspicion that
l82New York Times, January 16, 1954, p. 15.
a Q
New York Times, January 17, 1954 p , 62.
184jjew York Times. January 23, 1954, p. 3,
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Eisenhower was be ing influenced by growers interested
only m cheap labor and not in the rights of Mexican
aborers
. Fears were articulated that the guarantees
U1 t Up 0Ver the years were all to be lost. 185
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced
that the United States was ^x disposed to re-open talksm an atmosphere of
-mutual respect- and "goodwill."
Some Mexican newspapers responded favorably. 186
Caught in the middle of the controversy were
Mexicans wanting to do farm work in the United States
Armed Mexican soldiers and police would pursue them
as they attempted to cross the border. Some were
caught and turned back. Others entered, legally by
United States standards while violating Mexican law.
Others entered in violation of the laws of both coun-
tries, inasmuch as they did not go through the American
security check and health inspection. However. United
States officials legalized even some of these.
Officials escorted them back to the border for the
ritual purpose of stepping eighteen inches into Mexico
so they could then be legally admitted to the United
•j
O r
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States Mexican guards SQmetimes out the iegaUzation
y seizing farm workers. Fights broke Qut
and sometim
; 8v
he w°uld.be iromigrants were beatei;
and jailed. 107
Mexico did not long continue her efforts to
stop the movement of people into the United States
It appeared to be futile, and the image of Mexican
policemen beating impoverished men who simply wantedjobs could have had its political costs in Mexico.
During the first week in February of 1954,
the Eisenhower policy of unilateral recruitment ran
into trouble at home. The Bureau of the Budget
ruled that funds appropriated by Congress for Mexican
labor could not be used in the absence of an agreement
with Mexico. The Bureau ordered the program ended. 188
Legislation was then introduced in Congress
to nullify the ruling of the Budget Bureau by legalizing
unilateral recruitment. Among those supporting the
resolution were the American Farm Bureau, the National
Council of Farmer Cooperatives, and the National Cotton
Council. Opposition was concentrated in organized labor.
l 87jbid.
188
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In the House, opposition was led by Harold
Cooley (North Carolina). He claimed that passage of
the law would furnish a "bUckjack- for the Eisen-
ower administration to use against Mexico. In the
Senate. Hubert Humphrey (Minnesota) was particularly
critical of the proposed legislation. He said the
bill was "in violating ~on of our good-neighbor policy."
He charged that it had onlvy one purpose
, bringing
into the United States cheap labor." 1 ® 9
The bill was passed in the House by voice vote
on March 4, 1954. One day earlier, it had been
approved by the Senate on a roll call vote. 190
Of 43 Republican senators voting. 42 supported the
bill. Seventeen Democrats voted for it while 21
opposed it. 191 once again an important provision for
providing Mexican labor drew predominant support from
the Republicans.
On March k t it was announced by the State
Department that a new agreement had been reached with
Mexico. The United States had won the important con-
cessions it had demanded. While Mexican officials
189„
(1954). 12r°i;r
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could protest the treatment or k
st t
° f bracet
-os in the UnitedS a es, they could no longer call work stonxi K ppages.
Although the new arreenw>n+ <' '"t incorporated the m„st lm_
t demands of the administration, Eisenhower
nnid he wan pleased that Congress had provided for
unilateral recruitment. He called th„
„
e new law Rood
precautionary" legislation. 192
During the final years of the Eisenhower adminis-trate. opposition to the hracero program increased
substantially, However. the number Qf
contract workers imported each year dwarfed even the
Truman era. From 1956 through 1959, well over
'•OO.OOO entered each year.’ 99 Once the Eisenhower
administration had let up on its drive against illegal
aliens, it became the most important ally 0f the
growers. However, it was not completely unified.
During the late 1950-s. Labor Secretary James P.
hell used his administrative discretion to bring
ab°Ut 80me Uberal ref°™3 ° f Mexican labor program.
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For instance. he adopted a new wage formula forbraceros „hioh was designe(J tQ their
impact on domestic farm workers He he
. .
it . began setting
minimum labor standards for American farm workers
recruited by the Department of Ubor.W MitcheU
also began using his position to help pUblioi2e the
case for farm labor reform. 196 v*He became a kind of
spiritual godfather to the growings reform movement
during the late l 950's and early i 960 's.
Summary
By 1942. United States involvement in World
War II had substantially reduced the labor force
available to growers. Under Dreq^n^ -rp ssure from southwestern
farmers. Congress passed legislation providing for the
second formal bracero program in American history.
The Roosevelt administration sought to liberal-
ize the Mexican labor system and to use it as a lever
to reform the conditions of domestic farm labor. How-
ever. grower interests enjoyed special access to
Congress, and they successfully pressured it to roll
195,
196
Craig, op. cit.. pp. 152-53
PP- 153-55.
176
ba= fc the reforms already enacted and to head off
anticipated ones.
Although the bracero program h»* vad been justified
as a wartime necessi+v i
+
lty
’ dld not ®nd with the war.
ew excuses related to post-war recovery were found,
"der the Truman administration, the number of Mexi-
can workers imported far exceeded the peak war years.
Truman left office, the wetback problem had
also grown to major proportions.
Once World War II ended, opposition to the
bracero program grew. It was led primarily by
organized labor. The mass media also began to look
"ore critically at grower claims.
With United States involvement in the Korean
War, reform forces lost any hope of ending the bracero
program soon. The annual importation of Mexican
workers again reached unprecedented numbers.
During President Eisenhower-s second adminis-
tration, opposition to the Mexican labor system grew
substantially. However, Congress remained firmly
m support of the program and so did the administration.
The only partial exception was Secretary Mitchell.
Although he did not oppose the program per se, he be-
gan to speak out against its worst abuses and to iden-
tify them as factors undermining domestic farm workers.
17?
CHAPTER y
final years op the bracero program
Introduc tion
The body of scholarly ii+a>-o +
nf. .
y llterat^e on the politics
f Mexican labor in the United c*
.
.
States is weakened byjo important historical gaps. Xn Chapter XXI. Mention
urned to the much neglected. pre- 1942 era in order
o provide some historical background Lor understanding
he bracero programs of later years.
The present chapter turns to the second neglected
period, the era spanning the four years between Presi-
dent Kennedy's inauguration and termination of the
Mexican labor system in December, 196*. Although these
years are absolutely essential to any overall under-
standing of the Mexican labor program, scholars of
PUbli° LaW 78 have Paid li«le attention to them. 1
ProgramJ^nte'f^^-l^^^ard B. Craig, The Bracero
University of Texas pge^s ?u,f?
reIpn ™ ^TTA^tlKT
attention is also devoted
’ 1 VPP ' 1 5°-97 • Brief
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1966), 170-75.’ AgnculturaX Hieto^, XL (July,
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Likewise
, books on the Kennedy presidency fail to 00n.
vey the substantial concern of his administration with
Mexican labor problems
.
2
The activity of pressure groups reached a new
intensity during the early 1960-8. Their strategies
successes and failures took on a new significance
during the Kennedy era, because for the first time
since 1942
, the seemingly invulnerable grower coalition
lost the battle to its historically weaker group oppo-
nents. Still another new pattern was that never
before had Congress been confronted by a president
so critical of bracero legislation. Also new, in de-
gree, was the zeal with which much of the press joined
other reform interests.
Additional interest in the Kennedy era is added
by the fact that as late as 1961. the rapid decline of
the bracero program was generally unantic ipa ted .
3
How-
ever, this failure to anticipate the future is
(Greenwi?h^'c^”^?/ n^?^’ ’
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through two decades of both war and „»peace. it had
flourished more than ever during +»,
,
.
.
U the se°ond Eisenhower
administration.
This chapter, then, turns to the neglected but
interesting and important years from 1961 to l 96h
The purpose is two-fold. First, the broad goal is
to outline some of the bracero program’s more important
political developments during this era. Secondly, a
more specific purpose is to deal with the question
of why Public Law ?8 was eventually terminated.
Kennedy's Reform Inheritance
Certainly the Kennedy administration played an
important role in the reform and termination of the
bracero program. However, even before it assumed power
there were scattered indications that reform trends
might already be developing. Failure to recognize
them would exaggerate the impact of the Kennedy govern-
ment, important though it was.
The years 1959 and i960 were marked by consid_
enable media attention to the problems of farm workers
and their families, it was only to be expected that
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liberal periodicals such as the New^^
would
continue Publicising the hardships Qf f_
was J0 ined by Various other maga2ines
_ ^
"
andinterchurch MQ,.,n E .“ hS business-oriented Fortune
oegan to write of migrant
~
,
hardships and to place partf the blame on farmers. 4 Variousno important news-
papers, including the Newark Times, featured similar
articles and editorialised for farm labor reform.
5
During I 960
, two television networks broadcast power-
ful and controversial documentaries on the plight of
American farm workers.^
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Pollsters apparently l.ii.p ^i°na sentiment about farm labor during ^
were scattered indications that public opinion
- growing more favorable toward reform. :n March.
*'• ^
reported that public opinion
* m°re COnc™ ^out farm labor prob-
ems for at least a year.? Letters reprinted in the
^^^S^i^aOecord and the Times took on an increas-
ingly reformist tone during the late l 950’s and early
1960’s. Public reaction to the television documentaries
was reported to be favorable.** Luring 196o. seven
states had passed laws or taken other action to improve
conditions of domestic farm workers. 9
Forces struggling to reform the bracero program
had always been weakened by the fact that American
farm workers, the people most threatened by imported
labor, were unorganized. Before Eisenhower left office
there were signs that even this might be changing.
During 1959 and i960, the American Federation of Labor
and the Congress of Industrial Organizations had made
substantial attempts to unionize southwestern farm
jjew York Times. March 20, 196l, p. 28.
8
f •
Keisker, loc
. cit .
9„ AAmerican Outcasts," loc. cit.
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workers. 10
During the final year of +ho w*
trati™ * . Eisenhower adminis-ation, certain senators began di*m •u splaying a new
determination to reform k
, +u .
the bracero Program, m i 96 0
.
e first time in the history of Public Law 78the reformers were able to hold its traditional two-
Y ar renewal to a period of six months. This unprece-
dented success came from a new determination on the
part of such senators as George McGovern (D-S.D ) 11
who simply threatened to filibuster an end to the
’
program if its supporters continued to insist on a
two-year renewal period. 12
Another trend favoring the Kennedy adminis-
tration's reform efforts was mechanisation. By 196l
,it was already reducing the demand for farm labor
and weakening the case for the bracero program.
The chance for reform was increased by another
important factor which is easily overlooked. Although
the reform group in Congress had been consistently out-
VOtgd °" the braCero ProSram, its numbers had always
10 T , . .Ibid
.
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-en SUbStantial
- ™ °ne- third of the members
b;. :
3 g°°d C °re~ a majority could be
was to e
taSk COnfr°nting the nSW administration
convert this substantial minority to a new
congressional majority.
Importance of Kennedy's Election
th ,
b3S1C Clai" °f tMs ° haPter t- that although
e Kennedy administration inherited certain conditions
conducive to reform of the bracero program, the new
government itself was a major cause Qf ^ reforms ^
e Ultimate decision to terminate the Mexican labor
system. It did make a difference whether Nixon or
Kennedy won the 1960 presidential election because
their records on farm labor were signifioantly different,
Had Nixon won and used the vast power of the presidency
to hinder reform, the bracero program might have lasted
beyond 1964 ,
Apparently neither Nixon nor Kennedy mentioned
the Mexican labor system during the i960 election. It
is thus necessary to look at the earlier record.
As a congressman, Nixon was never faced with a
roll call vote specifically on extension of the Mexican
184
labor program. 1 ^ Howpvor.W6Ver> as floated earlier,
1XOn had lonS been considered a snolce
e ^ P°^ sman for the
southwestern farm cause. His recordn ranged from
osi ion to farm labor unionisation14 to his votes
against anti-wetback bills. 1 ?
/
n °°ntrast
- as ^ congressman, John Kennedy hadaligned himself more with +u .the ontics of southwestern
growers. On a roll call vote i„ 1951 h ,^ V . he ad voted
to end the bracero program 16 mu ^. The following year
ennedy had voted against a proposal to cut appropri-
°nS f°r the Ira,”igrati0" a"d Naturalization Service
the roll call method ^n^hf^h'th
3” ??* reo °rded by
each member votes '’aye" or "Lv -
r?H is Called aadelude the ’‘voice" ann , aay ;t Alternatives in-
problems for the research" T votes - Thaaa Presentindividual congressman^ the votes of
official recordf
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(Which is responsible for wetback apprehension) .
^
n 195^, he had voted against Eisenhower’s unilateral
recruitment bill. 18
The distribution of Kennedy’s electoral sup-port probably increased the likelihood that his
administration would seek either liberal reform or
termination of Public Law 78 . The bulk of his elec-
toral votes came from the heavily industrially and
urbanized eastern centers, 19 located in «+ +m states which
used no braceros. It is unlike lv +h a +i K iy t t a conservative
approach to the braoanncero program would have helped
Kennedy to hold his coalition together.
In the i960 election. Kennedy won about 85^
of the Mexican-American vote. In many parts of the
Southwest,
"Viva Kennedy” organizations worked for his
eleCti°n - The «exican-American vote made possible
^ SesS?^^.^IluirParr3T-356802-d6?rngt>
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victorias in ^ 2 ,
such a close election
t +
29 eleoto^l votes of thesewo states loomed large in theg m margin of victory 22
~™;;:~;r °fr —OS lor farm jobs, they tended toPPose the Mexican labor program 2 3 Con
.
ei * sequently.
any ing less than a reform approach would have en-
angered Kennedy's important Mexican-American support.
Flnally
’ Kennedy ' s marein Of Victory among
“ V0t6rS ~ de° iSiVe in
— ^ates, including
Illinois With 27 electoral votes. Blacks suffered
rom one of the highest unemployment rates i„ the nation
were frequently in competition with Mexican labor. 2 '*
Had Kennedy lost the states of Texas. New
-
eXiC °’ ^ IUin0iS
' -1- »ave lost the election.
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This realization may well have reinforced his prior
critical, inclinations toward the tracers program.
Kennedy's reformist outlook on Public Law 78prang logically from his promise of a New Frontier
/
icated to creating opportunities for disadvantaged
»erlcans
. By the tine of his inauguratiQn>
evidence indicated that the importation of Mexican
workers was having an adverse effect on America's
farm labor force, particularly in the Southwest
where Kennedy was heavily indebted to ^ Chicano^
The Reform Offensive of 1961
When John F. Kennedy was inaugurated on
anuary 20, 1961, Public Law 78 was due to expire the
following December. The new administration was not
long in mounting a reform offensive. However, it be-
gan with an attack on rural poverty rather than a
direct assault on the bracero program. During Kennedy's
first month in office, several high level officials
including Secretary of Labor Arthur Goldberg and
Agriculture Secretary Orville Freeman highlighted the
extent of this poverty and pledged the administration's
188
efforts to eradicate it.^
The preliminary focus on domestic poverty was
not unrelated to the forthcoming assault on Public
Law 78. Within a month, the administration would be
blaming many of the hardships of American farm workers
on the widespread use of Mexican labor. This was to
be a continuing theme of the Kennedy government and
one of its most effective weapons in the campaign to
reform the bracero program.
The 1961 struggle over Mexican labor legislation
centered around the so-called Gathings bill. Early
that year. Representative E. c. Gathings (D-Ark.)
introduced H.R. 2010 which provided for a four-year
extension of Public Law 78 without amendment. 26
In earlier years, the Gathings bill could have
been expected to sail smoothly through the House. By
1961 the situation had changed. Bracero interests
which rallied around H.R. 2010 found themselves opposed
by the united forces of the Kennedy administration.
^
administration was not long in making known
2 5
r, »
New York Times
. February 5. IQ61 n 79February iz t 1961, p. 46 .
J P lf P * ™ and
26p .raig, op
. c it
.
. pp, 163-65*
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xts unalterable opposition to the Gathings bill. The
y racero program the administration would support^ 3 ref0™ed
—— protect domestic agri-
cultural workers. However. Kennedy did not wish tosee the bracero program terminated in 1961. 2 7
The administration preferred
.. .
i reform over imme-
a late termination for spvP r.a ie e l reasons. One was its
recognition that conversion to a .
.
domestic labor would
take time. Another was the realization that an abrupt
end to the program would involve unacceptable risks in
United States relations with Mexico. To abolish
Mexico's third most important source of foreign exchange
on short notice would have been too much out of charac-
ter with Kennedy's Alliance for Progress, still
another consideration was the fact that the Presi-
dent was counting heavily 0n a Mexican endorsement
of the Alliance as a means of making it more acceptable
to other Latin American countries. 28
Perhaps another reason for Kennedy's willing-
to settle for less than termination was his assess-
ment of the limited power of his administration to
27IMd., pp. 163-64.
28
1962, p. 7f
ennedy ln Mexico," New Republic. July 2,
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accomplish such radical change Hp u h. e had won the presi-
enoy by the smallest percentage of the popular votem American history. Nor had the Democrats fared
particularly well in congressional races. 2 ?
On March 6. 7> 8. 9
. and 17
. 1961
, the Sub-
committee on Equipment. Supplies, and Manpower of the
House Committee on Agriculture held hearings on
H.R. 2010. 30 The subcommittee was chaired by Repre-
sentative Gathings. the author of this non-reform bill
to which bracero users threw their enthusiastic
support.
The hearings attracted a variety of oral and
written testimony. Supporting H.R. 2010 were numerous
farmers, both individual and corporate. Most came
from the West and many were users of braceros. A great
deal of testimony was offered by growers' associations,
many of which were western based. The services of
growers' associations vary considerably, but many are
primarily concerned with furnishing large supplies of
labor on short notice. Many of the braceros had always
^Friedheim, op, cit .. p. 221.
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been supplied through these organizations,
associations of growers presenting evidence
Gathmgs subcommittee on behalf of H.R. 2010
the following 1
Among
to the
were
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
Verctahl
ey Cotton Ass°ciation
Wefterr r
Growers Association of Americas n Growers Association °
California Tomato%rowers^A s soc f^^ee
Ventura^itru^ ^Q
ti0n
National Pickle Growers A^^nr* i
o
Imperial Valle
B
p
6t Growers Associationy Farmers Association
The American Farm Bureau Federation had long
championed a non-reform bracero program, and its
spokesman presented a well-prepared statement at the
Cathings hearings. He was joined by a representative
from the Arkansas Farm Bureau Federation. A few local
units of the Chamber of Commerce sent spokesmen to
oppose reform.
Also testifying for H.R. 2010 were spokesmen
for a variety of business interests whose own success
was heavily dependent on grower prosperity. These
included an association of canners. a Chicago processor
of Michigan pickles harvested by braceros, the Great
Western Sugar Company, a cotton ginner, the Southern
Pacific Railroad, and the Security State Bank of
Littlefield, Texas
.
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Reform-oriented cresc-nr'a -rP essure groups were better
represented at the 1961 hearings than ever before.
err numbers had increased and their testimony was
noticeably better prepared.
Several spokesmen from labor organizations pre-
sented testimony highly critical of the Gathings
bill. Among these were representatives of,
1.
2.
3 .
4
.
The American Federa +i™ r ^
(AFL-CIO) g * Food ’ and Allied Workers
(AFL?CIO)
:ed Meat Cutters an <* Butcher Workmen
Joint-U.S.
-Mexico Trade Union Committee
Also testifying against the Gathings bill
were representatives of several voi; •01 religious organizations,
including the following
t
2
3
4
5
6
Social Justice
Method ist^Church°
*Ural Lif® C°"^ence
Racial and ethnic groups most affected by the
bracero program were barely represented at the 1961
hearings. The only such testimony consisted of a
short letter from the American GI Forum of the
United States, a Mexican-American organization. The
letter called for termination of the bracero program.
Also presenting testimony critical of the
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the
blU the Nati °nal C °nSUmers League and
Consumers League of New Jersey
. braoerointerests had long maintained ^^ ^ ?g^
t
6eP f°°d PriC6S d°Wn
’ "° consumer groups appeared0 suPP°rt the non-reform bill.
Other organizations presenting liberal testimony
critical of the braoero program were.
j: £
ThS Socialist Party °f thfUnited^tales
Finally, spokesmen from the United States De-
partment of Labor testified against the Gathings
bill and called for reform of the braoero program
to protect American farm workers.
Patterns of group distribution at. the lorti
Heatings. On balance, the distribution of groups
represented at the hearings favored the reform cause.
Since earlier hearings, a greater number and
variety of groups had joined the reform cause. The
Status quo forces had gained few new converts. Perhaps
symbolic of troubles to come, one of the important
farm organizations, the National Grange, dropped its
traditional support for Public Law 78 and joined the
critics at the Gathings hearings.
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its futu
63 dayS °f the MeXiCan lab0r
re was not particularly threatened by the
^t that its strongest advocates came from a single
region or two of the United States. After all< few
vocal organizations from any region attacked the
program in a systematic and effective manner. How-
ever. the narrow regional base of its most ardent
supporters had become more of a liability by 196l
.because the program was under fire by an entire
administration and a host of politically adept and ably
manced organizations whose members were far more
dispersed around the nation. Since union members,
teachers. Catholics, and Methodists are scattered
throughout the nation, no congressman is immune to
their retaliation at the polls. On the other hand,
the vast majority of congressmen are not dependent on
the votes of bracero-users. cotton ginners. and
southwestern bankers.
Finally, most individuals and organizations
supporting the Gathings bill had a direct economic
interest in opposing reform of the Mexican labor
system. The reformers generally projected a more self
less image inasmuch as most of them would neither gain
lose money regardless of what happened to the
bracero program.
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A_ note on the terms nr debate a
. ..
~—— Q D
.
t > As already
ndicated, the arguments for and against the
.
*s m use ofMexican labor have been characterised >,nze by substantial
continuit, over the years. However. as major histori-
= anges have occurred, one side or the other has
«en found it advantageous to insist that the terms
s debate change to reflect new developments. When
fort has succeeded, debate has re-focused to
center around a new predominant question. Although
answers to that question have generally favored one
s^e at the expense of the other, even many interests
disadvantaged by the new concern have agreed that it
an appropriate question which mustii-Lun be answered by
both sides.
During World War I. employers seeking Mexican
workers gained decisive advantages when they succeeded
xn structuring debate around the national security
aspect of farm labor. Obviously these terms were
outmoded with the end of the war. With the onset of
the Great Depression, opponents of Mexican labor
succeeded in structuring national debate around the
issue of massive domestic unemployment. This strength-
ened their case and played a major role in bringing
about the repatriation of large numbers of Mexicans.
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With the outbreak of World War II. the advan-
tage moved to potential employers of Mexicans as they
once more to shift the terms of debate to
the national security role of farm labor. As peace
returned, reform forces gained ground as they turned
attention to growing unemployment. Then with the
outbreak of the Korean War. they lost control over
the terms of debate. Once again the preoccupation was
insuring an adequate farm labor supply in the
interest of national security.
During the post-Korean Eisenhower era. the
structure of debate changed from the wartime necessity
for Mexican labor to a generally conservative, pro-
agriculture orientation. Both President Eisenhower
and Congress were content to assume that farmers
needed Mexican labor, war or no war. The burden of
proof was thrown to the critics of Public Law 78.
With the arrival of the New Frontier, the terms
Of debate shifted to favor the reform forces. The
pro-business concerns of government gave way to a
growing concern with liberal reforms. Critics of
Public Law 78 shrewdly took advantage of this develop-
ment and successfully insisted that the bracero
program be debated in terms of an assumed commitment
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to reform. The outstanding characteristic of the
1961-64 era was th«+vil3.X th6 SUDDOrtp r'Q
-P
•PP ers of sporting Mexi-
labor were forced more onto the defensive than
year 1961 mar.cs the last major shift in
of debate prior to expiration of Public Law
7 • Both the case for and against Mexican labor were
Presented in great detail at the Gathings hearings
that year. Because later hearings and congressional
debate added little new infnrmc+^o ation or style, argu-
ments presented at the Gathin^ un u mgs hearings will be
summarized in considerable detail. The case against
the bracero program deserves special attention because
it was these arguments which eventually prevailed and
helped bring an end to the entrenched Mexican labor
system.
The reform case at the 10A, At the
196! hearings, critics of the bracero program made
much of the claim that they were in tune with the new
national mood of social and economic reform while
their opponents were clinging to an outmoded position
Kennedy's campaign and early presidency set
the stage for a greater national awareness of the
problems of poverty. As noted earlier, critics of
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the bracero program had long charged that it was a
-jor cause of rural poverty. With the coming of
ew Frontier, their argument gained new attention.
Reform of Public Law 78 to protect American farm
workers, they argued, would be an important anti-
poverty, New Frontier program.
Growers had always claimed that they used
Mexican labor only because an adequate supply of
able and willing Americans was unavailable. At the
1961 hearings, reformers charged that farmers were
deliberately making the conditions of work so diffi-
cult and unattractive that Americans could not afford
to do it. This was allegedly achieved by setting
low wages 3 * and by the failure to offer dome£Jtic
workers the many job benefits which braceros were
guaranteed.
Throughout the history of the bracero program,
participating growers had worked hard to create and
maintain a good public image. They had always denied
responsibility for rural poverty, attributing it
instead to generally depressed farm conditions which
made it impossible to pay higher wages. An important
strategy o f the reformers at the 1961 hearings was to
31 Ibid .. PP« 57-58, 72 .
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undermine this image. Th y drgea that many of thebracero-users were weal+hv r.t y corporate farms. The
accusation was that much of the
.
.
° P°verty against whichAmerica’s conscience was reh^n •belling was deliberately
generated by wealthy growers « +hy so they could become
even richer.
Critics charged that in addition to causing
many Americans to remain unemployed, the braoero pro-gram was undermining domestic farm workers who had
lobs. They statistically demonstrated a tendency for
wages to remain lower n areas using substantial
numbers of braceros.* They also presented
showing that as the number of braeeros used in various
states increased, wages for domestic farm workers
tended to stagnate . ^3
These claims helped to undermine the traditional
grower argument that the braoero program was no threat
to the American farm worker. Although the critics had
long disputed that assumption, their rebuttal during
the 1
9
h0 and l 950’s had come mostly in the form of
emotional and unsubstantial statements. At the 1961
hearings, they offered detailed studies, some of which
32ibid., pp, 56, 5^ 95 #
33
pp. 97 , 102
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had been conducted by the Department of Labor. This
crucial gam for the critics, because much of
the support for Public Law 78 had been based on the
assumption that the imported labor had no adverse
effect on American farm workers.
At the 1961 hearings, critics of the bracero
program made a major effort to capitalize on the New
Frontier concern for the disadvantaged. They stressed
the allegedly terrible conditions under which American
farm workers lived, and they blamed these hardships
directly on Public Law 78 a ov, i^ /a. a spokesman for the
National Consumers League testified.
the^OO^OOO o?
U
so Mexica^br
11^ 1 importation of
and a deleterious ?? eros *as a direct
cond?r Sti° "^htTorke
0
" °f
anfth^b Sn^diminiT^ °f ^ Applicants
,
worktime decreases inh
n Y?^ue wa6es decrease,
window/ 34
, job security goes out the
By 1961 two trends were expanding the surplus
of agricultural workers and making the alleged need for
braceros less convincing. Spokesmen for interest
groups critical of Public Law 78 forcefully pressed
both points. They called attention to the fact that
unemployment was at its highest level since the days
of the Great Depression. 35 Secondly, they pointed out
^^Ibid.
,
p. 96 . ^5ppid.
,
P- 55.
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that fan, mechanization had made great process and
that it was creating more and more rural unemployment.
As increasing numbers of fa™ workers lost their jobs
to machines, how could growers claim that Americans
simply could not be found to fill the shrinking^
of remaining jobs?
The claim centering around mechanization was
a more powerful justification for reform than was the
old argument that reliance on Mexican labor should be
P ased out because of general unemployment. Champions
of the bracero system had been able to counter the
earlier argument by pointing out that many of the
unemployed were not farm workers and were unwilling to
begin such a drastically different form of work. It
was much harder for them to answer the claims centering
around mechanization, because the unemployed in question
were agricultural workers who, on the face of it, were
willing to do farm work.
The paradox of the reformers at the 1961 hearings
was that much of their best ammunition came from devel-
opments which they most deplored. If national rates
of unemployment had not been climbing and if farm
mechanization had not been throwing people out of work,
their case would have been considerably less convincing.
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Also attuned to the New Frontier style of
politics was the reformers' attention to the morality
o the hracero program. At the 196l hearings,
o aimed that the use of foreign
.
.
workers to undermine
merican labor was inconsistent with "the moral
conscience of this Nation. "36 To continue PubUo
haw 78 without reform would be ", h1n+u o a blot upon our
national conscience " 37 and ia violation of the
Christian concept of justice .*’ 38
A third theme of critics at the 1961 hearings
was also meshed with priorities which the New Frontier
was already popularising. It was charged that at the
very time President Kennedy and the American people
were alarmed about the declining prestige of the United
States, the bracero program was harming the nation's
international reputation. An American spokesman for
ung Christians, an international organization, told
of bringing some young Latin American leaders to the
United States for a good-will visit. They were criti-
cal of the treatment of braceros. especially "their
severe limitations of movement, their life in labor
camps, separation from their families, and their
nZ
PP. 58, 72. 37 Ibid.,
38
-
Ib id
.
, p. 125.
P. 75.
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inability to change jobs ."39
ics at the 19ol hearings charged further
that the conditions of American farmworkers, under-
lined hy the use of foreign labor, were also giving
the United States a bad image abroad. It was pointed
out that at least one million domestic migrants did
not "enjoy the human rights and privileges which the
General Assembly of the United Nations has agreed
should be a common standard of achievement for all
people and nations.
Although gearing their testimony to New
Frontier priorities enabled reformers to take the
offensive, it sometimes caused problems. For instance,
the Kennedy administration was strongly committed to
extension of foreign aid, and supporters of Public
Law 78 claimed that the bracero system was a crucial
foreign aid program. At the 1961 hearings, spokesmen
for interest groups critical of the Mexican labor
system made clear that they were not opposed to the
principle of foreign aid. However, bringing many
poor Mexicans to the United States for a few weeks of
work each year at very low wages could not be a
'
^Ibid
.
» P- 113 * ^° Ibid
.
.
p. 125.
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permanent solution to the problems of Mexico's
extensive poverty.
Secondly, it was noted that other countries
were aided from general revenues rather than by
throwing the entire burden of foreign aid on already
poverty-stricken families Who+nes. What sense did it make tohelp poor Mexicans bv eiviro- .5 g ing them the jobs of the
poorest workers in the United States?
Since 1942 a powerful justification for the
labor program was the argument that it fur-
shed a substantial income to poverty-stricken
exicans. Its friends had long told of thankful
braceros returning home laden with farm machinery,
automobiles, cooking utensils, new clothing, gifts,
and substantial sums of money. They had claimed that
bracero earnings had enabled many people to build
homes and buy farms and successful businesses. By
the late 1950's, a common assumption among supporters
of Public Law 78 was that the law had been an important
cause of the expansion of Mexico's thriving new
middle class.
Before 1961, critics of the bracero program
had countered these claims more with statements of dis-
belief than with statistical data. However, in the
205
hearings that year, they were ready with survey results
gathered from interviews with braceros leaving the
United States upon completion of their contracts. The
study found that the workers had failed to earn enough
to maintain their families and repay their indebted-
ness for the trip to the United States
.
41
Friends of Public Law 78 had long claimed that
the large number of braceros wishing to return to the
nited States year after year demonstrated the pro-
gram's popularity with them. Indeed the survey found
that some 93^ of the men expected to seek a new con-
tract the following year. However, the researcher
concluded that the high return rate was due mostly
to the braceros' indebtedness resulting from their
work already performed in the United States
.
42
A second broad strategy of the reformers was
designed to convince segments of the coalition
supporting the bracero program that their own interests,
aside from New Frontier priorities, were not being
served by Public Law 78 .
Supporters of the Mexican labor program had
always argued that it was necessary for "American
4l
pp. 356-57. 42 Ibid.
» PP. 357-58.
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farmers." Critics charged that it
th» • t
Was ln fact serving
reia L7T
#
'^ ^ gr°WerS
- *** that
of h
7 SmaU farmSrS US6d b— "hiie
-t
^
— "ere hired by large corporate
c arged that hraceros were used on iess than 50.000.^
* ° ritlCS Want6d t0 kn°W w^ small farmers should
support thrs program which did not benefit them
Continuing the theme that Public Law 78 was atorm of governmental favortism to a very limited num-
*r of growers, reform forces emphasized that only a
small geographical region received any substantial
number of braceros. Most went to the Southwest, but
even within that region, the primary beneficiaries
were the five states of Arkansas. Texas, New Mexico.
Arizona, and California.^ Reform interests asked
why farm interests in the other forty-five states
should favor this labor bonus for such a narrow region.
Critics of Public Law 78 went on to claim that
growers not participating in the bracero program were
actually being harmed by it. While only a few farmers
W6re aSSUred Cheap and
^reign labor, the others
44
Ibid .
, p. 96.
43 ibid., p. 296.
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had to sell their products in the same market. Those
Paying less Tor lahor could afford to sell their pro-
for less, thereby undermining the competitive
position of farmers not participating in the bracero
Program. it was also claimed that ^
of a cheap Mexican labor supply encouraged employers
of braceros to overproduce which in turn lowered the
value of* that product for* -pa x i r all farmers producing it.
Critics of Public Law 78 alleged that the
program put an unjustified burden on taxpayers. At
the Ga things hearings, a reformer charged that the
use of Mexican labor placed "an unnatural and
unnecessary strain on taxpayers in agricultural
areas through the social effects of extreme poverty
It was also charged that the program was harmful to
local businesses. Braceros would spend less money
in the local area than would have domestic workers
holding the same jobs.^
46
45
47
Ibid-, p. 338. 46 Ibid., p . 89 .
Ibid.
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-£a^-ag^^iberaLreform n , th ,
ial£“s™“- *« «•
,„„„„„
“ “"r"0~a b'*'*~ >”»*
much on the defensive The profrr*mn P °g a was on trial
and its partisans suffered from the disadvantage ofavmg the terms of debate structured primarily bythe critics of Public Law 78 .
Two closely related themes appear in the de-
fensive case built by supporters of Mexican labor
Flrst. the bracero program was not out of character
with emerging national commitments to social reform.
Secondly, it was in fact a liberal. New Frontier
type of program the termination of which would under-
oine the most important priorities of the Kennedy
administration.
Much of the concern of the grower coalition
was directed toward answering the charge that Public
Law 78 was undermining American farm workers. Farm
spokesmen charged that the administration of the law.
actual conditions of domestir m ,u x c farm workers, and the
intent of growers using braceros had all been
misconstrued.
It was claimed that the average yearly wage for
farm workers was misleading because they included
209
economicaUy
as housewives and retired persons
.
48
Supporters of Public Law 78 did not claim that
omestic farm workers enjoyed high earnings. How-
they did argue that impressive earnings were
possible for able and devoted people. Numerous
P es were cited, including one migrant family
which was able to save $3 . 200 in a period of five
weeks. True enough, not all employees would earn
a good living, because many American farm laborers
were lazy and did "not want to work" 5° or were
severely handicapped, physically, mentally, or
P ych la trie ally, or by reason of age .''^ 1 None of
these problems were caused by the fa™er. and it
would be unjust to saddle him with the responsibility
for solving them.
There were sound economic reasons why even
able Americans doing farm work on a permanent basis
did not earn more. The fact that their earnings were
not higher was not due to the caprice or insensitivity
of growers. It was caused by a combination of declining
farm prices and the leveling of worker productivity. 52
48 49.IMd., PP. 4-5. ^ibid.. p. 80.
J
°Ibid., p. 81 . 51 Ibid ..
52Ibid . t p. 5.
p. 12.
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Supporters of Publio Law ?g argued
tWltleS f°r
—
-re increasing at an
impressive pace
. Liberal reforms did ^^ ^ ^
written into bracero legislation, because farm wages
ad already risen substantially in all bracero-using
states, some farm workers were already covered byocial Security, the Interstate Commerce Commission
was protecting interstate migrants, several states
were guaranteeing safe intrastate transportation of
farm workers, twenty-eight states had already estab-
lished migrant labor commissions, eight states had
passed laws repairing crew leaders to register, and
more state departments of education were working to
improve the education of migrant children
.
53
There was no attempt to deny that some migrants
lived under deplorable conditions. Growers and their
Political allies called for some reforms, particularly
relatively non-controversial ones in such areas as
education and health. However, legislation dealing
with such matters should come from state and local
governments. They were 4-vn closer to the people and less
likely to abuse power and threaten the democratic
way of life than was the national government.
53 Ibid.. P- 37.
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Liberal critics of the bracero program and
users of Mexican labor had always disagreed about
which level of government should ass„m„n i u e responsibilityfor regulating the conditions *u a x Of farm workers.
“‘*"1" « «• or ,obllo 7e
r.o,r,„„,ly ,7W „
,up<rtlionr
ro e of the national government while farm interests
Lad generally favored regulation from the state and
local level. Whatever the motivation, each had
Ught to place governmental responsibility at which-
ever level its own political influence was likely to
be greater. Coming from more agricultural states
bracero-users could generally expect their local and
state governments to be more sympathetic to their
cause. At the national level, the political influence
Of southwestern farmers was more diluted because it
had to compete with the great urban and industrial
political interests of the eastern states.
Supporters of Public Law 78 charged that the
reforms proposed by its critics made unrealistic
assumptions about the bracero program and its impact
on American workers. It was simply not correct that
the Mexican labor program was undermining domestic
workers. After all. the law flatly and explicitly
212
prohibited that. Pub l io Law ?8 required ^ ^
Labor Secretary, before certifying braceros for far.
use. must have determined that Americans who were
qualified, and willing to work were unavailable
at the time and place needed. He must also have
concluded
"that "there wrmiaould be no adverse effect on
domestic farm laborers and thatthat the grower had made
reasonable efforts to hire Americans at "wages and
standard hours of work comparable to those offered to
foreign workers." Therefore,
"to the extent that
domestic workers are or may be available, these pro-
visions assure they will receive priority.
According to supporters of Public Law ?8,
there was no question that this provision of the law
had been enforced. In fact, it was claimed that,
jus
t
6
benf
6
over'bac kwards^to ^ •
De™ent has
Jroviqinn A administer this
are often required^fT *5® extent that they®Pl ired to employ domestic workers
people who !?
aS b®en rec
^
uired employ*0 are just a disturbance, who didn’to any work, who were ineff ic ient. 55
It was charged that a second unrealistic
assumption of the reformers was the claim that unem-
ployment in the United States demonstrated that
Mexican farm labor was not needed. When workers
5h
Ibid,
,
55 Ibid.p. 1
6
.
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"" needed
' W6re
needed at a particu-
ar trme and place. General unemployment might be
highest during the
.inter months while the greatest
demand for farm workers
.as in the summer and fall.
Those without work
.ere often in the East
.hile crops
needed planting and harvesting in the South.est.
Transportation over such distances
.as impractical,
because most farmers needed seasonal
.orkers for
only a fe.
.eeks at a time .-56 Many of the unemployed
were industrial
.orkers with no experience in agricul-
ture. Sometimes they had no desire to move inasmuch
as they o»ned their homes, had children in school,
or were otherwise committed to the local area.
Supporters of Public La. 78 vehemently denied
the accusation that growers had failed to make a
conscientious effort to recruit Americans for avail-
farm jobs. They claimed that farmers much
preferred able domestic workers to braceros because
of the substantial expense involved in providing the
numerous benefits guaranteed by law to the Mexicans.
Positions had been announced through news releases,
radio spot announcements, and handbills. Information
stations had been established and farm placement
56Ibid,
,
p. 10.
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^ ^ b6en l0Cated
- facilities to reach
a maximum number of potential employees. Transpor-
tation had often been furnished to and from the Sob. 5?It was pointed out that many unemployed Americans had
refused the Jobs. Of those who went to work, few re-
mained beyond several days and almost none lasted the
Since few Americans wanted these jobs, the
growers had no alternative to relying on Mexican labor.
The preceding case for the bracero program was
mostly a defensive one. Although Public Law 78 was on
trial, its supporters also took the defensive. They
claimed that they were the ones who were for humani-
tarian legislation while the critics of the bracero
program had made proposals which would only intensify
human misery.
Critics of Public Law 78 had testified to the
terrible conditions under which American migrants
lived and worked. Yet they had repeatedly advocated
reducing the extent of the bracero program and moving
American citizens into these jobs. 58 Growers did not
believe that the government should encourage Ameri-
cans to move into seasonal work, because it was hard,
it often d isrupted families, and it made it almost
57 Ibid.
, pp. 33-35. 58 Ibid.
, p. 8.
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impossible for children + rt ." t0 °btaln a education,
he use of Mexican labor reduced the number of
Americans exposed to these hardships. 59
Another reform quality claimed for the bracero
Program was that it had significantly reduced the wet-back problem. If there were no program> ^
still have to harvest their crops and the problem of
illegal entry would return. Since poverty-stricken
Mexicans were going to enter in any event, it was
much better to have them coming under the bracero
program with all of the protections which it guaranteed.
Congress was reminded of the terrible problem of illegal
immigration before the Mexican labor program was
established. 0
Supporters of Public Law 78 claimed that it
possible the kind of good relations with Mexico
which the United States was seeking. The bracero
program had led to increased understanding between
the two countries. There was great poverty in Mexico,
and to end the program would hurt her and her citizens
"critically." 61 In fact, Public Law 78 was serving
59Ibid
.
. p. 16 .
° 1
Ibid
.
. p. 14.
60
Ibid.
» PP* 18, 21, 83.
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the same
.unction as the proposed Peace Corps. We
-re teaching Mexico
-about the United States through
e eye witness account of its own citizens." 62
President Kennedy had expressed the goal of
keeping Latin America from going communist. Continu-
ation of the bracero program was well suited to that
New Frontier priority, because it was helping to
avoid "the economic chaos which is the feeding ground
for communism. ,,b 3
Summarized above are two main clusters of
arguments presented in defense of the bracero program
at the 196! hearings before the Gathings subcommittee.
First. Public Law 78 was not standing in the way of
New Frontier goals. Secondly, it was in fact a
liberal reform program which could be most useful to
the Kennedy administration. A third set of justifi-
cations represented a reply to the reform effort to
up the bracero coalition. Supporters of Public
Law 78 denied that any members of their coalition
were violating their self-interests.
It was claimed that termination of the Mexican
labor system would harm small farmers more than large
62-
Ibid
. t
63
Ibid.
,
P. 27. pp. 42-45.
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ones. If the Mexican labor supply were cut off. there
would be a labor shortage which probably could be met
only through mechanization. The wealthy farmer could
solve the problem through purchasing expensive machin-
ery but the small farmer could not. The latter would
not have the money, and even if he did it would not
be economically sound to mechanize a small farm. 64
Evidence was presented to contradict the claim of the
reformers that few small farmers were participants in
the bracero program. 6 ^
It was charged that the termination of Public
Law 78 would harm even farmers who grew only crops
in which no braceros were used. If Mexicans could
no longer work in the United States, the demand for
the available supply of domestic labor would be
much greater. 66 An employer of Puerto Rican farm
labor in New Jersey testifiedi
if
th% Mexican nationals should be barred of entrv
Sew Mexfco
6 “Wition with CaUforn^'
Puerto Rican agrtcuiturafiabSr ^Tis^lfthat
New
P
Jersey°counties^7
e in th6SS
64
66
IMd.. p. 6. 65Ibid
.
.
p. 4l.
Ibid*
» P» 26. ^ Ibid.
, pp. 26-27.
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Supporters of the bracero program charged
that its termination would serious! v „
, .
ly harm numerous
merican businesses. This oonolusion „as based on
e assumption that growers would lose a great deal
in IIT
^ UnaMe " °btai
" l-or.
a event, the many businesses furnishing themWith supplies would also suffer ThP ^ +UIl * e Picture presented
a vastly interdependent eoonomy i„ which farm-
” Play a vital role. It was dangerous to tamper
with their labor supply, because anything depressing
farm income would have a deleterious effect on millions
of other people, leading to serious economic problems
far beyond the farm economy itself,
Advocates of the bracero program claimed that
ft was helping to prevent the very sort of depressed
areas which so concerned President Kennedy,
p
f
ro
r
.r
ederal aid t0 de '
materially chane-ad P & am is cut off or
cultural Las »mi/rat segments of our agri-
but bankrupt overnight?^
1”6 n0t
'
iUSt dePressed,
Supporters of Public Law 78 claimed that its
termination would harm almost all American consumers.
Without a Mexican labor supply, the labor shortage
IMd., p. 23. 69 Ibid..
68
P p. 21.
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;rtr wages unreasonabiy «*• *—3
coot on to consumers.
With so many points of view and with +h
„rn ,mo . .
Wl the "any pressureg oups pushing for reform, it is
+ . „
• not surprising that
ennedy administration drafted its own liberalbill (H.R, 6032), T+ wao • .
Mp .
“ WaS lnbroduced by Representativeerwm Coad (D-Iowa) t+o •> Its aim was to prevent braoeros
rom adversely affecting domestic farm workers. Thebill would have banned the Mexican workers from year-long and skilled Jobs, it provided that in order to
qualify for braceros, growers must have previously
offered American workers wages as high or higher than
those paid Mexicans. Finally, it specified that domes-
tic laborers must be offered various other perquisites
which braceros were finarantooH _ uguaran eed such as free housing
and transportation.'70
Several administration spokesmen had called for
reform before the Gathings subcommittee. After the
hearings had ended, they continued to call on the House
Agriculture Committee to reject the Gathings bill and
70
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report out a reform measure. For example> Qn
ZT
16
’ Lab°r SeCret3ry GOldberg iSSUed ^ statementmg that the Kennedy administration was flatly
opposed to extension of Public Law 7 8 without amend-
ments to protect American farm workers from unfair
competition. 71
The Kennedy administration had no realistic
hope of getting a reform bill reported by the House
Agriculture Committee, of thirty-three members, only
two came from the northeastern states. The committee
membership came predominantly from the southern and
western states. Bracero supporters had always domi-
nated the committee.
Despite the discouraging composition of the
House Agriculture Committee +h* r™xx , t e Pressures directed
at it by the Kennedy administration were not without
purpose. They helped to publicise further the position
of the executive branch. Also, they helped to set the
stage for the more favorable showdown before the full
House in which grower strength was more diluted. They
encouraged reform groups to push their case harder now
that they were clearly allied with the executive branch.
71
—” York Times. April 26, 1961, p . b6.
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0n 196!. the Agrio ul tUre Committee
y a vote Of 25-3 approved the Gathings bill and ex.tension of the Mexican labor program without reform. 7*
e only raembers opposing the Gathings measure were
Representatives Goad. Lester R. Johnson (D_wisc
. )(and Daniel K. Inouye (D-Hawaii )
.
73
The accompanying report of the Agriculture
Committee did little more than summarise some of the
mam arguments presented in the testimony of grower
spokesmen before the Gathings subcommittee. For
instance, it concluded that Mexicans were needed be-
cause not enough Americans were willing to do stoop
labor and that ending the program would be disastrous
for small farmers. Keeping it would provide much-
needed jobs for poor Mexicansu
. The program played an
important role in supplying crucial dollars to Mexico's
economy. It helped to reduce the wetback problem. The
committee report flatly rejected all of the adminis-
tration's reform proposals. To require employers of
braceros to pay a certain wage to Americans would be
"a backdoor approach to regulating the employment of
domestic workers." There was no need to guarantee
72
cgWR, XIX (April 28, 1961), 714.
73CgWR, XIX (April 21, 1961), 677.
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»* „jw bI
aoeros. Amerxcan workers alrea(Jy ^^
b
W3S SUPeri°r” t0 th. Mexicans,ecause
"domestic workers are free to 1*
ment they don’t like a
6mPl°y-
and seek employment elsewhere .
-
7I*
The administration attack was nr„m+ ,
nv> .
P o ptly renewed.
Pri
.
23> GOldberg blasted ^e committee action.
tjafth^ pow:r
a
and
t
aut^Itfofh?h
a<1
!!
inistration
nomic conditions of United
r|?dI dePressed eco-Evidence accumulated hv +h atas Tarm workers,proves beyond doubt tha+^w Department of Labor
of Mexican labor has ban
the
”? ss importation
verse effect on the Wa^ 3 i? having’ an ad-
and employment opDortnft + 1! a
W°r
'e
1
l
:
)
g condi tions
farm workers? At a lZ»? S °f United States
a major problem in the Unul? s25i°?fe,lt isbe no justification for cnn+tnf^ there Canprogram unless action is taken SU?h ainterests of United ^ protect theu States farm workers
. 75
The administration carried its fight for
liberalization of the bracero program to the floor of
the House. Some of the most important reforms con-
tained in the unreported Goad bill were offered as amend-
ments to the Bathings bill. They were all defeated.
some in vo ice votes, others by standing votes.
?
6
74
CSWR. XIX (April 28, 1961), 71*.
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~ - York Times
, April Zb, 1961, p . Zb.
76CgWR, XIX (May 12
, 1961 ), 794.
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Only one or two Republicans supported the liberal
amendments while the main opposition came from a
oalition of Republicans and conservative Democrats,
especially southerners. 77
House debate on the Gathings bill and extension
of the bracero program was lively. Supporters of the
Program claimed that this effective •ii foreign aid bill
was helping to keep Mexico out of the communist bloc. 78
The Mexican labor system was essential because Ameri-
cans simply could not be found for the hardest kinds
of farm work. 77 Because farmers had to have labor
termination of the bracero program would bring a re-
turn of the wetback problem at its worst. 80 Reforms
were not needed, because Public Law 78 gave Secretary
Goldberg all the authority he needed to protect domes-
tic workers from adverse effect.®*
In House debate, the following representatives
supported continuation of the hra p 0 nn1 xn b cero program without
77New York Times, May ll, 1961, p . 36
.
7 Sr, q,
a?th c°^->
79
Ibid
.
8°
Ibid
.
. p. 7709.
8l
Ibid., p. 7710.
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substantial reform.
1
2
3
k
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
C
AS S*ith (R-Calif.)harles Teague (R-Calif )
Har?
ld
S°°
ley (D-N
-C.)lan Hagen (D-Calif.)
Wi?^
eS
?
ubser (R-Calif.)lliam Avery (R-Kan.
)
Hoeven (R-Iowa)Edwin Durno (R-Ore.) *
c. Ga things (D-ArV )Clem Miller (D-Calif!)
VJ. R. Poage (D-Tex.)
James Utt (R-Calif. )82
None of these anti-reform congressmen came
r°m ^ indUStr
-l
-st. With one exception, allCame the
-ftM and most from hracero-
using areas.
Reform congressmen participating in House de-bate included the following.
1
2
3
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Thomas Lane (D-Mas=? )
Marguerite Church (R-m.
)
Jeffery Cohelan (D-Calif )
a?£
W1
h S°
ad (D
-^wa) #)Alfred Santangelo (D-N.Y.)
Edfth
1
^ Ba fley (D’W - Va.)i Green (D-Ore.)
Charles Joelson (D-N.Y.)John McCormack (D-Mass.)James O’Hara (D-Mich.)
James Roosevelt (D-Calif.)William Ryan (D-N.Y.)
In contrast to the vocal anti1 l
-reform congressmen,
these reformers came more fv™ +ufrom the eastern United States
82I
For the debate, see Ibid., pp . 7706-28.
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and were more likelv- v i-.y t0 be Democrats. For the firsttime, the outspoken refnrmD
of the u
formers included the Speaker
House (McCormack).
The main obiectinn +« v
it, ,
" t0 the bracer° Program was
verse effect on American workers it
+ ..
. was noted
. X .... h.r. n,
pirUioMy Mexican-Americans ^
- M~U oritici.eo
,orignoring «»,
-g„„ lMy
^the Gathmgs subcommittee r„„,
• Congressmen were reminded
that
-through the device of extension, an emergency
program is being stretched out into a permanent
Policy.- Supporters of the Gathings bill were accused
Of insulting Mexicans by "claiming +ho+ +vy that they are will-
ing to perform labor that .,xn lg below the dignity Qf
American men and women." 83
During House debate, no traditional opponent
of the bracero program observed that he was in the
process of reconsidering his position. However, there
cases of traditional supporters of Public Law 78
noting that they were thinking of switching sides.
it was obvious from their explanations that points
83Ibid.
,
pp. 7707-09.
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raised by the rpfnv-maJ eior ers were threaten
*
+ho ,
n xenmg to undermine
racero coalition. Representative B. F
. sisk
- if.) ha, consistently supports, Public Law ?8 .
6 W°Uld
-ver ,„ so again. „e was
particularly troubled by evidence indie +•a indicating that
6 racero program was undermining a
workers. 8i*
" American farm
Representative Marguerite Church (R-Ili.),
another traditional supporter of ti,,the bracero program,
at she had supported it only because she had
>een told that Mexican labor was needed. She implied
that she was beginning to doubt that foreign workers
were needed. She caIIoh or steps to protect domestic
migrants from bracero competition
.
85
On May 11, the Gathings bill was put to a roll-
call vote in the House. It passed easily with a vote
°f 231 ' 157> Ocntinuing the pattern of the 1950’s, the
program once again received disproportionate support
from the Republicans. The Democrats split evenly.
WitH 115 V°ting for the and the same number voting
agalnSt U - 0nly 42 Republicans voted against it
'iMd., P- 7707. 85Ibid.. p . 77o8.
84.
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while 116 supported it. 86
Thus the Kennedy
administration's
reform proposals fared badly in th e uy H0Use
- M°*t supportive of
non-reformed hracero program were members of the
conservative Gathings subcommittee and the House Agri-
- ure Committee. Although the administration didbetter on the vote in the full h
M1 ,
U 1 House
> Gathingsbill was passed by a wide margin.
Reform forces were able tn •0 galn some ground inthe Senate. This wa<? ,W S not
“"expected. Scholars of
Congress have noteri +vic+- vted that because senators represent
entire states, they must be relativelvy more responsive
to urban interests mi--. ~. The composition of many House
districts is more exclusively rural.
Senator Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.) introduced
the administration bill (S 1945) in the Senate. It
was cosponsored by Hubert Humphrey (D-Minn.).
Stephen Young (D-Ohio). and Paul Douglas (D-Ill.).8?
The McCarthy bill was essentially the same as
the Goad measure which had died in the House. The
McCarthy proposal required denial of braceros to
®6CQWR, XIX (May 12, 1961), 79h f 832-33.
££WR» XIX (June 16, 1961), 988.
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farmers who had not offered j mc, •
oonrtif
American workers comparable
tions It limited the Mexicans to tem-Porary employment. It banned them from operating
power-driven machinery, it alsoy required that no
employer could receive braceros unless he
..offers andPays to such workers wages equivalent to the average
r: "r
" the State *
- employment
“ located, or the national farm wage average, which-
ever is "the lesser.
McCarthy spent considerable energy in explaining
the motivation for his bill to the Senate. It was
“
meant to implement the Kennedy administration's desire
to protect American workers from braceros. Although
Law ?8 had always granted power to the secretary
of labor to prevent "adverse effect." it had failed
to spell out clear guidelines for achieving that goal.
the Labor Department had implemented guidelines
to protect American farm workers from their Mexican
competitors, it had sometimes been faced with lawsuits
based on the assumption that it was exceeding its
aUth0rity
' McCarthy said the purpose of his bill „as
88
i=!+
U
*?Ai Congress ional Record f 87th1st Sess., 1961—W II, Part 7T5599.
Cong.
,
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to provide
"the Department of Labor with mctuo ore and
clearer standards designedl t0 Prevent the program
” *v‘”‘ *dv*~ •"”*
”p°" «•
"a
„f
workers. ,,oy
The bill reported by the Senate Agr .culture
and Forestry Committee contained some reforms. It
required employers to furnish the same conditions of
work for Americans as for braceros. Mexicans were tobe employed only in seasonal work. They were not tobe allowed to maintain or operate machinery. Empioyers
were required to both offer and actually pay the
prevailing wage in the area to bnth ao American workers
and braceros.
The Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee
refused to accept all of the administration-proposed
reforms, it rejected the proposal that Americans be
offered the same guarantees of housing, subsistence
insurance, transportation, and work guarantees as
braceros. Because the farmer could be relatively sure
the Mexicans would complete the season, he could afford
to offer them extra benefits. On the other hand, the
American worker was free to leave at any time and
89
Ijbid., pp. 8596-97.
*
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t
th
I.
farmer ' S initUl inV~
• — as for transpor-ation, could be lost.
Supplemental views, reiected hv» eject by the committee,
were offered by McCarthy, Maurinp n mY * e B. Neuberger (D-0re.)
f^ Pr°Xmire (D- WiS°^> ^ilip A. „art (D.Mich-)
an, Stephen M. Young (D-Ohio). They said the braced
program should not be renewed unless the la„ were revised
^ require farmers to provide identical benefits, in-
cluding housing and transportation, to domestic workers
They proposed a guarantee of more generous wages to
Americans than the committee was willing to accept. 90
In their supplemental views, the five committee
members added:
Public Law 78 was enacted in 19 <>i »+ a +<labor shortage during -t-ho v a time of
f*™
-b.r-
In a letter dated August 8. 1961, Secretary
Goldberg told Senator McCarthy that the "prevailing
wage" requ irement reported by the Senate Agriculture
90
GQWPf XIX (August 4
, 1961), 1358.
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Committee had "no practical value " 0
that that •
Goldberg noted
provision had always been part Qf
agreement with Mexico. Because the
"prevailing
«age" tended to be set *
„
.
unilaterally by farmers, itwas important to tie waaes * *„g to the state or national
average. Goldberg told Earthy that his wage pro-
: :r:9;
th
;
keystone
-
-
.
s
sho Id r
add6d that M0Carth^’ s wage formula
ul be added as an amendment on the floor ofthe Senate. ^
The bill reported by the Senate Agriculture
ommittee was the Gathings measure 2010 ) with
amendments. McCarthy followed Coldberg-s advice and
added a wage proposal as an amendment, ft specified
at farmers were to pay no less than 90* of the
national or state average farm wage, whichever was
lower, before they would be eligible to contract
braceros. It was accepted in a roll call vote by
^2-bO. Critics of the amendment charged that it was
a devious means of • •setting minimum wages for domestic
workers and would ffreativia greatly decrease the value of the
bracero program to farmers. 9^
9
^IMd., p. 18786
.
93 Ibid., p. 18787
.
9 C£WR, XIX (September 15, 1961), 1574.
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In Senate debate, the -Foil
significant ref
lowing meters opposed
orms xn the bracero program and
supported the Gathings billt
1
2
3
4
5
6
Allen Ellender (D-La )yer-ett Jordan (D-N.C.)John T°wer ( R-Tex
.
)
llliam Fulbright (D-Ark )
Clint
ard
A
H° llarid (°-Fla.
)
on Anderson (D-N.M.
Reformers speaking out in Senate debate were
"ore numerous and included the following,
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Eugene McCarthy (D-Minn.)
n Long (D-Hawaii)Claxr Engle (D-Ca lif.)
C?f?f
S
°!? ?
lUifs (D-N.J.)°rd Gas e (R-N.J.)
Philip Hart (D-Mich.)
aurine Neuberger (D-Ore.)William Proxmire (D-Wisc )
Pau?
e
n
h K
?
ati
"s (R-N.y.)l Douglas (D-IH.)
Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.
)
Wayne Morse (D-Ore.)
John Carroll (D-Colo.) 9^
The bill (h.r. 2010) as amended passed the
Senate on September 11
. 1961
. by a roll call vote of
76-9. The heavy vote for the bill should not be inter-
preted to mean that the traditional bracero program had
grown immensely popular. The important fact is that
1st Seasf^mi— 8 7th Cong..
Part 16. 20755- 75?
’
’ 18769’ 91 and
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the bill was verv munh «y c a compromise measure with
something for everybodv growers, there was con-tinuation of the programP even though unemployment
rates were high. For critics of it. there were re-forms designed to protect domestic workers. ThebUl was passed by a large ooaution Qf nberais
conservatives. The nine opponents were also a mixture
of both. Liberals such as Albert Gore (D-Tenn.
)
and Kenneth Keating (R-n y ) joined such conservatives
as Richard Russell (D-Ga )
•
)
and Herman Talmadge (D-Ga.
)
in opposing H.R. 2010.
Party support in the Senate took a different
pattern from that in the House. It will be recalled
that in the latter, disproportionate support came from
Republican members. In the Senate, the bulk of the
opposition to H.R. 2010 as amended came from Republicans.
Three^Democrats and six Republicans voted against the
bill. Perhaps one reason this pattern deviates from
heavier Republican support observed earlier is that
the issues were now less clear inasmuch as the bill
»as such a mixed bundle of liberal and conservative
compromises.
96,
'CfiWR. XIX (September 15, 1961 ), 1574, 1603.
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On September 15, i 96l
. House-Senate cont
committee members met to
erence
th,
>" differences i„«»».« «d Sen,,, v.r,l0„ „
mittee voted tn •
The com~
eliminate the important McCarthy
amendment. Of the seven Senate conferees, onlyGeorge Aiken (R-vt )
ment The •
SUPP°rted Mention of the amend-S °PP0Sipg retention were all
southerners and/or Republicans.
bill
^ C °nferenCe °°mmittee finished with the
1. was more conservative than it had come fromthe Senate. On September 21, 196, o
the conference ren h
aCCepted
SPOrt by a rol l «11 vote of 4l-31 . 98On this more conservative version of „.R. 2010
. Hepubli-
an support was up and Democratic support down. Of the
enate Democrats, 25 voted for the bill while 24
opposed it. Republicans split l6-7 . with the majority
supporting H.R. 2010."
a party vote breakdown for the House vote on
the conference renort ic
-
P° 13 not Possible, because the
97CJM. XIX (September 22, 1961), 1619.Qq
OgWR, XIX (September 29. 1961), 1661.
"ibid., p . 1685.
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P mber 16 determination was by voice vote 100
«•”*<»
blllinto law on October 4 iqfii „ , .
+ _ . ,
1961
’ 00raPlaming that it failedinclude guarantees
"which 1 hoi •
„ „
ftlC be lieve necessary toprotect domestic farm workers ” 101 uH°wever. he didmake some concessions to form • +
th . .
0 far lnteres ts. He Claimedat braceros would be needed in some areas during
e coming year. But Kennedy pointedly charged that
exican labor program was "adversely affecting
the wages, working conditions and employment oppor-
tunities for our own agricultural workers." 102 Upon
signing the bill, the President said th.*l at even though
was not what he wanted, putting an abrupt end to
the program would seriously harm the Mexican economy.
Kennedy promised that Labor Secretary Goldberg
would take full advantage of his authority under
Public Law 78 to set standards for the use of braceros.
and that he would simply refuse to certify them for use
where their employment would have an adverse effect on
the working conditions and wages of domestic workers. 10 3
XIX (September 22, 196l), 1619
101
-
.
**
cited as C^^xvf
) ;
r
.^
rly A1llwn*H (hereafter
102
—
W York Til"e£ > October 5 , 1961, p. 24.
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Of course, this wa<? +uthe solution preferred by
resident Kennedy, because it left the t v,1X i r Labor Depart-
ment s actions onen +«P to delaying courtroom challenges.
the en ,
Perhaps the greatest gain of the reform forces during
the year was the election of Kennedy and the defeat ofixon. Kennedy’s record in Congress, his reform-
oriented campaign, and his political indebtedness to
orces critical of the bracero program all foretold
his attack on Public Law 78.
Having a friendly person in the White House
for the first time brought numerous benefits to
reform elements. It stimulated unprecedented publicity
for the case against foreign labor and conveyed its
rationale to the general public and to Congress more
clearly than ever before. The executive branch has
vast resources for research purposes, and several care-
ful studies of farm labor were conducted. These
findings, mostly favorable to the reform cause, were
released to the press, passed along to friendly
congressmen, and used by administrative spokesmen at
legislative hearings.
The administration worked closely with reform
members of Congress. It drafted legislation such as
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the Coad bill. When reform oongressmen ^
the administration obliged.
The new administration mounted an impressive
campaign for reform of Public Law 78
. it attacked
early and vigorously with a unified offensive
mounted simultaneously by the President and several
top-level officials of his government. Over and over
each emphasized that he was speaking for the entire
'nistration. There was no opportunity for the
traditional bracero forces to ally with any cabinet
official as the reform forces had done during the late
1950 -s. The united offensive of the Kennedy adminis-
tration enhanced its power.
The executive branch gained additional advantage
by integrating its assault on Public Law 78 with its
broad attack on poverty. This gained more attention
for criticism of the bracero program. As the govern-
ment linked the Mexican labor system more closely to
domestic poverty, new converts were gained for the
reform cause.
By the end of 1961, Kennedy had made clear that
some reforms would be undertaken administratively even
though Congress had failed to grant specific authori-
zation for them. This was a bold but risky venture.
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“ WU1 bS rSCalled that
Roosevelt similariySought such reforms + h *. v
snarl
.
.
thr°Ugh Use ° f Farm Security
Administration nni v uo ly to have them rapidly dismantled
y ongress. As we shall tvsee, Kennedy was luckier
and his boldness paid off.
President Kennedy's willigness to operate from
a compromise position probably helped the cause of re-form. In retrospect, there seems to have been very
little chance in 1961 +ho+ n
.
that Congress would either abruptly
terminate Public Law 7 o y78 or extend it with no reforms
at all. By adamantly opposing all reforms, grower
interests weakened their own position. This rigid po-
sition forced even some supporters of the Mexican labor
system to criticize it and align themselves partly with
the Kennedy administration. By talcing a moderate po-
sition, President Kennedy appeared more responsible
than the adamant status quo forces. It enabled him
to draw support from both friends and foes of the
bracero program.
Kennedy's power to reform or terminate the
bracero program was limited by a number of factors.
He had won by a very narrow margin. Most congressional
opposition to Public Law 78 had come from Democrats,
and in neither House nor Senate races had they done
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particularly well in 196o
. xlth
Kennedy had voted , *
6 member
-
_ .
°r terminati°n of the Mexican laborystem. as President he found several fact^ ors which led
Stop Short Of his old position. One was the
ization that conversion to domestic labor would
Another was his concern that relations
with Mexico should not be endangered by a too abrupt
termination of Public Law 78 .
By 1961, interest groups pushing for reform of
the bracero system were more formidable than ever
^ey were a far cry from the little group appearing
at the Downey hearings i„ m2 . By 196l> the^
coalition had won many new interest groups to its cause,
including some very well fina n« c j , _
.
n financed and politically adept
ones. These groups were vocal and exudedct-L a a new confi-
hence borne of careful preparation and a sense of being
allied for the first time with the powerful executive
branch of government. Membership in these groups came
from all major parts of the country. This maximised
their chance of getting a favorable hearing from Congress
The tactics of the reform interest groups were
impressive. The bracero program was attacked from
many angles. This approach maximized the likelihood
that its vulnerabilities would be found and exploited.
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Keform forces wisely tried tQ break ^ the
tl0n ^ aPPeaUn® *> self- intere s t of
Its member groups.
Although status quo forces were formidable
opponents, they made a number of tactical01 errors. As
P lie concern grew about povertv 0 u •y and emphasis was
placed on society’s obliffatirm +iga on to provide economic
opportunities, it was a mistake to charge farm workers
laZin6SS ^ d™nness. At the time when Presi-
Kennedy, the media, and congressional hearings
were publicizing rural poverty, claims that migrants
were enjoying great progress were not very convincing.
The claims looked particularly spurious when bracero-
users justified the program as a way of saving
Americans from the miseries of farm labor.
The claim that the use of Mexican labor in the
United States was a liberal reformi program probably
convinced few. Also, by 1961, abuses of the bracero
program were receiving more publicity, and this prob-
ably helped the reform cause. The threat that without
a generous supply 0f Mexican labor, southwestern farmers
would simply use wetbacks struck some congressmen as
an effort at intimidation.
A number of social and economic trends were
24l
weakening the old status qUQ
^^ ^ex ic an labor user had always been most
when unemployment was high. Parm mechanixation was
Pressing and undermining the rationale for Mexican
abor. The American population was growing more hsh urban.
and even with legislative
malapportionment, farm
strength was slowly being eroded. Also, the civil
nights era was beginning, and it would bring political
s rength to groups such as Negroes and Mexican-Amerleans
.
ough in 1961, status quo forces held reforms of
Public Law 78 to a minimum, these eroding trends
would be intensified during the coming years.
Although the reforms achieved in 1961 did not
satisfy Kennedy and Goldberg, they were the only sig-
nificant changes in Public Law 78 during its decade
Of existence.
Notwithstanding the fact that the year brought
some changes long sought by liberals, bracero-users
and their congressional allies enjoyed a number of
crucial advantages. From about the World War I era
on, it was widely assumed that western growers had a
"right" to Mexican labor. Except during extraordinary
times, the rest of the country maintained a hands-off
attitude. The government itself had established a
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formai system to supply Mexican labor during each war.
effort IT
b6tWeen WarS
' ” h3d
- little
to keep wetbacks out.
In Congress, the users of Mexican labor had
enjoyed support from the powerful alliance of RepUbli.
cans and southern Democrats. Although some members
ol Congress thought bracero legislation should go
through the more liberal labor committees, the con-
servative agriculture committees had been granted
jurisdiction from 1942 on.
For these reasons, at the end of 1961, the
future of the Mexican labor system remained uncertain.
Whale the reformers could show some gains, their oppo-
nents continued to enjoy some powerful advantages.
Events of 1962
The agreement with Mexico was due to expire
on February 1. 1962. The Kennedy administration
negotiated its renewal without fanfare. Agreement was
announced on January I0. 10if
During 1962, the administration continued to
push for legislation to improve the conditions of
104New York Times
, January 11, 1962, p. 18.
2^3
domestic farm workers. In January, the President's
r COmmittee °alled ~ legislationP ovtdtng collective bargaining rights. minimum wages>
and unemployment insurance benefits for f
.
il t arm workers,
resident Kennedy endorsed its resolutions.
Committee members noted that the main hopes
of the administration were pinned on House treatment
of several bills providing benefits to migrants.
The Senate had already passed all of the measures
during 1961. It appeared that the bills providing
grants-in-aid to the states for health care and edu-
cation of migrant families were more realistic
possibilities than such reforms as minimum wage legis-
lation which were sure to run into strong opposition
from farm state representatives. 10?
During 1962, the Labor Department made good
on President Kennedy's promise to achieve some re-
forms administratively. Perhaps most importantly.
Secretary Goldberg found a way to establish minimum
wages for American farm workers being used on the same
farms as braceros. According to his interpretation,
new legislation was not essential to accomplish this
purpose, but it could be done quite legitimately
%ew York Times
, January 18, 1962, p. 19.
2kk
through Public Law 78 which h*a
.
. „
l0 ad serv®1 as the legal
0 the bracero program since i 951 .
It will be recalled that Public Law 78
that braceros were to rec •
Pr°Vlded
.
.
.
0 eive ^e
"prevailing wage"
P31d ^ farraers similar types of „ork in
area. The problem was that well before theseason had arrived fa v«m
„
6 > farffiers would
-et and arbitrarily
set a prevailing wage » n„3
- Domestics were offered that
e. a most always low. When they refused to work
at that level, growers requested braceros. Because
Americans had failed to work for the wages offered, a
or Sh°rtaee "" d6Clared a"d they got their workers
"cm MeXi°°- Under *•" circumstances, wages could
almost never work their way up very much because the
back-up supply of Mexican labor was always available
at the low rates. As Secretary Goldberg saw it. such
prevailing wages" were meaningless. His solution
was to change the means by which they were determined.
The Labor Department proceeded to conduct hearings in
areas using braceros. Then a minimum wage was determined
which took into account not only grower testimony but
that of farm workers as well.
Farmers offering American workers less than
this newly established minimum wage were not to be
2^5
certified to receive v»v»braceros. The rates set by
Secretary Goldberg differed <v„s amere from state to state.
varying from a low of sixty cents an h
of one dollar.
t0 3 high
Union officials and other reform interests
Wel°°med GOldberg ’ S ** claimed that he had
set the wages too low. Bracero users predictably
charged that he had simply taken illegal action to
establish the minimum wa^es for* -rg r farm workers which
Congress had always flatly rejected
.
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Despite their gains in 1961 and the first half
of 1962, critics of the bracero program suffered some
disappointments. Onlv ao y single bill providing for
improvement in the lot of American farm workers was
passed by Congress. It was a bill which furnished
federal grants for improving health services for migrant
workers and their families. Three others were held up
by the conservative House Rules Committee after having
been reported favorably by the House Education and Labor
Committee and having passed the Senate. As is its
prerogative, the Rules Committee simply failed to
provide ru les for the bills which effectively killed
106m
XXI (fanuary 25 ’ 1962 > P- ^
>
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them.
f . ..
°Urine 1962
’ er°Wer interests «aged a vigorous
Sht against reforms then being carried out and
others which they feared were imminent. Moves were
"ad6 “ COngreSS t0 deprive S.ere tary Goldberg of the
roader authority he had assumed. He was charged
with creating a czar-like Department of Agriculture. 108
The year 1962 marks the beginning of a pro-
nounced trend for grower interests to recognize that
power was shifting away from them and the need to
consider alternatives +n 4x to the increasingly undesirable
bracero program.
The first option was to seek to continue using
Mexican labor but to bypass the bracero program. One
possibility was to encourage Mexicans to enter the
United States under regular immigration status and
eventually apply for citizenship. In 1962. the
~ Y°rk TimeS
-
SUggested that such a pattern was emerg-
ing. It noted that while the Kennedy administration
had been reducing the number of braceros admitted,
immigration from Mexico had been increasing. 109
10 ?
COWR y v rfri u°
rk TimeFi
> May 28, 1962, p. 28-k U XX (October 19, 1962), 1944. P ’
108
New York Times
, July 15, 1962, Part Iv p , 8
1 09jjew York Times, August 12, 1962, p. 33.
2k7
The second alternative was to turn
.ore and
more to mechanization. Although this was more dim
°Ult ^ ° r0PS SUOh as berries and fruits, great
Progress had already been made in large farm oper-
ations such as cotton, and 1962 brought marked gains
1,1 dl
^0
laC6ment °f l-»>or with harvesting
machines.
Developments of 1963
The administration continued its assault on
the Mexican labor system during 196 3 . m January, it
was learned that the Department of Labor had been en-
gaged in an investigation of alleged law violations
by bracero-users. The investigation was set off by
the allegations of a former clerk for a major lettuce
farm that she had been instructed to alter payroll
records for Mexican nationals to indicate that they
had worked many more hours than they actually had.
reason, she suspected, was the company's desire to
remove any evidence which could be used to prove its
discrimination against American workers.
^
E ® allegations were in turn used as fuel by
110 -,. ,Ibid.
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critics of the bracero program. A California organi-
zation named the Emergency Committee to Aia Farm
Workers demanded that the Mexican Labor Program be
permitted to end upon its expiration date at the end
the year. Committee spokesmen charged that thelaw contained inherent inducements tor iUegal actions
indicated by the alleged payroll alteration event. 111
In the meantime, it was disclosed that the
Labor Department had investigated several other grow-
ers as well on the suspicion of similar legal
violations
.
^ 2
Such developments were bad publicity for
farm interests and came at an especially inopportune
txme inasmuch as the program was due to expire at the
end of 1963. Also dampening the hopes of those seeking
extension was the fact that during 1962. the United
States had brought in the smallest number of braceros
m twelve years. The higher wages required by the
Department of Labor were bringing more Americans into
farm work and lessening the likelihood that growers
would qualify for Mexican help, 1^
t
New York Times
. January 21 1061 10January 20 . i q6 t V,—rs~ T y~ 1 ' P* 13;y » p. 18; January 25, 1963, p. 13.
New York Times
, January 30, 1963, p. 18.
113New York Times. March 26, 1963, p. 17.
2^9
During 1963. Representative Gathings once
asain led the anti-reform forces in the House. Heintroduced a bin (H.R. 2009 ) which would have ,x.
tended Public Law 78 and repealed several of the
liberal reforms passed in 1961.
Despite its criticism of the bracero program,
e Kennedy administration was unwilling to let it
die at the end of 1963. On March 27 . the new Labor
Secretary, w. Willard Wirt,, testified in hearings be-
fore the Gathings subcommittee. He observed that
mechanization had reduced the need for Mexican labor.
Also, the administration was concerned about growing
domestic unemployment. Yet he called for a one-year
renewal of Public Law 78. This was a compromise, he
indicated, which would enable the administration and
Congress "to re-examine the need for continuation of
the program in the light of further and now unpre-
dictable developments in the labor market situation."
Secretary Wirtz blasted the Gathings bill as
a "serious step backward.” He called for new reforms
which would require farmers, before requesting braceros,
to offer Americans not only working hours, wages, and
Physical conditions of work identical to those guaranteed
Mexicans, but equivalent transportation costs, housing,
250
and occupational insurance. 114
The alignment of interest groups at the hearingsro uced no real surprises. Farm groups generally
supported the anti-reform Gathings bill. Their um°ny differed little fw„ ^. from that offered at the hearings
wo years earlier. They claimed that progress in
—°” h“ •‘“'I-!, lessened
„.a" "X““ “‘°r
- "•"ei stseP Jobs
not enough Americans were willing to do them.
Coming under especially heavy fire was the Labor Depart-
merit’s practice of • •setting minimum wages for American
farm workers.
Various welfare, labor, religious and other
interest groups attacked the Mexican labor program.
Some called for its termination at the end of 1963
while others supported the administration's proposal
Of a one-year extension.
°n May 6, the House Agriculture Committee re-
jected both the Gathings bill and the administration's
proposed reforms. The bill reported (H.R. 5497) by a
vote of 19-3 called for a simple two-year extension
of Public Law 78 without reform but also without
114
CQA, XIX (1963), 114-15.
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wiping out reforms gained in 1961.
The maj0rit* "Port Of the committee claimed
XlCan W°rkerS "" needed for seasonal
arm work because experience hoH •• uP had ’shown that most
American labor is unwilling to accept seasonable agri-
cultural employment.- it noted that Public Law 78
virtually eliminated the wetbacks" and that
- -d been of benefit to Pico’s economy *7 ^
report rejected Wirtz's call for a one-year pro-
visional extension of the program because it would
cause
"unwarranted hardship." Concerning his pro-
posal that farmers furnish American workers with
housing, transportation, and occupational insurance
the committee said that this would interfere with
matters properly left to the states. 116
Committee members opposing H.R. 5497 were
Benjamin Rosenthal (D-N. Y. ) , Spark M. Matsunaga
(D-Hawaii). and Alec Olson (D-Minn.). They proposed
that Public Law 78 be terminated and a similar pro-
gram be established for furnishing domestic workers
growers. As they saw it, the importation of
115
Ibid., p. 115,
CQWR. XXI (May 10
, 1963), 72h.
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Mexican laborers created an adverse effect on thewages and living + *conditions of Americans. 11 ?
House debate on H.R. <407
tra ,, + .
5497 was spirited. Many
0, lr„«„ prom- a
™ w ,y„„
*> to 0, b,„„ tr,altipnil ^cause it was nn+ ^ »* •c*-*3 ox a pi vp-atuoir" —K away program. Also, it
assured that the money „0U l d reach the people who
needed it most. Public Law ?8 was essentiai ^ ^
c
"'r iCa" e00r
‘0my
’ because for each dollar of farm in-ome which was generated an additional five dollars
were pumped into the non- farm economy. 1«
fact that H.R. 5497 would extend ^^can labor program for two years was praised. It was
argued that the administration's proposal for a one-
year renewal would not enable farmers to olan a
_
0 P adequately.
urthermore, the next debate over extensi on would come
ln a Pres idential election year. 119
Il
the 1963 H°USe debata
- reformers attacked the
117
118,
Ibid.
lst * $$» ,*>*> c°^.
119
IMd.
, pp. 9807-08.
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bra0er° Pr°Sram “ith conservative and llbe ral
arguments. Because it brought governmental inter-
-nce in the economy it violate, the principle oftree enterprise t+^ • Zt was a fading cause of "the
continuing problem of the „„tfiou l°» of American dollarsto other countries.- Because of the cost to the
government of administering Public Law 78. it „as
an important cause of the swollen federal budget.
Reformers again reminded the House that the
burden of proof should lie with tk„„those proposing the
sixth extension of a "-homr^v,emporary program." They noted
the wide spectrum of interest *r„S ouPS critical of the
Mexican labor system 120 *Especially strong criticism
came from two Mexican-American members of the House
Henry Gonzalez (D-Tex.) charged that it was displacing
many poor American farm workers, particularly Mexican-
Americans. Edward Roybal (D-Calif. ) noted that it
was a program which thrived
-on the poverty of both
Mexican nationals and American farm workers." 122
Even more than in 1961. supporters of extension
°f the bracero program criticized it and sometimes
120
-,-,.^
PP. 9820-28. 121 Ibid
.
.
122
Ibid
.
. p. 9827.
P. 9809.
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its termination
- *—
- Bass
’ argUed that
nationals should not hemployed in crops characterised by price c
°
controlled acreage 12 3 Rp '
r°1S °r
(D-Calif ,
Representative B. P. Sisk.)^ while call intr -plmg for passage of H.R, 5h97
R be
3 minimUm f°r d°mestio farm workers. 12^
rt Duncan (D-Ore.) acknowledged that the hraceroProgram had some
-adverse effect on the employ
opportunities of domestics."^
Some House memhers noted that they might dropon of the hracero coalition after the expected 1%3
extension. For instance. Representative H. Allen
Jith (R Calif.) told his colleagues that
"agriculture
have to figure out some way to solve thisdilemma during the next 2 years ” 126 «„ «.
- Another supporter
racero program, Representative Ed Foreman
•)’ Sald that "With a* extension of this act.
we win be able t0 completely get away from the
for brarpm t ^.1
the answer lay in mechanization. 127
123
, p< 9804. 124Ibid.,
125 T*. .Ibid., p. 9824. 126„Ibid.
.
127
I.t’Id.
, p. 9809.
P. 9805.
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Representative Morris Udall (D-Ariz.), whointroduced H.R. 5497 tolri . .W7, ld his House colleagues,
support irLcaSse^think'it1113 bil1, but 1
not be with us very much longer. 128
During House debate, both supporters and oppo-™ 0f the
.
braCSr0 ^
-t. of the increasing
ic opposition to the use of Mexican labor. 129
In a surprise move on May 29, 1963. the House
rejected H.R. 5497 by a roll call vote of 158_m
As expected, heavier support for the bill came from
Republicans. While 78 House Republicans voted for it.
53 voted asrainstgain it. Democrats split 80 for
and 121 against.
We have repeatedly found an association between
region and support for the bracero program. Of the
74 voting representatives from the states using the
greatest numbers of braceros (Texas. California, Michi-
gan, Colorado. Arizona, and Arkansas), 50 voted for
H.R. 5497 while only 24 voted against it. 1 ? 0
There was substantial negative reaction to the
House vote
. Hard-core supporters of the Mexican labor
128
Ibid., p. 9818. 129lbid.. p. 9824.
1 3025WR. XXI (May 31. 1963), 832, 856.
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system such as Gathings 131and t»
on their- „
gUe ProBPtly called
colleagues to reconsider Teas
that ^
* &ue suggested
a one-year extension might Hp
af .+ n? be acceptableafter all. lj>2
Grower response in the Southwest „„
;r
; *——
-
-
™
«<. «h«r
A of tt<ir
elegrams were presented to Congress by repre-
sentatives of braca™ , .cero areas and inserted in the
Congress ional 133
Various western newspapers featured articles
or editorials critical of the Hnuca + •xn ho se action. These
included the following*
1 • _?he Denver Post * 3^
~
en^ura County Star-Frpp p riaf,„ /p *. . ~ >nt;
3. £resno__Bee (Calif. )136 (Calif,
lbg_fiotton Trade .t~..—
i1
137
6 lP f,rfncisco Examinpr.1^
o ^
he Bakersfield CalT7^ ; nn 139
8* f-^
erside iJaily Fnterprigr~(p
n i
\1408
- SSsjasj^a^^ }
ist 3.as ?.°i963,naff
e
g^"3; 9g;gr^ 88th c °ne-.
132 TK . .l£ld »
» p. 9903.
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PP - U435
> 12785. 15216-17.
IMd.. pp. 15217-18. 135^., p . 13639<
Ibid* 13 '’jbid
.
.
p. 12945 .
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The House decision to kin n vx ll the bracero programa so received considerable attention •l ln Mexico. The
newspaper Ultimas Noti,.;-..
rtr
„
—
e is inn asked i
Are we to interpret the vote in the hHouse of Renre-
sentatives „ .
p
an act against slaverv—
, .
V —or as imprudent
discrimination?" In Mexico City thel y* newspaper
hg^Prensa remarked*
They would leave us in -f-v.es . i
of losing from one day to thp
lner
?
ble position
that the braceros send back I*
1
? dollarsprecarious balance of n*?™ maintain ourthat some 300,000 MexicarTfamii •
And
.
that means
e
f
a
r
rner
t
s?l^
empl°y”ent °f their'f^i^^f
N°t UneXPeCtedly
’ « was reported that braceros
»ere stunned by news of the House action.
Various officials of the Mexican CTlvlex government
commented on the House vote killing the bracero pro-
gram. A spokesman for the Interior Department claimed
that termination would not result in seriously increas-
ing unemployment rates in Mexico. He claimed that
displaced braceros could be absorbed into his country's
industries. Gustavo D{az Ordaz. Secretary of State,
emphasized that the death of Public Law ?8 would cause
"problems" in the United States.
"
l43
142
Ibid., p . 10418. 1 ^3 Ibid
.
.
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Some Mexicans expressed ^
program
satisfaction that the
was apparently coming to an end Fran •u c a • cisco
Hernandez y Hernandez, previously a-P director of the
a iona Farmers Organization, noted that his grouphad always maintained that hraceros were needed at
°me ' Senat0r Albert0 took a similar standi
On dune 21
. 196 3 , the Mexican ambassador de-livered a note outlining his government's stand on
the House action to the American government. The note
° almed th3t “exican lab°r was still needed in the
United States. Therefore, the only question was
Whether it was to enter legally or illegally. To
return to the wetback era was most undesirable because
would result in exploitation of the wetbacks and
would undermine American workers. The note continued,
can^orkers^nder^he
^international®
0 °f Mexi-
produced unfavorable effects ?Sreeme"l hasQuite the contrary Thfw.SV ®rican workers,
contracted braceros
b!"®£lts S™>ted the
that can be followed'for'dem
e
+
Pr0Vlde<i a Pattern
lack such protection.
° d°mestlc workers who
The note claimed that "the virtual extinction
of discrimination against and segregation of persons
of Mexican nationality in areas of the United States
Wh6re SU° h Practides once existed can decisively be
144
Ibid.
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The United States government
Mexico hea ,
-'ernme was reminded that
ong held that any termination of the
racero program should occur gradually. The House
action would have the effect of creatine •1 g serious
rrr*
in ^^ •*• ~ *-*Uy <" ta».ro. H 1„„ „«
Mexican economy,
the deer"
003 Am6ri0an "eWS medU 3ttemPted
-
-PXainecline of the bracero program. The
observed that political pressures againstT^
been building up for over a decade. Although reform
een blocked from the beginning by farm state
congressmen and their allies fv™ + ui l rom other states, the
paper noted that the non-farm aliip<3l lies were moving out
of the coalition. 146
The £^*EX£tian_J2entur^
, a traditional critic
of the bracero program, noted that with increasing
mechanization there was less need for farm labor. It
concluded that
-legislative cancellation of a labor
system which does far more harm than good and which
seems doomed anyway is a commendable House action.- 147
145 T . . .Ikid., p. 15204.
146
New York Times, May 31 , 1963, p. 52.
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Cofflonseal, another traditional critic of
^ ?8
’ Wel°0med wha* it believed to be the
end of the Mexican labor program The nagazine gaye
substantial credit 0 u•teaix to such grour>s sc^ p as unions and social
»e are organizations which had incited public feeling
against the program.
Commonweal^ observed thata urban congressmen hadgone along with the program over the years but with
increasing reluctance as it grew more unpopular with
public. Also, the users of braceros had become
-re concentrated in fewer states. By 1962
, some „
of all braceros were in California and Texas alone.
As other states used them less, there was apparently
less pressure on their congressmen to "go along.”
Finally, Common^ noted that the reduction in farm
jobs and the high unemployment rate had helped people
he bracero program for the anachronism that
it was. 148
Although the Mexican labor system was nearer
termination than ever before, some of its traditionally
impressive staying power remained and it was revived.
The Senate A§ricul ture and Forestry Committee reported
P. 316 .
Fate of P.L. 78," Commonweal
. June 14
, 1963,
26 l
a bill (S 1703) on July 22 iq^
.
y 196 3
. Providing for ex-
tension Of the -pn program for one more year. It
rejected the administra+i nvn *t on s recommendation of an
amendment guaranteeing domeq + io -pstic farm workers against
adverse effect. However, it did so with the expla-
nation that because the program would be ended at the
close of 196b, there would not be enough time to put
the proposed reforms into operation.
Even the majority report of the Senate Agri-
culture and Forestry Committee foretelling the death
of the program was not enought to satisfy four members
of the committee. Maurine B. Neuberger (D-Ore.).
George McGovern (D-S.D.), Eugene McCarthy (D_Min^ )(
and William Proxmire (D-Wisc.) were opposed to ex-
tension on any terms. The program had been hurting
domestic farm workers all alon^- pnriong a d the government
Should cease to undermine these "neglected and
149underprivileged” people
In the meantime, efforts were made to get
the House to reconsider its early action and to now
vote for an extension of Public Law ?8. Southwestern
farm groups, especially from California, notified
House members that without the program farm production
149
XXI (July 26
, 1963), 1318.
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would drop drastically ai+k
sent *•
Although
southwestern repreentatives again took up the fis .h+
P
«**
- - -
....
*“*•*«
One such
labor program,
spokesman was Recre^* +•
,
r presentative Charles M.Teague R-Calif
. ) Ho v, ^ ^
theM •
^ had fought long and hard fore Mexican labor program •Serving on the Gathings
subcommittee. he> hen t ^had always sP°ken for growerinterests, praised farm spokesmen. and persistently
hammered away at the arguments of critics of the
bracero program. However, even he was giving up.
He co-sponsored bills calling for an extension of
ublic Law 78 for three years and its death at the
ond of that period. His bill 719a) provide<J
or the use of 150,000 braceros in 1964, 120,000
during the following year, 90,000 in 1966. and
termination at the end of that year. 150
Even when it looked as if the House had killed
program, the Kennedy administration did
not change its earlier position supporting a one-
year extension. Despite its vigorous criticism of
Law 78, it was especially concerned that the
Program not be abruptly ended so as to bring serious
^location to the Mexican economy. Therefore, the
150
Ibid.
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administration continued to call for extension of the
r
16 inSiSti
^°
n Vari0US guarantees for Ameri-
can farm workers.
On August 1 5. 1963. the Senate passed an
amended bracero bill (S 1 703 ) on a roU caU^ Qf
2-25. It provided for a one-year extension of the
Program through December. 1964. It also included an
amendment providing guarantees to protect American
farm workers from adverse effect. The amendment was
introduced by Senator McCarthy. It specified that
growers must offer domestic farm workers housing. a
specified work period, occupational insurance, and
transportation comparable to the guarantees given
braceros. Farmers who did not make such offers could
hot qualify for Mexican nationals.
The McCarthy amendment passed on a roll call
of 44 43 . it was opposed by a majority of both
southern Democrats and Republicans. Opponents of the
amendment charged that its passage would neutralize
whatever merit the bracero program had had. Senator
Spessard L. Holland (D-Fla. ) , who floor managed the
Mexican labor bill, recalled that Congress had
(Aagust'al^b^fl^? 3 ’ JUly 31 ' 1963s SSH5- XXI
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.n^„„bl«..,53
Still apprehensive that +h« wn t e House might not
resurrect the bracero program, southwestern farminterests continued to warn of the consequences ofending reliance on the Mexican labor supply. Por
instance
. . magazine called the C^Iifo^
estimated that the value of the state-, multi-million
-liar asparagus harvest would decline hy approximately
md if the Mexican labor program were ended. It
noted that farmers were already making plans to plow
up oome 20,000 acres of asparagus beds and guessed
that the growing uncertainty of a labor supply would
lead to some 10 .000 acres being converted to other
crops less dependent on labor. The magazine predicted
that the acreage devoted to other crops heavily depend-
ent on braceros. such as lettuce and cantaloupes,
would be substantially reduced. A University of
California study reached the same conclusions regarding
cantaloupes, a spokesman for the Grower-Shipper
Vegetable Association headquarted in Salinas. California
f°ret0ld 3 3°* dr°P in acreage devoted to lettuce
5 CQWR, XXI (August 23, 1963), 1466.
265
during the coining year.* 53
On September 6, I96l tho u
Cnmm .. .
3 ’ e House AgricultureCommittee reported a bill (H R s.ool«. . 8195) to extend thebracero program for an additional year its
indicated that it had
' P
suggested to the Labor.
Agriculture
, and State Departments that the Mexican
a or program be ended gradually over a three-year
HoweveT aii +u
..
’ ree dePaftments recommended
6XtenSi0n be f0r a year and that it in-
clude the main provisions of the McCarthy amendment
“ " h ^ Senate had alread
^
—Pied. The committee
compromised and its report proposed a single year
extension but rejected the amendment. It claimed
that the amendment
"could only result in confusion
and ineffectiveness” inasmuch as the administration
seemed to have only a "hazy notion as to how the
proposed amendment would be administered."
The four committee votes against extension
came from Democrats Spark M. Matsunaga (D-Hawaii).
Alec C. Olsen (D-Minn.). Benjamins. Rosenthal (D-N. Y. )
,
and James H. Morrison (D-La.). They charged that ex-
tension of the law would constitute a "tragedy”
beC3USe lt Pr°Vided for Poverty-stricken group
153New York Times, August 18, 1963, p. 52.
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of men to compete aeain^tg s another poverty-stricken
group to create still more poverty. "154
n October 31, 1963, the House reversed its
earlier position and passed the bin reported fey ^griculture Committee. The roll call vote was 173- l6o .
This about-face may have several possible expla-
nations. The bracero program had come under suchheavy fire from a growing number of interest groups
and the administration that its future in the Senate
was unpredictable at the time of the initial House
vote. However, in the interlude between the two
House votes, the Senate had made clear that it was for
extending the bracero program for one year. It became
obvious that if Public Law 78 were permitted to expire
at the end of 1963. the House alone would be responsible.
Also, the apparent consensus among senators that the
Mexican labor system should be terminated at the end
of 1964 permitted the House to compromise in its
second vote without sacrificing it. Koo-uc m s basic commitment
rmination. In the interval between the two
House votes. Mexico's government had issued its
strong statement against abrupt termination.
1 54
XXI (September 1 3 , 1963), 1562-63.
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Anally, it should be emphas . zed
House vote was on a two
* flrst
-year extension To
it was poor strategy for the H
retrospect.
to support that
" AgriCUltu
~ C°™itteePP grower-backed bin *
-*
...
....
a one-year extension but nothing more.
^
The House votes of 1963 suggest cert •
in the diTio*
oa tam patternsintegrate of the bracero coalition. Par-ticularly revealing are the votes of 21 represent ..
who ^ atives
voted against the two-year extension but
«ere willing to support the one-year renewal in the
t6
’ Wh° Were th6Se key congressmen who heldthe alanoe of power in the House ^^ ^^e raditional two-year extension? They were
primarily old supporters of Public Law 78 who hadgrown increasingly sceptical of it. Sixteen of them
ted on the question of renewal in 1961. !55
Thirteen of the 16 had voted tho+a that year to extend the
racero program by two years.
The switchers came overwhelmingly from the
Party which had traditionally been more supportive of
the Mexican labor system. Seventeen of the 21 were
The other five had not yet been elected.
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Republicans
.
Only 4 of the switchers came from the South-
west. The others came predominantly from the Midwest
and Northeast, areas which had been less dependent on
the bracero program.
In summary, the 1963 House vote indicates that
the bracero coalition was breaking up. The swing group
holding the balance of power and unwilling to grant
the traditional two-year renewal were largely old
friends of the Mexican labor system. Not even the
Republican Party remained a faithful ally. The swing
group willing to kill the bracero program then and
there if they could not hold the extension period to
one year were overwhelmingly Republicans. These
losses to the grower coalition came mostly from areas
using few or no braceros.
On December 4. 1963. the Senate voted to accept
the House version of legislation extending the Mexican
labor system. 156 This represented one loss for critics
of Public Law 78 inasmuch as the House had failed to
accept the McCarthy reform amendment. However, the
reform forces had won their greatest victory yet because
the consensus was that Congress would finally let the
program die at the end of 1964.
^ CQWR, XXII (January 3, 1964), 9-10.
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Events of 1964
in February. 1964, the NewJorOimes observed
that many California farmers hah apparently given upthem struggle to continue the bracero program after
the end of that year. They had already begun to arrange
for the recruitment of more domestic workers. Reconcil-
ing themselves to the new reality, they had changed the
direction of their political pressure. Now they had
begun to request both the state and national govern-
ments to inventory the possibilities for acquiring
American farm workers. 157 studies were conducte(J - n
a number of states concerning how the braceros could
be replaced by the end of 1964,^-5®
Toward the fall of 1964, Business Weoe wrote
that although some growers were attempting to cope
with the new reality by preparing to hire domestic
workers, others continued to claim that not enough
Americans were available for farm work. It noted the
fact that some growers were clinging to the position
that those without work would prefer to collect
1 57
Ijew York Times
, February 23 , 1964, p. 55 .
1 58
^ J *
New York Times
r April 10
, 1964, p. 23 .
2?0
unemployment pay and that the braoeros ^^ ^capable workers that each two of them would have tobe replaced by three Americans. 159
Political developments during i 964 brought nonew hopes to the bracero coalition „
+ _
. Upon succeeding
e presidency in November, 1963, Lyndon Johnson
showed the same commitment to the rural poor that
Kennedy had. On January 31 p
.
y J ’ 196k
' President Johnson's
lirst agricultural messapv* nsage to Congress called for
several reforms. He asked + uthat the program of food
stamps be expanded and called <Q x for improvements in
housing for migratory workersy . Johnson stressed the
low income of the average farm worker and noted that
housing on farms was frequently
•’dilapidated and sub-
standard." He pointed out that rural people were
more likely to be poor and called attention to the
fact that "almost one-half our nation's poor live in
rural areas. The President promised that in other
messages he would ask Congress for- ^l r programs to fight
poverty and improve train inp 0 j„- n+ .£» education, housing, and
health care in rural areas. 160
1 59„
Week. August^a^iq^^p^ilo^ Braceros '" Business
CQWR, XXII (February 7 , 1964), 254 .
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In the presidential, campaign of 1964
, nttle»as said about the
ll U
in general
Program. Farm issues
l were not prominent. Even am* ong farm
oters
, these matters tended to hPbe overshadowed bysuch issues as race rpi.+i
. + .
relations and the developing
situation in Vietnam. 161
President Johnson was content toto accept the
ongressionai decision to let Public Law 78 die at
B
6nd °f 1964< « °PPonent, Senator
arry Ooldwater. was not. I„ August before ^^
ron. Goldwater oallea for tentative continuation ofbra0er
°
continue
. he saia,
until we can find ways of satisfying the need of farm
a or through domestic sources
.
••^2
In late Ootober
Goldwater told a group of Mexican-Americans in Los
’
Angeles that the dohnson administration was making
a mistake in letting the bracero program expired
As recently as the last Senate debate on the
bracero program in 1963
. Senator Goldwater had firmly
aligned himself with the bracero coalition. 16^
^CQWR, XXII (October 16, 1964 ), 2460.
—
W York TiniP
-g . August 3 , 1964, p. 6 .
164~
" Y°rk 'ril"eS
-
’ October 31, 1964, p. 1.
^ 88th cong
-’
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With the election o-r T-»r»-.rif Lynd°n Johnson in 1964
1 aPP6ared that h0P6S 0f reviving the bracero p^were dead. Even John Kennedy, handicapped by his
narrow election and the Democratic Party’s poor-
‘
‘
»•< »„ » 1
. ,0
8 eXtenS10n of Publie Daw 78 to a period of oneyear with the understanding that it would be allowed
to die at the end of 1 0649 . Johnson was elected underfar more advantageous circumstances. He won by a
landslide and swept to power with him greater pro-
portions of congressmen of the types most likely to
oppose the importation of Mexican labor. With a
markedly more Democratic and liberal Congress than
the outgoing one. the victory of reform forces in
late 1963 became less tentative, and it began to look
like after twenty-two years that the bracero program
had finally come to an end. No serious efforts were
made to revive Public Law 78 during late 1964. and
on December 31. the long-sought termination became
a reality.
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Summary and Conclusions
nati Tral rSaSOnS ^ teen 8u»«.d termi-
.°" ° the braoer° program. Among these were
various social and economic trends. The hieh
::r 7- »•-— ::rrraim of a serious farm labor shortage.
As urbanization continued, the political
influence of farmers declined. This result
flea • was intensi-
,
m 1962 when the Supreme Court began a series of
^apportionment rulings requiring both state legis
latures and the United States House to increase the
representation of urban population.
Unprecedented mechanization displaced rural
workers and made the case for foreign labor less con-
vincing. Experience with mechanization convinced some
growers of its superiority to any kind of labor program,
ioreign or domestic. Thus a nrm
-political development
significantly changed the nature of demands on the
political system.
The grower cause was further weakened by certain
priorities of the Kennedy administration, including its
commitments to alleviate rural poverty and to bring
minority group members into the mainstream of American
2 74
economic Termination of Public Law ?8 ^ ^as one of the administration’s
anti-poverty
measures, especially des igned to increase job oppor-
Utl1 163 f°r the gr°Up which suffered most from
competition with the imported workers, Mexican_
Americans
.
During the years 1961-64. the reform coalition
operated from an unpreoedently favorable position.
It stood in sharp contrast to the many earlier years
when it seemed to enjoy no political advantages over
the employers of Mexican workers and their political
allies. Prior to World War I. organised labor, weak
and unpopular, had stood almost alone in its effort
to limit the use of Mexican workers in the United
States. By the early 1960’s, the earlier small rump
group of reformers had been transformed into a broad
coalition possessing the highest credentials, it
included the President himself and increasing numbers
of congressmen from both parties and from most regions
of the country. It included respected organizations
such as the AFL-CIO, various churches, and several of
the most respected publications in the United States.
This new coalition was a formidable participant
in the political process. No longer could its members
be lightly dismissed as they had been at the Downey
2?5
;r;:r *»„
„ z:„ z\z
im“ *“*'“"
-*•««
.mi™
gran, eh
61r 6ff°rt *“ ref°rm the bracero P*>-
f :
SrOUP t6nded " °°mPlement *" strengths
n nt
a°h0ne
— its
at on I";
P° lnt ‘ ChUrChSS
--der-i s while unions focused ™ „
t . , .
S °n economic objections to
use o Mexican labor. This shotgun assault onU 10 ^ 78 maxim i 2 ed the chance that the vulner-
abilities of the bracero program would be exploiteC.
By the 1960-8. members of the reform coalition
Possessed impressive political shills. Some, such
as organized labor, had developed an enviable record
or their ability to mobilize large numbers of voters.
Many of the interest groups were not tackling reform
of the bracero program as a one-shot cause. Organi-
sations such as the National Education Association
and the AFL-CIO had gained valuable skills from their
continuous involvement in the political process on a
variety of issues. Some of the reform interest groups
had their own full-time research staffs and legislative
spec ialists
.
All of these advantages gave the reformers a
a new assurance during the Kennedy years. They pressed
their points harder and demanded greater concessions.
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They could threaten with more assurance that their
opponents would take them seriously.
The bracero program was further weakened by
using it as a wedge to achieve reforms in domestic
labor. Some of these were gained by administrative
discretion. Others were gained through congressional
concessions to domestic farm workers as Public Law 78
was extended in 1961 and in 1963. Perhaps even more
important than the actual concessions made to domes-
tic labor was the fact that the increasing number of
reformers were more insistent on more concessions than
ever before. This was bound to dampen grower enthusi-
asm for the bracero system. After all. farmers had
originally sought the program partly as a tool to
use against domestic workers, not for them. By 1963,
the attractiveness of the program to farmers had
diminished while it continued to bring an increasing
threat of government control over all farm labor.
Had it not been for this development, it is unlikely
that many of the Mexican labor system’s oldest and
most faithful friends would have agreed to kill the
program, effective at the end of 1964.
It is interesting to speculate about what
might have saved the Mexican labor system. It has
already been suggested that Nixon’s election in i960
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might have done so. The vast ^
could K v.
P r 0f the P^sidency
have been employed to counter the growing
power of the reformers.
History suggests that American involvement
maJ °r War mlght 3150 have salvaged the Mexican
•l" S
-**‘
-
hree formal bracero programs 411. All were instituted
a ortly after American participation in a ma ijor war.
Wars have been thpxne chief spawners of01 oracero programs,
ecause they reduce liberal opposition to the use
of Mexican labor. Once the war ends, the program is
aced with rising opposition and it grows increasingly
vulnerable. The precarious position of the bracero
Program in 1 96 3 is emphasised by the fact that it had
contmued over into peace-time longer than any other
in American history.
The historical pattern suggests that had the
massive American involvement in Vietnam occurred in
1962 or early 1 96 3 rather than in 1965. the national
security aspect of farm labor might have saved Public
Law 78. With United States soldiers in Vietnam until
197 3 and American combat involvement ending under a
conservative president, the bracero program might
still be in existence.
2?8
CHAPTER vi
the political aftermath
Introduction
Nothing so simnle +y,a
t . .
P 38 the 0sessional decision
o terminate the bracern nr.P gram on December 31 iq64
couid have provided
. conclusive soiution to the ion;oonmct over the employment of Mexicans in the United
States. Twice before (after the ^^
formal bracero programs had ended without altering the
fundamental disagreements between its advocates and
opponents.
What we have sppd -? <-. „ _ .een is an ongoing struggle
punctuated by a series of rotating and insecure vic-
tories for each side.* During certain periods (war-
time), growers have sucrp^^fni -i, rcess ully pressured the national
government to guarantee them a supply of Mexican labor.
fet the guarantees have never been permanent. Reform
forces have always re-mobilized to bring an end to
programs onlyf "i^does^nt made for formal bracero
earlier chanters thf? +„ dispute the ^lSHTof
failed to conscientiously S°vernment has often
denied Mexican workers to grower^
^ Which W0Uld hava
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j; ro yi,i965tthesco---n . Three
nated vTms had been inaugurated ——
ultile
^ neUher h3d
—— theltimat concession from it<= ™lts opponent. The "loser"
::.r
”-“iu“a
-«— «»•—
This historical pattern observed in earlier
p J
tSrS l6adS ^ ^ expectati°P that termination of
10 L" 78 W°Uld n0t SUdden^ *°lve the underlyinggroup conflicts. That southwestern growers would
not be content with the new policy is aXso prediot_
able from pluralist theorv wi-t-wy Wl h its emphasis on the
continuous nature of group conflict.
While the whole question of the politics of
Mexican labor in the United States has been relatively
ignored by scholars, most of their limited attention
has been focused on bracero programs themselves. The
Politics of post-bracero eras has been all but ignored.
The present chapter turns attention to the after-
math of Public Law 78 . s termination, particularly the
nature of the ongoing group struggle and the search
for alternatives to bracero labor. With the Mexican
labor system so recently ended, 1965 was the crucial
year during which grower protests reached a peak and
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reason, di=,nop„r« lt,^« ^on developments of that year.
The Aftermath: 1 965-68
Alternative smimog 0f jyjex i ,—0 uz M ican lah^ Critics
of bracero programs have been nrone tn
.
p o over-emphasize
e importance of laws specifically providing for the
importation of Mexico workers. They have
paid much less attention to Mexicans entering under
general immigration laws and to those entering illegally.
et these latter ohannels have brought far m0re workers
from Mexico to the United States. Nevertheless, during
the early 1960's, reformers gave the impression that
termination of Public Law 78 would solve the problem
of Mexican competition with American farm labor. This
ignored the fact that termination of earlier bracero
programs had never shut off the flow of Mexican workers
to the United States.
By no means did the demise of Public Law 78 end
the group conflict over Mexican labor. Instead, the
struggle was re-directed. Even before the bracero pro-
gram expired, growers had enjoyed four additional
supplies of Mexican workers. After December 31, 1964,
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they turned increasingly tn no + •
+ .
* Y 0 certam of these alterna-
The Ub0r DePart“-t effectively curtailed
re xance on some of these channels but only in the
aee of furious pressure from farm groups.
To consider the group struggle over Public
Law 78 without regard to this broader context is
misleading. The formal bracero program was merely
one means of governmental accomodation to the grower'sbroad demand for Mexican labor. When he lost that
specific program, he was perfectly willing to seek
the same labor by other means. In doing so. he fell
back on many of his old justifications for the bracero
P ogram. He found that most groups opposing his renewed
efforts were old opponents from pre-termination days,
and they, too, resurrected many of their olny i xn d arguments.
For these reasons, the grower initiative to obtain
Mexican labor during 1965 is more accurately seen as
a continuing, rather than a new, struggle.
The employment of wetbacks had continued even
when record numbers of Mexicans were entering under
the provisions of Public Law 78. 2 The number of
illegal Mexicans apprehended by immigration authorities
and afterterminationtf Putft °f "S tbaoks before
282
began a constant increase as +he> -k
beimy v
raCer° Pr0^m was
s
g Ph3Sed °Ut ^
--- after lt. expiration.
3;" 00 ° "ere apprehend^ ^ 1963. By 1968
, thenumber of annual arrests h** tx had climbed to over
150, 000. 3
This trend may be explained in either of two
ways. The first possibility is that the number of
wetbacks entering the United States did not grow
and the upward trend simply reflects more vigilant
action by American immigration authorities inspired
by a reform administration. The second explanation
is that when Mexicans could no longerj-ong enter as braceros,
more came as wetbacks.
During the final days of the bracero program,
the Johnson administration announced that the border
would be more carefully patrolled. However, there is
little evidence that it made serious efforts to prevent
the predicted increase in wetback entry. The number
of Border Patrol personnel was increased only slightly.
In a recent study of the wetback problem. Julian
Samora concludes that the last important campaign
" lniUated by the Border patrol to tighten up the
(Notre Dame: UniversItv°nf
W
N
'
^
d°S
b
— The Wetback Story
p. 46.
u i y o otre Dame Press, 1971 ),
'
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border occurred in 1954 ,^
Various annual reports issued by the Immi-gration and Naturalisation Se„ioe assuffie ^ ^increase in the number of wetbacks
1Q , L ,, apprehended since
.
^ S the fa0t that ^creasing numbers ofillegal Mexicans were entering the United States,
or example, the AnnualJeEort for 1970 states,
"Since termination of the Mexican Agricultural Act
at the end of 1**. the number of inegal entries
over the Mexican border continues to soar."?
The relevant question which cannot be defini-
tively answered from present research is the extent
to which wetbacks came to be employed in farm jobs
previously held by braceros. However, Samora<s
findings that most employed wetbacks do agricultural
work would suggest the likelihood that many were in
fact replacements for earlier braceros. This expec-
mcreased by the fact that large numbers of
wetbacks worked in the Southwest which had relied
heavily on the Mexican labor system.
Approximately 100,000 more wetbacks were
4ibid
.
» p. 50.
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apprehended in 1968 than during the iaa+s ft l st year of theracero program. When these numbers are a
•
,m„ . ^
D adjusted
upward to allow for the fact that many illegal Mexi-cans are never caught it w, becomes obvious that
termination of the bracero program *did not finallv
end the
"problem" of Mexican emni
States.
employment in the United
ironically, in debate leading UD to t. •
Of Public Law 78
s p termination
, reformers had said little about the
wetback problem r+U WaS m0Stly friends Of the braceroP-gram who had warned that its termination would bring
^e return of large numbers of illegal Mexicans. Re-formers had treated Public Law 78 as the big enemy.
and they had paid little attention to the gro„ing „um-ber of wetbacks.
The efforts of Secretary Wirtz during 1964 and
1965 were directed mostly toward making it more
difficult to obtain leggl Mexican labor. He paid
little attention to the wetback problem. To some
extent this neutralized the liberal victory gained by
termination of Public Law 78. Since wetbacks enjoyed
no legal protection, they could be exploited far more
than braceros. This meant also that they posed a
greater threat to American workers.
Why Secretary Wirtz did so little about the
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wetback problem is not clear. pPT*
r^-p
* rhaps it was becau^Preform groups during the ute 1950-3 and ,
;:;;rr;r
The gre ^
lllnS attentlon to the wetback problem.
realL b
natl°nal C0nC6rn
- "ever
revived since Eisenhower’s aborted
of 1954 Ro e crusade
’ form groups had thus not laid the same
rrration f°r -— -^^
leg 1 •
^ ^ ^ adminiStration^ attack on theal importation of Mexican workers.
on th
The faUUre ^ SeCretary t0 ntrate
ref
Pr0Mem
a common pattern of the
ormers. Historically, they have tended to equatefavorable laws and formal t,i,m • , .n public policipc? „
mu 1 ^
iC ies with success.
h has been one of their greatest + •strategic errors.
^or example, they celebrated +>,*o the end of the World War Ibracero program as if that inp licy change would solve
the problem of Mexican labor t+. It was m fact the pre-
lude to an unprecedented decade of wetback entry.
In a book published in 1954. Burma concluded
that since 1940, more Mexicans had entered the United
States illegally than legally.* Between 1924 and 1969.
6
Un ited States
H
(Durham 1 n
Speaklng G roups in the
pTW; ' n . Duke University Press. 1954)7
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over five million wetbacks were a™ u 7apprehended
.
f As
noted above, large numbers have beann e apprehended
since termination of the brarpmcero program in 1 964.
with such massive numbers of Mexico *1 exic ans entering the
United States illegally, the reformer’s on~ common tendencyto assume that all is well if .X1 l the law is well has
weakened his own cause.
To keep the bracero program alive between
1951 and 1964. growers had been forced to mobilise
politically, m contrast, they won the post-bracero
wetback battle by default. Reformers said and did
little about the problem. For that reason, the issue
was markedly lacking in the flurry of group activity
which had surrounded the controversial bracero program.
Since expiration of Public Law 78
.
a second
alternative source of Mexican labor has been the
so-called
"border-crossers .
"
The Immigration and Nationality Act provides
that a special Nonresident Border-Crossing Identifica-
tion Card (Form I- 186 ) may be issued to an alien
"who is a resident in foreign contiguous territory."
This provision facilitates the movement of many Mexi-
cans and Canadians who wish to make short trips to
^Samora
,
op. c it .
.
P- 57.
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the United States for uleaa..™ „
Form I 186 •
topping, or business.
twent
Pe™ ltS ^ ViSUOr ^ 3 ofy-five miles from the United States border.
Although he may remain in this count™ „untry no more than
seventy-two hours at a time, there is no i • •wi limitation
on how often he may return Tin-Mi Ty . Until January io, 1969,border-crossing cards were valid for-r a period of fouryears. Effective . .l that date, they have been good for
an indefinite period.
While Form I-186 prohibits the visitor from
working in the United States, immigration authorities
claim that many apprehended Mexicans entered initially
on the border-crossing card, then violated its pro-
visions by finding jobs and violating the seventy
two hour limit. 9 The practice of keeping no record
of the date of entry probably encourages violation
Of the card’s provisions. 10
Large numbers of Mexicans hold Form I-186.
Based on data for 1968. Samora reports that each 'month,
over 2,500 of the cards are issued in El Paso and
"several hundred are canceled monthly, primarily for
violation of the work restriction." Approximately
g
Ibid., pp. 155 - 56 . 9 Ibid.. p. 23.
10 T,
. p. 145,
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7:5,000 residents of Ciudad t»,
n .
arez hold Form 1-186 11During the years 1961-67 the .number of •
in the Southwest (not ,
lssued
n
exclusively
to Mexicans) w overwhelmingly
,
increased annuaUy
_ 0ver
issued in 196l . In 196?> oyer
Were
-
vu
* 000 were issued. 12
The marked increase in the number of cards
and since 1964 surest- t, , .gges . the likelihood that some
of the braceros werp hoi^r. ,e being replaced by border-
crossers
.
We have now examined two non-bracero sources
of Mexican labor which were being used even during
the bracero era. After Public Law 78 expired, both
brought increasing numbers of Mexican v1 workers to the
United States. Our attention +t turns now to a third
source of non-bracero Mexican labor.
In the southwestern United States, Mexican
immigrants are commonly called green-carders. The
name comes from the color of Form I-151. the Alien
Registration Card, which is issued to all immigrants
to the United States irrespective of their country of
°rigln
- H°WeVer> inf0™al
-age ordinarily applies
11
Ibid., p. 23. 12 Ibid
.
.
p. 184.
Working on^arms Maxican Migrants
October, 1967, p* 3^
a^o r Developments
f September-
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the green-card label to Mexico ,*ican immigrants only.
Green-carders have almost all the rights and
responsibilities of American citisens. They are
free to work at almost any iob and +„ n •
,
v j d to live wherever
they Please. Legally, the green-carder is no
different from all other immigrants to the United
States
.
Prospective immigrants from Mexico apply for
a regular immigration visa. It is issued only to appli-
cants who meet all specifications for immigration as
set forth in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, as amended.
°n July 1 * 1963> the Kennedy government began
taking administrative action which made it more diffi-
cult for prospective immigrants to enter the United
States for the purpose of working here. Effective that
date, the Department of Labor was given a veto over the
entry of such prospective immigrants. With few excep-
tions, the State Department began denying visas to
them unless the Labor Department certified a shortage
of American workers with their particular skills and
verified that admitting the prospective immigrants would
have no adverse effect on domestic workers.
14
Ibid.
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The Johnson government continued this restrictive scrpp^vu, -S 33 3 matter <* administrative discrefUntU Decemb
-. 1965f when Congress ame h a
.
nded the
emigration and Naturalization Act to re •
r ,
CX quire the
°r department to make a judgment ab *
Zve
" diSCUSSed Pr0SPSCtiVe immigrants. T 5 This
the i7
ent W3S lmPOrtant be0ause ingress ratified
labor secretary's earlier assumption of that powerP°r decades, growers had looked upon the Labor De art
irr — - - -in. theyJo strip away its allegedly illegal power
over foreign labor. Thus the 1965 congressional
action was another loss for the grower cause.
Before the Labor Department's assumption of
authority m 1963, Mexicans who could not
qualify as braceros could sometimes be admitted as
immigrants, if there were nQ ^
secretary could refuse to certify their entry as bra-
ceros. However, they might then bypass him by applyingfor entry as immigrants to Hn +>,«s x do the same work. Labor
shortage or not. until 1963. the labor secretary had
no voice in deciding which prospective immigrants
would be granted visas. As noted earlier, as the
15
Ibid.
,
p. 40.
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bracero program was out baok dur . ng the^ i96o , g
the number of Mexicans entering as immigrants increald.
After Secretary Wirtz assume, this veto over
prospective immigrants desiring to work in the United
States, the number of Mexican farm laborers admitted
as immigrants dropped sharply. During the fiscal year
preceding the new policy. 6.797 Mexicans were issued
immigrant visas for the purpose of doing farm work in
the United States. In the first year the new amend-
ments were in effect, only 1,748 Mexican farm
workers were admitted as immigrants. 16
A special type of Mexican immigrant needs
some separate explanation. He has all of the rights
and responsibilities mentioned above as characteristics
of Mexican immigrants, because he is legally an "immi-
grant” to the United States. As they, he must meet
the same requirements for obtaining a visa. Known as
a commuter,
" he enjoys a special privilege which
is shared only with certain Canadian "immigrants."
That is the right to commute to the United States for
work while continuing to live in his own country. Thus,
the paradox of "immigrants" who do not immigrate.
While living in his native country, the commuter enjoys
16
Ibid.
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the same legal and employment rights in the United
States as do all other persons admitted as immigrants
to this country.
The commuting practice was created by adminis-
trative rulings of the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS), while immigrant visas indicate that
the immigrant will reside in the country to which he
is immigrating.*? the INS has long permitted certain
Mexican and Canadian
"immigrants" to work in the United
States without living here. It ruled decades ago that
admission as an immigrant entitled them, but not other
immigrants, to live in the United States but did not
require them to do so. 18 As Samora has pointed out.
the immigration visa often turns out to be nothing
more than "an alien work permit." 19 The INS has
claimed that this special treatment of Mexican and
Canadian immigrants is justified by the special relation-
ship which the United States has long enjoyed with their
countries. 20
Being granted immigrant status does not auto-
matically entitle Mexicans and Canadians to commuter
rights. According to a recent INS statement, the
1
7
Samora, Q£> L cit., p. 29. l8 Ibid.
,
p. 158.
19
Ibid., p. 22. 2 Q Ibid
.
. p. 157
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r “ h- *' «... »«.»>.
„ "Z ,
°““ ln * VI" '» •*“
-
he solution is the Border Crossing r a u-
-+-U
c ard which enableshe commuting worker to return to v, •
. .
his status as an
mencan immigrant each time he comes t +h -21 _ o o this coun-try. Some of the laborers enter i„_, „ng under this
procedure return dailv +u •y to their homes in Mexico and
anada. Others work a week nr- i
home 22
longer between trips
^^ttics have claimed +1..'Lal that the commuting practice
legally questionable. Samora has called it a
"legal fiction" because the commuting workers are not
really immigrants
.
2
Because the INS bnnc-eeps no systematic record of
the number of Mexican immigrants who actually commute
regularly to work in the United States, the numbers
and characteristics of such commuters are not entirely
clear. However, two post- 1964 studies of commuters
have been undertaken.
During November and December, 196?, the INS
asked entering green-carders to complete questionnaires
23 Ibid
.
,
21
IM£. 22 Ibid
.
.
p. 20. p. 22.
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if they commuted dailvy t0 Jobs “ the United States.
The study found that about 40.000 Mexicans were living
in Mexico and crossing the border each day to work
^ "
m the United States. Some 40 percent .indicated that
they were employed in agriculture. 2^
Although the findings of this study are useful.
they do not indicate the full scope of the commuter
Phenomenon. First, only daily commuters were surveyed
and it is known that some Mexicans with commuter status
hold jobs in the United States while returning frequently.
but not daily, to their homes and families in Mexico.
Secondly, the study may have underestimated
even the number of daily commuters. Samora has written,
It is known that when counts are hpinrr + v
beinfnf’ p^obably apprehensive about wha? is^
no^oL1^* ?he
a
Unild
th
li
r
t
StatUS
-
eibh-
United States «*.
In January, 1968, the United States Labor
Department did a study of the wages paid commuters in
and around Laredo, Texas. 26 It found that those
doing farm work were paid less than those employed in
24 ,
o + ,
Stanley M, Knebel, "Restrictive Admission
Pa !m
d
f
r
J
Sl Probable Impact on Mexican Alien Commuter^ "
_ r Labor Developments. November, 1968, pp. 8, 13.
*
25Samora, op. cit .. p. 22.
^Knebel, loc. cit
.. p. 8.
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other jobs and well below thexn minimum wage which
Congress had by then set for aerie., it, , 27Sricul ural workers.
The number of commuters doing farm work may
seem small on a national scale HoC i
- However, their con-
centration near the Mexican border has had an
important impact on the labor market of these areas.
The INS study found that about h9 percent of the
daily commuters worked in Texas. 38 percent in Cali-
fornia. and 13 percent in Arizona. 28 Because ending
Public Law 78 did not affect the flow -ru xn l of commuters,
these border areas were adequately supplied with
Mexican labor while many previous users of braceros
were claiming a catastrophic labor shortage during
A A / 71965.
Still other studies deal with the composite
of Mexican immigrants, including commuters. In a sur
vey conducted in 1965. James Nix found that about
631.000 Mexican aliens were registered with the INS.
From a sample of the registration cards, it was con-
cluded that approximately 39,000 had listed their
u.s.
CR),
27 Ibid
.
,
p. 17 . 28 Ibid
.
,
p. 8.
29See the remarks of Senator Sp
Vi^?fireSsional Recnrd (hereafter09th Cong., 1 st Sess., 1965, CXI,
essard Holland!
indicated as
Part 3 , 3099 .
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occupations as so. form of farm wort. However. Nixbelieves this figure is too small to reflect the
Mexican
-migrants' impact on agriculture>
numerous others who listed non-agricultural jobs
probably do farmwort at least occasionally. "30 He
concludes that during 1965. the first post-bracero
year, about 24.000 Mexican immigrants were employed
on farms in Californiamor ia. That was about 20 percent of
all seasonal farm workers in that state . 31
Nix study found that a large proportion
of Mexican immigrants doing farm wort in the United
States "were relative newcomers." Approximately
38 percent had been admitted during the 1950 -s. The
number increased markedly during the first few years
of the 1960 's. Some 35 percent came during the 1961-64
As noted earlier, this increase in Mexican
immigration corresponded with the declining years of
Public Law 78. Some growers were apparently replacing
braceros with immigrants.
This trend was checked by three developments.
The first was the July 1963. action of the Kennedy
30 „
on Farms, locr
a
citf.
1S
pp
CS
3°5iS
eXICan ImmiSrants Working
31
Ibid., p. 39. 32 Ibid j
297
administration giving the Labor g^ ^the admission of prospective immigrants wanting to
enter the United States for farm worh. The second
was congressional ratification of this-tun i xn new procedurem 1965.
Congress made historic reforms in the immigration
laws during 196 5 ,33 and fall. out from^
resulted in a ceiling being placed, for the first time
on immigration from Western Hemisphere countries. The’
*ey bill was H.R. 258o . It provided for ending ^
controversial national origins quota system which pro-
vided a country-by-country ceiling for annual
immigration from countries outside the Western Hemi-
sphere. As discussed earlier, the Latin American
countries and Canada had always been specifically
excluded from the quota limitations, and no ceilings
had ever been placed on immigration from those nations.
The Johnson administration enthusiastically
championed H.R. 2580 and its provisions for ending the
quota system .
^
However, various conservative congress-
men sought to add amendments to that bill which would
(1965), fcY!SS10nal gU?)rterlv Almanac , XXI
34Jbid
.
» p. 459.
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Place a ceiling on immigration from Western^
The
°n »as 0PP0S e d *
pat-bl
1 lnSS
' ItS SPOkeSmen Said they were inco-
; h
wlth our " s
;:
oial
—onship .. with nations
of this emisphere
.
33
In the House, Clark MacGregor (R-Minn.)
introduced an amendment to H.R. 258o which would
have limited annual immigration from Western Hemi-
sphere countries to 115 OOO a-f+3
, 000 . After reportedly strong
pressure from the administrationm tion, the amendment was
rejected by a roll call vote of I 89-218. 36
The administration's fight against the ceilings
was lost in the Senate. As H.R. 258o was being con-
sidered by a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, it became obvious that only a minority of
its members were willing to support that bill (to end
the quota system) without demanding a price. The
administration needed to win over two additional sena-
tors on the subcommittee. Everett Dirksen (R-m.)
and Sam Ervin, Jr. (D-N.C.) let it be known that they
would support H.R. 2580 only if the administration
W°Uld dr°P its °PP°s ition to a ceiling for Western
35Ibid. 36 Ibid., p . q.62 .
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Hemisphere countries, it reluctantl
S pna+ „ .
-Luctantly agreed.
e tor Ervin then introduced and the Se t
an amendment limiting
^
to 120 000
Hemisphere immigration^ . annually, elective duly 1( 1968 .37 TheErvin amendment was htp,
-eluded in the i I
HoUSe
aw (Public Law 89-236) „h ioh wassigned by President t vJohnson on October 3, 1965. 38
Inasmuch as it set an upper limit on • •
frre +i™ e ^ immi-g at on from the Weq+ov^ uw stern Hemisphere, the Ervin
amendment to H R. . 2580 may be seen as another set-
ack to the grower cause. Viewed from that ne
it is paradoxical that the •
perspective.
-
3 S lni tiative for some kind
oi ceiling came predominant lvy from conservatives. For
example, the five members of the Tmmi01 Immigration and
Naturalisation Subcommittee supporting the Ervin amend-
were a combination of southern Democrats and Re-
publicans. opposing it were Senators Edward Kennedy(D'MaSS ' ) ’ PhUiP <«*>•> and Jacob Javits ( R-N
. Y
.
)
Viewed from a second perspective, establishment
o an lmmigrati0n ce ilinS for Western Hemisphere coun-tnes was not a serious setback to growers seeking
37
39
Ibid. 38 Ibid., pp . 459, 466<
Ibid., p.
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Mexican labor. Southwestern farmers had i
th=+ long notedey preferred temporary workers unencumberedby families
. They had idealized the hl bracero because
once the harvest had enripn uded, he returned to Mexico
rather than remaining a ''onni
s+ .
S 3 S°Clal in the UnitedStates. While wetbacks cnninC0Uld meas«re up to this stand-
’ Pe™a-P^ of immigrant farm workers mightlMne "w " “* "*
-«•* ».« «».
in domestic workers.
Consideration of this perspective makes more
understandable the 1Q6^9 5 position of certain traditional
nends of the bracero program. For example. Senator
Allen J. Ellender (D-La.) claimed that the termination
of Public Law yd had resultprfulted m a serious shortage of
farm labor. Nevertheless rm q OT,+ ,i
* on September 22, 1965, he
told the Senate, "It makes little sense to me to con-
tinue to accept large numbers of immigrants when we
have almost four million unemployed in the United States
at the present tW*> Yet during 1965 , he was harshly
critical of Secretary Wirtz for not permitting more
temporary Mexican workers to enter the United States.
Although the Ervin amendment probably reduced
the number of legal Mexican farm workers entering the
40
Ibid., p. 4?9,
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UnitSd Stat6S> Uberal
°PPosition to it is under-
standable
. Mexican iabor reformers had never been
critical, of the employment of all Mexicans. Most of
their criticism had been aimed at the use of foreign
labor which undermined American competitors. A more
permanent labor force of Mexican immigrants accustomed
to higher living standards would hardly p0Se the same
threat as impoverished wetbacks and braceros who had
no meaningful alternative to working quietly for the
American grower.
We have now discussed three types of non-bracero
Mexican labor, wetbacks, border-crossers
,
and immigrants
A fourth type was the so-called "H-2" worker.
Consistent with earlier American immigration
laws, the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
(Public Law 4lh) provides for the temporary admission
of certain foreign workers. Type H-l applies to the
relatively skilled laborer and is not particularly rele-
vant to the importation of agricultural labor. A type
H-2 entrant is defined in Public Law hl4 as "an alien
having a residence in a foreign country which he has
no intention of abandoning" and "who is coming
temporarily to the United States to perform other
temporary services or labor, if unemployed persons
302
capable of performing such service or 1 k
,
,
l labor cannotbe found in this country " 4l c’ Section 214 Df the
same law provides that the »++o Attorney General shallprescribe conditions to regulate
. .
" the entry of non-immigrants to the United States T*
' » specifies that
admitting temporary workers thenc , prospective em-ployer shall submit a petition „ * -P containing whatever
information the Attorney General Rh»ny c s all prescribe.
Regulations issued bv th a *a y the Attorney General for
administering this section state. "A U.S. Employment
ervice clearance order concerning the nonavailability
of qualified persons in the United States and stating
that its policies have been observed shall be attached
to every submitted non-immigrant visa petition to
accord an alien" an H-2 classification
"unless the
petitioner has been informed by the Service that a
clearance order for the beneficiary’s occupation is
not required."^2
Although Public Law 78 authorizing the bracero
program and Public Law UlU contain u •1 *+ ntained obviously similar
provisions
f 03.ch sgtvph q .1
______
r ed a distinct purpose. The latter
303
was the general immi^rati™ i
. .
"deration law and made no specificprovision for rep^niov*-;regularizing the entry of Mexican laboras such. Of course +
and h-h
’
term Mex i=an workers could
Snter UndSr PuWic Law *14 Just as could
workers from other countries. As noted earUer
temporary Mexi^ workers have long entered undlr
spec ial loopholes written into the general immigration
laws. However, this broad authority to import short-
en™ labor from any country did not give the same
specific recognition to the demands of southwestern
growers as did P-ivino- ^ .gi g them their own special Mexican
program under Public Law 7 8. This is not to say that
bracero-users had not welcomed the H- 2 provision of
Public Law UlU t+ was a convenient, supplementary
legal basis for contimHnrr +w„ •nuing the importation of Mexican
labor should the bracero program be ended.
debate leading up to termination of Public
Law 78. reform forces paid little attention to this
loophole. However, the great pressure group struggle
of 1965 centered around the temporary worker provision
of Public Law 414. Of the four alternative sources of
Mexican labor, this was the only one on which growers
and the administration clashed vigorously. Farmers
were able to use increasing numbers of wetbacks and
border-crossers without the administration indicating
304
any serious desirp
-Fn~f°r 3 ° lash those issues.
" °°Ul<1 1,6 n° ”’a
'i0r battlS °n the Emigration
committed to keeping it open. „ thp „• 11 ^ere was to be abattle approximating the intensitv
Public T op •
he 8tru«le overUD Law 7 8, it had +r» via
„ , +
t0 be °Ver the final option.
2 temP°>-ar-y Mexican workers. Both the a •administration
and growers decided to focus on it k
' ocause those workers
of th
C
r
617 reSemble<J bra° er0S
- That »as the only one
e four alternatives which could have been used to
-ng back, under another name. a Mexican labor supply
closely resembling the bracero program.
Unlike immigrants, braceros and H-2 workers
could be brought to the United States for temnorarv
work. When the season ended, they returned to Mexico,
and farm communities did not have to face yearlong
migrant problems. Whereas growers might have to
furnish housing for the families of immigrant migrants.
H 2 workers, like braceros. came alone. Although wet-
backs and border-crossers furnished a cheap, docile
force, their illegal status presented problems
which braceros and H-2 workers did not. First, not
all growers who wished to use Mexicans were willing
to employ illegal ones. Secondly, even those who
were could not be sure that a reform administration
305
would continue to tolerp+*
ni ,
ate widespread use of anillegal Mexican labor force.
Sls
-Ji^S£_DeBartment' R n 0
.. re£ni , + .
entry of t.e,^
~ ^^-^ns_£ovea^
As observed earlier, refrul^gulations issued by the
Attorney General had given the T a h n
„ .
L bor Department broadiscretion to determine policies governing th
nf . + e admissionOf temporary H-2 workers under Public Law 4i4. Even
efore the bracero program expired, Secretary wirtz
correctly anticipated that many growers would attempt
o replace braceros with massive numbers of H-2
Mexicans
. Consequently, he took early steps to defeat
that effort.
During December, 1964, Secretary Wirtz held
a series of public hearings at which criteria for the
admission of foreign workers were considered. 43 On
December 19, he issued tough new standards, effective
January 1 , 1905
, for employers seeking H-2 workers
.
44
The importance of the new criteria was that they
forced growers to make substantially more attractive
J °b °fferS t0 AmerT°ans or forfeit any hope of obtaining
Develop: ESu&f*9*5
.^ 1*/ ^^™labor
44
Ibid
.
,
pp. 6- 7 .
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temporary H-2 workers from Mexico.
The new standards specified thatP ^med applicationswould be considered onlv if „„ ,y emPloyers had first made
reasonable efforts" to utilize »aln' l sources of
available domestic workers « Ro
a
Reasonable efforts wereefined to include offers of daii
- +
.
ly transporta tion
,
other appropriate recruitment efforts." and
. willing.
ness to employ workers from other states. The
secretary also issued a state-by-state suited
minimum waffp'? 1ges. Only growers offering to
hire Americans for no less *u
+u
SS than the wage specified forthat state would be el - .igible to hire foreign labor.
Also, employers were required to furnish family
housing
"where feasible and necessary." The new regu .
lations required that "except as otherwise provided,
domestic workers must be offered, as a minimum, all
the terms and conditions of employment that are
offered to Mexican workers under the migrant labor
agreement of 1951. as amended, including a written
contract embodying these conditions." Any growers
failing to honor these contracts would be ineligible
to receive foreign workers.
The regulations further specified that foreign
workers could not be employed "for a period exceeding
307
days. If domestic workers became available for
jobs already filled by braceros,
-the domestic
workers must be given preference." Finally, foreign
labor could not be used by employers "involved in
strikes or other labor disputes.
-
4 5
The new standards once again spotlighted the
foreign labor parodox of southwestern growers. They
had long sought Mexican workers as a means of reducing
the power of American farm labor. However, they were
again finding that legal Mexican labor could be ob-
tained only if they first agreed to important demands
of American farm workers and their political allies.
Mexico’s concern with the rights of n_o
workers. As noted earlier, the Mexican government
took the position that the United States had terminated
the bracero program too rapidly. However, that did not
mean that Mexico was now willing to supply massive
numbers of H-2 workers on whatever terms southwestern
growers wished. It will be recalled that Public Law 78
and the agreement with Mexico had outlined the rights
of braceros in detail. Many of these guarantees repre-
sented American concessions to persistent pressure from
the Mexican government. In contrast, the H-2 provision
^5 Ibid.
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Of Public Law 414 made no specific reference to the
rights of these foreign workers. Consequently, any
grower effort to simply substitute massive numbers
of H-2 workers for braceros posed the danger that the
Mexican government would lo^p tv, 0 uia se the hard-won concessions
hich it had gained in Public Law 78 . Therefore,
notwithstanding its desire to continue sending workers
to the United States, the Mexican government attempted
to head off what it suspected were grower efforts to
simply substitute H-2 workers with few rights for
braceros who had enjoyed substantial guarantees.
Secretary Wirtz supported its efforts.
In his statement of December 19
, 1964, Wirtz
noted that any continued importation of Mexican
workers, even under the tough new standards, would be
done only in cooperation with the Mexican government
.
46
On December 31, 1964, Antonia Carrillo Flores,
Foreign Minister of Mexico, issued a statement concerning
the new regulations issued by Secretary Wirtz. He noted
that the provision for consultation with Mexico had
taken into account "the views expressed for some months
by the Mexican Government and, particularly, by Presi-
dent Diaz to President Johnson last November." The
46
Ibid
•
,
p , 7 •
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Foreign Minister further explained:
;K4^sri £=£=£*'*-»
as having to be offered to the U.S. workers . 47
The Foreign Minister noted that American
growers had already been asking Mexico for H-2 workers
on these terms.
C riticism of the new regulations
. From the
time Secretary Wirtz issued the new standards governing
admission of H-2 workers under Public Law 4 l 4
,
they
were vigorously criticized in various forums by
grower interests and their political allies. Spokes-
men for growers associations sent letters and telegrams
to congressmen, the Department of Labor, and President
Johnson. Associations passed resolutions which received
wide publicity. Their spokesmen met with congressmen
and representatives of the Labor Department. They
testified in congressional hearings. Also, various
congressmen criticized the new standards in congressional
47Senate Agriculture Committee Hearings (here-
after cited as SAC Hearings), loc . cit .. pp. 35-36.
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debate. Some congressmen attacked them in „
, .
a cn l congressional
hearings. Some sent critical i ++letters and telegrams
resident Johnson and Secretary Wirtz. Various
newspapers featured articles, editorials, and letters
to the editor which criticized the new standards.
Critics of Secretary Wirtz argued that he had
gal authority for setting farm wages. Congress
had repeatedly refused to extend mini™,XXt mum wage coverage
to agricultural labor. 4? The hourly wages set by
Wirtz were unreasonably high and would encourage work-
ers to loaf.-50
critics charged that the new regulations
would drive the cost of production to an unreasonably
high level. This would result from such factors as
the excessively high wage rates, reliance on untrained
domestic workers, and skyrocketing costs of recruitment.
It was charged that the new standards were predi-
cated on a highly unrealistic assumption about American
workers which had been repeatedly disproven. Wirtz
had assumed the existence of an adequate supply of
able and willing Americans who could be hired for farm
49
50
CK, loc. cit., pp. 3100, 3102, 3111.
IMd.
. pp. 3100, 3111.
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work. During the early months of 1965. the critics
charged that even the higher wages and additional
benefits required by the secretary were failing to
attract enough domestic workers to save the crops.
They argued that intensive recruiting drives had been
undertaken at great expense, but almost all were dis-
appointing. Many of the available workers were lame,
drunkards, lazy, or otherwise undesirable employees/
Most newly recruited Americans quit their farm jobs
after a few days. 51 Growers repeatedly explained
that their best efforts to attract domestic workers
had been a bitter disappointment. A typical case
is illustrated by a letter from the president of a
sugar company to Senator Holland. Advertising for
workers at a minimum wage of $11.50 per day and
furnishing transportation in air-conditioned buses,
he was able to hire only one man, and he worked only a
day. 52
The critics charged that because many farmers
were denied reliable foreign workers and forced to
depend on expensive and unreliable domestics, the farm
For var ia.'t ions on "this ‘thomp qpp T'hiri
pp. 3100, 3105-3107. 3110. 3113. 3m; 31197^22-24.
52 Ibid
.
,
p. 4475.
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economy and the nation would suffer. Unless the new
regulations were rescinded, devastating crop losses
were certain. As early as January, 1965. various
senators were telling their colleagues that crops
were already rotting. This theme occurred increas-
ingly during February and March. 53
Farmers would not continue to invest tens of
thousands of dollars in the production of crops which
could not be harvested. Many growers would cease
planting altogether or convert their land to low
labor crops. This would bring food shortages and
skyrocketing costs to consumers.
The critics of Secretary Wirtz noted that some
growers were leaving the United States and buying farms
m Mexico. They claimed that labor there was much
cheaper and far more dependable. Senator George
Murphy (R-Calif.) told his colleagues that he knew of
five major farmers who had already moved their operations
to Mexico. He claimed that this exodus would under-
mine the secretary’s goal of putting Americans to
work. As farmers left, American farm workers and all
whose jobs were dependent on them, such as teamsters,
would lose their jobs. Also joining the exodus, the
53Ibid .
.
pp. 3100, 3110, 3128.
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critics claimed, were various packing companies.
This pattern had been developing for several years,
and it was helping Mexico to increase her volume of
farm exports to the United States. Because companies
could produce more cheaply in Mexico than in the
United States, they were able to undersell Ameri-
can farmers. This too would adversely affect domes-
tic farm workers.-^
Critics of Secretary Wirtz argued that his
120-day limit on foreign workers was unrealistic.
Some crops, such as dates, take up to ten months to
develop, and it would make no sense to force growers
to employ two or three different crews of foreign
workers during the season. 55
Secretary Wirtz was portrayed as an impractical,
ivory tower official who had listened too much to
"do-gooders." Although he was well meaning, he knew
very little about the problems of farmers. As one
congressman stated the critic ismi "There is a con-
test going on, an imposition of the will by someone
who has a theory, on people who have had years of
practical experience
.
54
-~
bid
‘ » PP* 3106, 3108, 3110, 3117, 3144.
t p. 3100. ^ Ibid
.
. pp. 3108-3109.
31k
. On
January 15 , 1965, Secretary Wirtz responded to the
attack on his new standards for Sporting H-2 workers.
d6fenSe WaS Presented
- testimony before the
Senate Agriculture and Forestry Committee.
Secretary Wirtz was particularly concerned
wtth the charge that after Congress had repeatedly
refused to regulate farm wages and working conditions,
1,6 had artitra^ ^ne just that. „e noted that no
farmer was being forced to abide by the new regu-
lations. They governed only those growers who
voluntarily chose to ask for the special privilege of
importing temporary workers from other countries.
Congress had provided in Public Law 4l4 for limiting
the conditions under which farmers could obtain such
labor. Section 10 specified that temporary workers
could be imported only "if unemployed persons capable
of performing such service or labor cannot be found
m this country." Referring to that section, Wirtz
explained to the committee*
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p
T
ro\\eVa^ which we
in terms of whether the work to whlJ mUSt befernng is work with res^ot +° b *cb Ve are re ~be said that there *hlch it cannot
of performing such service^r^abo^to 0^ Japablem this country. 57 °r l r to be found
Congress had not specified the standards for
determining when such conditions exist. However, it
had provided in Public Law 414 for the Attorney
’
General to decide on the admission of H-2 workers
after consultation with other governmental agencies.
Wirtz pointed out that the Attorney General had
issued regulations giving the Labor Department the
authority to veto the entry of H-2 workers when
Americans were available to fill the jobs. By
issuing the new regulations, Secretary Wirtz claimed
that he had simply been meeting his responsibility.
It was unquestionable that there were unemployed per-
sons in the United States. He noted that they numbered
almost four million. The only question, then, was to
determine whether this huge labor surplus contained
enough persons capable of doing the necessary farm work.
At starvation wages, the decision required by Congress
could not be made. Even capable unemployed persons
57SAC Hearings, loc. cit .. p. 65.
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"Xght very well refuse to harvest crops if they were
unable to earn a living by doing the work. Nor did
Congress provide in Public Law 4i4 that
-'labor
shortages" resulting from substandard wages and
working conditions could be solved by simply import.
ing alien workers.
As Secretary Wirtz explained it, his primary
responsibility under Public Law 4l4 was to come up
with some meaningful system for determining if an
adequate supply 0f capable unemployed Americans could
be hired to fill vacant farm jobs. He claimed that
determination could be made only when wages and
working conditions had been lifted above the sub-
standard. That was the purpose of his new regulations.
He believed they would make farm labor sufficiently
attractive to prove that all vacant agricultural po-
sitions could be filled by American workers .
$
8
The dispute over congressional intent, in
termination of the bracero program
. During early 1965
,
much of the disagreement between grower interests and
reformers centered around the question of congressional
intent in terminating Public Law 78 . More specifically,
38For the secretary’s defense of the
regulations, see Ibid
.
.
pp. 64-100.
new
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was the decision to end the brace™cero program motivated
desire to convert to domestic farm labor?
r was congressional intent limited solely to ending
a or importation under Public Law 78 with no impli-
cations at all for Mexicans entering as temporary
H-2 workers under Public Law 4i 4? Reformers predict-
ably advanced the former argument. They claimed that
the congressional decision to end the bracero program
had been a clear message to the Labor Department to
tighten the administration of Public Law 4l4 so as
not to undermine the broad purpose of Congress.
In hearings before the Senate Agriculture
and Forestry Committee on January 15. 1965. Secretary
Wirtz responded to suggestions that Public Law 4l 4
could be used to supply substantial numbers of farm
workers "to American srowsrc; uQ „ .g ers. He replied that the
law which Congress had terminated would "not be
reinstated by administrative action through a back
door.
”
59
Even before the bracero program ended, various
interest groups warned that any attempt to bring
large numbers of Mexican workers into the United States
59 Xbid.
, p. 66.
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under Public Law 4 l 4 wnnin ->1 Would vi°late congressional in-
tent. F0r instance, the executive council of the
AFL-CIO expressed the following position at its
meeting on November 24
, 1964:
The AFL—C 10 was srra + i -p* qj u n
end to the importation of Mev"
Con
f
ress put an
under Public Law 78 We ™ ar\farm laborersthat some large agrlculLnf? ?pPalled to learn
making efforts to «™ + - Urai interests are
under Public Law 4l 9 ^This^e
S
?
me proSra“
to the intent of Congress fnd IearP contrary
allowed to happen. 6o
K * ust not be
Another statement of the reformers- interpre-
tation of congressional intent was submitted at the
January hearings of the Senate Agriculture Committee
by the legislative representative of the Amalgamated
Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America.
He claimed that Congress had focused on Public Law
78 only because it was the primary source of foreign
workers
.
61
Andrew J. Biemiller, head of the AFL-CIO
Department of Legislation, argued for the same liberal
interpretation of congressional intent. In a letter
he sent to all members of the House in early 1965,
the former congressman observed*
6o T ,Ibid .
.
p. 198 .
6l Ibid
.
,
p. 258.
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the Immigration and Natural?
13
? .
Public Law 4l4,
as a means of ciroumvtS Act ' beCongress to stop all fnl- g clear intent ofThe growers have embarked unon^ 01" importation.Secrekry of Labor^because L C *mpaiSn againstmaneuver. 62 D he has opposed this
viewpoint that the intent of Congress in
terminating Public Law ?8 00uld ^ fee
^
;
UStlfy thS t0Ugh nSW reSuTations was stated especially
fully and on different occasions by Senator
Holland, on March 9. 1965 . he told his colleagues
that Congress had not even considered terminating
the H-2 provision of Public Law 4i*. The whole debate
had focused on the wisdom of ending Public Law 78 . 6 3
Senator Holland observed that in debate leading
up to termination of Public Law 78
.
a number of
congressmen had pointed out that the end of the bracero
program would have no effect on the admission of H-2
workers. No reformers had challenged that interpre-
tation at that time.
CR, loc. cit
.. p. 4483 .
63 Ibid
.
64
Ibid-
.
p. 3104.
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The revival of grower interests a ur:ir,g , Q^ Cm the short sPan of a few months from ^
early January, 1965> ^ whole^ ^ ^^
over fore ign labor changed dramatioally
. ^ ^
as late 1964
, growers had generally seemed recon-
ciled to termination of the bracero program. Al-
though the struggle over Public Law 78 had been long
and bitter, many of its traditional supporters had
'
actually agreed to its death. The reformers appeared
to have won at laqt •s . Yet ln early 1965. the grower
demand for* foreign ig labor was so loud and vocally
supported by so many interests thaty -Luu it was reminiscent
of the World War II era. Even some senators such as
Ellender who had agreed to ending the bracero program
were now in the forefront of the grower demand for
foreign labor. Senator George Aiken (R-Vt.). who had
supported reform of the Mexican labor system, emerged
in early 1965 as a leading critic of Secretary Wirt2 .
What had happened in this short period to revitalise
the Mexican labor cause?
It was noted earlier that the strength of
supporters of Public Law 78 had weakened as braceros
came to be concentrated
Reformers had used this
in fewer and fewer areas,
increasing geographic isolation
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‘
re" i,“ ,h'* ,h*
served a narrow regional interest.
Secretary Wirtz’s issuance of new
governing the admission of temporary foreign labor
under Public Law 4l4 was oertainiy
-rms of his concern that ^^^ ^ ^
ended in name only. For termination of Public Law 78
to be meaningful, loopholes needed to be plugged, and
that was what he had done. On the surface, that action
seemed to be an unmixed, further setback for the
users of Mexican labor. Although they might still
obtain some temporary H-2 Mexican workers under
Public Law 414
.
they could do so only after markedly
improving their treatment of American workers.
Viewed from a different perspective, the
secretary’s attempt to plug the H-2 loophole enabled
bracero-users to overcome some of their previously
fatal isolation and gain important new support from
non-western regions. Because Public Law 78 had pro-
vided a supply Of Mexican workers only, growers in
regions using non-Mexican foreign labor saw that
program as being only indirectly beneficial to them.
However, once Wirtz began to fight bracero-users by
tightening the administration of the H-2 provision of
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Public Law Ui U hie?
’ tl0n dlre°tly threatened growers
of various eastern and southern states which used
substantial amounts of
-offshore" and Canadian labor.
Of Which was H-2 workers. The new regulations
brought these interests into a dramatic new coalition
with southwestern growers. More than anything else,
this accounts for the rapid growth of opposition to’
Secretary Wirtz. When the administration chose to
crack down on the users of all temporary H-2 workers,
not just employers of Mexicans, it guaranteed a
broadening of opposition to its policies.
Now that Florida's offshore labor supply was
in jeopardy, a great variety of organizations, interest
groups, and newspapers from that state joined the
assault on the administration. Spessard Holland.
one of Florida's senators, led the fight against the
new regulations. 65
The new regulations struck directly at the
users of Canadian labor in New England. In an about-
face, Senator Aiken decided that farm labor reform had
gone too far. On March 9. 1965, he told the Senate
that Canadian labor was needed in New England. Fair
wages had long failed to attract an adequate supply
65Ibid.
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of American workers. 66
Why did 0ld friends of P^lio Law 78
, such as
.
ender, „ho abandoned it in 1963 and 1964. suddenly
see a gr*6a.t need for Mevir'caKi 1exi n workers m 1965? The
answer necessarily involves speculation. One possi-
bility is outlined below. These old champions of
Public Law 78 abandoned only that law. not their con-
viction that Mexican labor was needed. There are
several strategic reasons why these congressmen may
have agreed to termination of the bracero program.
First, by 1963, it was clear that if tho+ ixn 11 at law remained
in effect, the administration would continue to use
it as a wedge for reforming the conditions of domestic
farm workers. This made the program increasingly less
desirable to growers.
Secondly, reformers had focused so heavily on
Public Law 78 's vulnerabilities that they had dis-
credited that law far more than the practice of using
Mexican labor as such. Therefore, when the grower
coalition agreed to termination of the bracero program,
they were abandoning an unpopular program, a "sinking
ship." On the other hand, liberal reformers had
66
Ibid
.
.
p. 4483 .
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rarely criticized the H-2 provisions of Public Law
Gr°WerS thUS hoped t0 achieve their same old
purpose
, the continuing acquisition of temporary
Mexican labor, under the more popular Public Law 4l4.
Thirdly, until Secretary Wirtz’s new regula-
tions were issued, growers were less obligated to
Mexican workers entering under Public Law 4l 4 than
to braceros coming in under the provisions of Public
Law 78 . Because farmers and their congressional
allies saw the former as the means by which the im-
portation of Mexican labor could be continued even
after expiration of the bracero program, it is little
wonder that the secretary’s effort to plug that loop-
hole brought vehement opposition from bracero areas.
.The foreign labor c oalition during 196^
. a
large number of interest groups, congressmen, farmers,
and newspapers blamed termination of the bracero
program for creating a serious shortage of farm labor.
During late 1964
, some news media warned that
termination of Public Law ?8 would result in a farm
labor shortage. After January 1, 1965, others
claimed that the warnings had come true. Some went
no further while others advocated removal of the new
restrictions on the entry of H-2 workers. Most of
325
these publications were located in the South and
Southwest. Among them were the Tampa Tribune
. the
?iia!!UU:i£2yi
’ and the
-
Los Angeles Herald-Eyamirov. 67
During 1965. many western corporations and
interest groups claimed that a farm labor shortage
had developed. Among them were many growers associ-
ations. Many claims of labor shortages also came
from corporate farms and interest groups in the South,
particularly Florida.
During early 1965, traditional users of
Canadian labor in New England exerted considerable
pressure against Secretary Wirtz's new regulations
governing entry of H-2 workers. These interests were
particularly outspoken at hearings held on Marc.h 29,
1965. in Presque Isle. Maine, by a subcommittee of the
House Committee on Education and Labor. Especially
well represented were state officials and potato
growers opposing the new regulations. 69
^
ing February and March. 1965, a number of
67 TV .Ibid., pp. 3098-4145, 4472-84.
SAC Hearingr^LS 168 “* thr°Ughout
69
on Law ^S;^ Cp ngr?!S’ House ’ General Subcommitteeabor of the Committee on Education and Laborearings, Investigat ion on Importation of Farm Labor*into the United Stajtes, 89th Cong., 1s t Sess., 1965.
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-ate, made a sustained
^ ^
administration that a serious farm labor shortage hadarrived and that it should permit substantial numbers
H-2 workers to enter the United States. The
initiative was led by newly elected Senator George
rphy (R-Calif.) and Senator Spessard Holland (D-Fla .)Also joining the grower cause in Senate debate during’
’
February and March were:
1 .
2
.
3.
4.
5.
6
.
7.
8
.
9.
10 .
11 .
12 .
13.
14.
T
1
i
en
m
J ' Ellender (D-La.)John Tower (R-Tex.
)
Gordon Allott (R-Colo.
)
George Smathers (D-Fla )Peter Dominick (R-Colo.’)
r^o
h
M
Y
p
rb
°f°Ugh (°- Tex.)Gale McGee (D-Wyo.)
Frank Lausche (D-Ohio)
Paul Fannin (R-Ariz.)
Wayne Morse (D-Ore.)
George Aiken (R-Vt.)
Mike Mansfield (D-Mont.
)
Carl Hayden (D-Ariz.)
Phillip Hart (D-Mich.)?°
Grower oriented congressmen rendered various
types of assistance to farmers seeking foreign labor
during 1965. These legislators often acted as inter-
mediaries in communicating grower dissatisfaction to
the Labor Department. For example, in January, 1965,
various spokesmen for Florida citrus organizations
expressed their dismay with Wirtz's new regulations
loc , cit
. f pp. 3098-4145, 4472-84.
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in meetings with several members of that state's
congressional delegation & -pL . A few days iater, a Florida
newspaper reported that Secretary Wirtz had just
experienced "10 days of unrelenting pressure from
senator Spessard Holland and other Florida lawmakers. "71
a similar pattern of channeling grower unrest
to the government developed in Wyoming. The Wyoming
Sugar Beet Council sponsored a meeting at Casper on
February 12, 1965, for the purpose of airing com-
plaints about the labor situation. Attending were
beet growers, spokesmen for major sugar processors
located in the state, and federal, state, and local
employment service officials. Wyoming Senator McGee
sent a member of his Washington staff to participate
in the meeting. In a letter dated February 15, 1965,
the senator communicated the outcome of that meeting’
to Secretary Wirtz and solidly endorsed the grower
demands for foreign labor. McGee wrote that there was
no hope for meeting his state's farm needs from the
domestic labor supply. He urged Wirtz "to take imme-
diate steps to authorize and certify the need for
foreign workers."'7 ^
71
IMd., p. 3133. 72 Ibid
.
, p. 3118.
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Sometimes congressmen met with President
Johnson to request foreign labor. At a press con-
ference in early April. 196 5 , Senator Holland
announced that he had met with the President to
dxscuss the urgent need for foreign labor in Florida
Senators Holland and Murphy acknowledged that they
were involved in an effort to get the President to
personally intervene with Secretary Wirtz so more
alien workers could be imported. They threatened
to attempt to have Johnson fire Secretary Wirtz
unless the new a 1
1
•gui tions governing H-2 workers
were relaxed.
^
A- npte on interests sunnort.ing the
tration-s fo
.
re ign labor policy . Reform forces were
not nearly so active during 1965 as they had been the
previous year. While the grower coalition in the
Senate was mounting a major assault on Wirtz >s new
regulations, they were answered in debate by only one
or two supporters of the administration.
At the January, 1965, hearings of the Senate
Agriculture Committee, eight congressmen testified
against the new standards, while only one, Senator
Harrison J . Williams (D-N.J.), defended them.
73New York Times, April 3, 1965, p . 32 .
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At those hearings, spokesmen for reform groups were
outnumbered by interests seeking to increase the
number of „-2 workers. Practically all of the re
form groups had been active in the earlier struggle
against Public Law 78 .
What had happened since late 1964 to trans-
the noisy, persistent reform forces into such
a passive coalition? At least four answers suggest
themselves. One possibility is that the reform forces
were simply repeating the mistake of letting down their
guard once a narrow legal victory had been won in
terminating Public Law 78. Secondly, some of the
m°re marginal may have had second thoughts
about the merits of cutting off foreign labor once
Public Law 78 had expired. Once the bracero program
had expired, the grower coalition took the offensive
again and "evidence" of labor shortages and crop
losses was presented during the first six months of
1965. Some "reformers" who had thought there would
be an adequate supply of domestic labor began to doubt
that they had been correct.
A third explanation for the cooling of reform
enthusiasm during 1965 is related to the fact that
Wirtz
• s attack on Public Law 4l4 alienated some
330
eastern congressmen who had been critical 0f thebracero program.
Fourthly, the problem of achieving reform
under Pub i io Law ^ in 1965 was Qf ^
different nature from the task involved in getting
Co
U
n
bUC ^ ^ te™ inated
-
-d the bracero program,
gress had to be convinced and that required reform
groups to be active. The power to reform the adminis-
ration of Public Law klk lay with Secretary Wirtz
and he needed no convincing from the reformers be-’
cause he already agreed with them. This may account
for some of the surface passivity of liberals during
1965.
The reduction of temporary foreign
As noted earlier, grower initiative to obtain H-2
workers intensified as the months of 1965 passed.
Although Secretary Wirtz had firmly insisted all along
that he believed the domestic farm labor supply was
adequate, he had never ruled out the possibility
that some foreign workers might be needed for the
transitional period.
By late March, Wirtz was still holding his
ground and had refused to admit a single Mexican H-2
worker. He continued to maintain that he saw no
331
convincing evidence of a domestic labor shortage
However, he could not ignore the rising tide of
Protest against his position. Growers could point
to some crop losses. and this furnished them with
the hind of emotional levers which might eventually
be used to undermine the secretary.
In late March. Wirtz journeyed to California
for an on-the-spot evaluation of the alleged labor
shortage. * Walking the fields, he talked with
workers, union spokesmen, growers, and local officials.
California farmers hoped that the secretary's
trip would convince him that Mexican labor was
desperately needed. Many told him that although they
had substantially increased wages, they simply could
not hire enough capable workers. They were scraping
the bottom of the barrel and had hired many workers
who would never have been employed under less pressing
circumstances. Some crops had rotted, and many more
were in great danger. Only Mexican nationals could
save them.
Farm workers had long seen Public Law 78 as
74
n Ql . f .
Th(
r
Following account of Wirtz*
s
trio to
torch' 27^1 oVbased heavily on New York Times ,i larch 27, 1965, p. 6 and March 29, 1965, p. 1.
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a major barrier to unionization. As soon as it ex-
pired, efforts to organize agricultural workers
increased. This was very much on the minds of
growers when Secretary Wirtz arrived in California.
They claimed that his new regulations placed them
at the mercy of union organizers. Some boldly asked
him to pledge that the government would guarantee
a supply of Mexican workers to save any crops
threatened by strikes.
Farm workers and union spokesmen told Secre-
tary Wirtz that there was no shortage of domestic
farm workers. While 1,500 union members were unem-
ployed in the Salinas Valley, farmers there were
requesting 5,100 Mexicans. Union spokesmen told
Secretary Wirtz that growers sought Mexican labor
not to meet any labor shortage but simply to prevent
unionization.
Various comments which the secretary made on
his California trip indicated that he was not very
convinced by grower claims that they had made reason
able efforts to obtain domestic labor. For example,
he characterized a labor camp near Salinas as being
"filthy" and proclaimed it shameful that such con-
ditions existed in the United States.
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H33 inspection completed, Wirtz held a news
conference m Los Angeles on March 28
. He noted
that Congress had ended the hracero program. Some
people had refused to accept that congressional de-
c is ron. They were seeking to import massive numbers
of temporary foreign workers under Public Law kik.
He bluntly said that he would not permit that. The
time Of a governmenmentally supplied labor force
was over. Farmers could get workers in the same
way other employers did, compete for them in the
labor market, wirtz rejected the argument that
higher wages would bring prohibitively high food
prices. Nor was he impressed with the grower claim
of catastrophic labor shortages in the State of
California. Secretary Wirtz claimed that the tran-
sition to domestic labor had been accomplished with
minimal problems for growers. However, he did
acknowledge that the fall harvest would require more
labor, and he admitted that some foreign workers
might be needed then.
On April 15, 1965, Secretary Wirtz established
the California Farm Labor Panel and assigned it the
task of assessing the farm labor situation in that
state and evaluating requests for foreign workers.
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Its members were appointed from the three campuses of
the University of California. 75
Wirtz promptly noted that creation of the
panel was not a retreat from his initial position on
foreign labor. He recalled that he had never claimed
that all temporary Mexican labor could be banned from
California. Now he said that perhaps a few H-2 workers
would be admitted but only if the panel objectively
determined that the domestic labor supply „as inadequate
.
76
The panel held public hearings to gather infor-
mation on the alleged need for foreign workers.
Growers testified that Mexicans were essential to save
the crops. Representatives of organized labor denied
it. A spokesman for the California State Federation
of Labor testified that 4?2,000 people were unem-
ployed in California and that many of them were in
the very areas to which growers were seeking to im-
port Mexicans. 77
The California Labor Panel recommended that
Secretary Wirtz admit a small number of Mexicans. In
75
Spaqn,3l
U.S Department of Labor, Year of Transition.e sona l Farm Labor: 196^
. p. I-50.
New York Times. April 16, 1965, p. 12.
77Gladwin Hill, "Need of Braceros on CoastDenied, New York Times
. April 21
, 1965, p. 34.
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late May, 1
. 965
, he authorized 2,700 for work in the
asparagus and strawberry harvests. However, accord-ing to a publication by the Labor Department,
|enr;utth|o f:o1rk?USeerg?ofw:rsrk:r ?U *h°riZed hadthem because they had no fWh ® d to rele asecan workers. By July 20 y eed for Mexi-
workers had bee£
^triate'd. 78
* M®X1Can
On May 7. 1965. Secretary Wirtz set up a
Michigan Farm Labor Panel to evaluate requests for
Mexican labor in that state.™ Ten days later
the panel advised him that five thousand alien
workers would be needed for the pickle harvest. How-
they were never brought to Michigan. According to
the panel’s final report, that was because the
prospective employers lost their eligibility to use
foreign workers by their “refusal or failure to
accept all of the domestic workers that had been
referred to them by the Employment Service ." 80
By the fall of 1965, it was clear that Wirtz
would cert ify far fewer foreign workers than growers
78
Employment Trends 1964-196^ " Far.™ t -kDevelopments
. July, 1965, p. 5 ,
1 ^
—
arm Labor
79U-S.. Department of Labor, op. cit
.. p . j. 37 ,
80-r-u • ,Ip id
.
,
p. j-2
.
336
wanted. Consequently, an effort was made to trans-
fer authority over the admission of H-2 workers
from the Labor Department to the Department of Agri-
At the suggestion of Senator Holland, the
Senate Agriculture Committee amended the omnibus
farm bill to give the Agriculture Secretary the
responsibility for deciding when temporary foreign
agricultural labor was needed. 81 As noted earlier,
farm-bloc interests had long sought to put foreign’
labor under control of the Department of Agriculture
on the assumption that it was less sympathetic to
farm labor reform.
President Johnson. 82 the Attorney Ceneral, and
the Departments of Agriculture and Labor opposed the
Holland amendment. 88 0n the floor of the Senate,
Ross Bass (D-Tenn.) introduced an amendment to nullify
the Holland amendment and leave control over foreign
farm workers in the hands of the Secretary of Labor. 84
The vote was 45 -45 . It became 46-45 for the Bass
8l New York Times
, September 3, 1965, p. 4.
cited as
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amendment when Vice Preside* woident Humphrey broke the tie.Democratic senators split 43-17 fnr7 7 o the amendment.
Only two Republicans voted for it while OH
85 28 opposed
-LX#
During 1964
, approximately 1 ?8,000 Mexicans
worked in the United States as braceros as or as
H-2 temporary workers. They were employed ^ a^Of seventeen states. 86 According to Secretary Wirtz
"the major change in 1965 was the greatly reduced
importation of Mexican workers." During that year,
he certified a total of 20 ion w c,100 H-2 workers from Mexi-
=0. All were employed in California. 8 ? During 1965.
there was also substantially less reliance on British
West Indian and Canadian H-2 workers than there had
been during 1964, 88
Measured in man-months, from 1964 to 1965,
there was a decrease of about 83 percent in American
reliance on foreign workers. 8 ^
85£3A, xxi (1965), 87.
86t
. QU ‘ S *' DePartment of Labor, op. cit .. pp . 5_6 .8?
89
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Ibid
.
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The use of H-2 workers declined even further
during 1966. Secretary Wirtz certifyJ rtified approximately
34 percent fewer than he had the previous year. 90
Reliance on H-2 labor continued to decline
during 1967. According to a publication of the
Department of Labor:
in more than 24 vear4 «b™’ V? the f }rst Period
+
y s when all crops in theited States were tended without the hpi^of temporary foreign workers. 91
lp
Collective discussion of H-2 workers obscures
some important facts about the shifting relative
position of legal temporary Mexican labor. During
the years of Public Law 78, the number of braceros
working in the United States had greatly out-numbered
all of the non-Mexican workers entering under the H-2
provision of Public Law 4l4. By 1967. the other
nationalities had come to out-number the Mexicans. 92
The year 1968 set new records for decreased
reliance on H-2 workers. In 1969, the Labor Department
reported:
90„
ment ”
Tr®nds in Foreign-Worker Employ-
’
Fa™ Labor Developments. January, 1967, p. 21.
ment ”
T™nds in Foreign-Worker Employ-
» iiarm Labor Developments. February, 1968, p. n.
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of World War II that no
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n contract workers
Further, for nearly half o^i 968^? Uni *ed .StatesSeptember, no foreign rnr\ + ^-rom April to
nationality were
Increasing reliance on farm 1aW.
As the bracero program was being phased out in late
1964, the Labor Department clearly accepted an obli-
gation to assist growers in recruiting an adequate
number of domestic workers. On December 14, 1964,
before issuing the new standards governing admission
of H-2 workers under Public Law 4l4, Wirtz called
for a massive state-federal initiative to recruit
American farm labor.
Secretary Wirtz paid particular attention to
growers who were likely to request foreign workers.
A special program of "mobile teams" was established
to help them recruit domestic labor. The Department's
efforts were guided by two goals. The first was to
supply farmers with enough workers to replace braceros
93..
Farm Labor Devel Marcht 196^. 8?
94,,
1965? ^™ <
Workers »" Farm Laboj^Sf^
34o
The second was to olacp thoopP e those persons most in need
of work. ^
The Department of Labor summarized its
initiative as follows:
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A dozen mobile teams, staffed jointly by the
Labor Department and state employment offices, were
created in early 1965. They fanned out from base
cities in Florida, California. Arizona, and Texas. 97
Later in the year, ten additional teams began recruit-
mg for the apple harvest in New England. 98
95 »
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’Recruitment Programs for Farmworkers "ar Labor Developments
, August, 1965, p . 1
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Lflbnr. npJfeCrui!ment Pro^ams for Farmworkers,” Farmabo Developments. August, 1965, p. 1.
d°meSti° WOrke”“ growers had already re
'
quested. Techniques included advertising vacancies
radio and television and in newspapers. The teams
also sought workers through unions, churches, service
clubs, and welfare aapncio.? muge cies. They even made door-to-
door inquiries in various low income areas."
A second recruitment program undertaken by
the federal government during 1965 was known as the
"A-Team" system. It was established for the purpose
of recruiting high-school, male athletes for farm
work. Each team consisted of students and a counselor
from the same school. The counselor supervised the
student workers on his team. A total of 3,225
A-Teams were placed during 1965. 100
A third federally operated effort to hire farm
workers was known as the College Summer Recruitment
Program. Inaugurated in 1964, it was intensified
during 1965. and it placed about 5. 000 students in
agricultural jobs. 101
99Groom, loc
, cit .
100
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fourth federal recruitment program was known
as Project Growth.” Secretary Wirtz described it as
"an experiment to determine whether opportunities
for seasonal agricultural employment could be uti-
lised in the rehabilitation of disadvantaged youth.”
The young male recruits first went through a pre-job
orientation program lasting two to four weeks.
Secondly, they did farm work for six to eight
weeks. That was followed by one month of testing
counseling, and "referral to other manpower develop-
ment activities.” At the end of 1965
, Secretary
Wirtz concluded that the program "did not result
significant additions to the agricultural labor
force. There had not been sufficient time for the
Proper planning and staffing of the project, recruit-
ment of the youth, or provision of the kind of a
working environment necessary to the success of so
complex a project ." 102 The program also ran into
considerable opposition within the Labor Department
where certain officials thought "dead-end" farm
work was an inappropriate basis for rehabilitation
.
10 3
102 T , . ,Ibid
.
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Work " M-,
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, "Jobless Youths to do Farm. New York Times. May 9 . 1965, p. 82.
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To fill farm labor nee(Js after terminat . on Qf
Public Law ?8 ( the federal government also urged state
governments to intensify their efforts. State employ-
ment agencies expanded their traditional methods of
recruitment. 104 During 1?65f a number Qf state
governments sponsored special recruitment drives.
For example, the California Department of Labor,
through the Summer Youth Employment Program, placed
25.292 young persons in agricultural work. Several
other states operated similar projects during the year. 10 5
Reminiscent of the World War II era, California de-
veloped a new policy giving parole preference to
certain types of inmates willing to do farm work. 106
By 1965, a number of states had established in-
formation stations for farm workers. These offices
supplied information on such matters as crop conditions
and wage offerings. Some could refer migrants to
particular jobs. 107
104„ DRecruitment Programs for Farmworkers,” l oc , c it .
10 jU.S., Department of Labor, op. cit
.. p. i4.
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» New York Times. May 15, 1965, p. 15.
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"Migratory Workers in the United States ”
—bor Developments
. October, 1965, p. 7
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Also attracting more workers to farm jobsby 1965 was the exiqtpnr. 0 ~stence of an increasing number of
annual worker plan*-P no. The purpose of these pians wast0 get tentative pre-spa^r, „P e son commitments from both
workers and growers anH +<-. jand to draw up an itinerary
accordingly. Migrants participating <m annual worker
Plans could thus be assured of a succession of jobs
rather than haphazardly seeking new employment after
each job was completed. This attempt to rationalise
the movement of workers also brought the grower more
confidence that workers would be available when
needed. loy
Of course, intensified recruitment of domes-
tic farm workers during 1965 was not limited to
governmental efforts. Near the end of the year,
Secretary Wirtz attributed much of the increase in
domestic farm employment to "improvements by the
growers in wages and in working and living conditions." 10?
Of course, some of this may have resulted from the
government s making clear to growers that if they
failed to seriously seek domestic labor, they would
108
109
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p . 6.
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be denied foreign workers regardless of what happened
"to their crops.
During 1965, the increase in domestic farm
employment was less than the decrease in legal
foreign workers. According to the Labor Department,
this was due to increasing mechanization and more
efficient use of domestic labor. 110 it probably also
resulted from greater reliance on illegal Mexicans.
However, the increase in domestic farm employment was
substantial. During peak season (August), about
86,200 more Americans were employed in farm work
than at the same time in 1964. According to the
Labor Department, termination of the bracero program
combined with the tighter administration of the H-2
provision of Public Law 4l4 enabled about 100,000 extra
Americans to hold farm jobs sometime during 1965. 111
Effects of the transition to domestic labor .
According to an official study by the Labor Department,
the markedly decreased reliance on foreign workers
during 1965 had few ill effects on American growers.
The study found that "the total of even the claimed
losses due to labor shortage in 1965 is estimated at
110IMd. f pp. 9-10. Ibid.
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less than * of 1 perc ent of the value this year of
crops which foreign labor worked on in 1964.
" How-
ever. the study concluded that some labor shortages
had developed as a result of the termination of Public
Law 78, although they
-were substantially less serious
than anyone could have predicted in advance
.
Surveying crops which had used substantial
numbers of alien workers during 1964, the study
concluded that some produced smaller harvests in 1965
while others produced larger ones. “3 Crop values
in 1965 were greater than during the previous year. 11 '*
The Labor Department found that the conversion
to domestic labor had brought important benefits to
American farm workers. In the peak month (August)
of 1965. unemployment among agricultural workers was
only 4.8 percent compared to 6.5 percent one year
earlier. 115 The study reported that farm wages
averaged six cents more per hour during 1965 than
during 1964. It noted that this was "the largest
recorded one-year increase since the Korean War
period." 11 6 Finally, it concluded that a variety of
IIP
Ibid., pp. 15-16. 113 Ibid
.
. p. 16.
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g and living conditions improved due to the decreasing reliance on foreign f_
; r
Se and^ "" - - established, phasing
the hracero program coincided with the beginning
3 S6riOUS thitiative to unionise farm labor H8
Orowers had argued that an end to the Mexican
a or program would cause major increases in consumer
f°r fari
” S°°dS ' However
. the Labor Department
’ "* P«~.
declined during- 196^ t+ • -u ,5 ' U attributed this to the more
abundant harvests of that year.
from November, 1964, to November. 1965, fruit
and vegetable prices declined by 4.5 percent while
the Consumer Price Index was increasing l, 7 percent.
Separating out crops on which large numbers of braceros
had been employed in 1964, the Labor Department found
that the prices of some climbed during 1965 while
others fell. 119
117
-Upj-d.
, pp. 20-21.
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The Nixon Era
introduction. After approximately three years
relative inactivity, pressure group controversy
over Mexican labor accelerated during the Nixon eraOnce again critics of foreign labor seised the
initiative. They began to show signs of recognizing
the fact that although the bracero program had ended
and the H-2 system had been greatly curtailed, south-
western growers continued to use large amounts of
Mexican labor. Reminiscent of the early l96o's,
attention turned heavily to the growing wetback’
problem and to alleged ahn« -n.buse of the commuter system.
Despite some important differences, there is
a certain continuity between the Johnson administration's
foreign labor policy and that of the Nixon adminis-
tration. The simple and easy conclusion that the
former was pro-labor and the latter pro-grower should
be avoided. The Johnson administration's efforts to
reform foreign labor usage focused overwhelmingly on
curtailing the flow of workers entering the United
States legally. There is no doubt that it greatly
reduced the use of this labor, but it paid little
attention to the growing wetback problem. Likewise,
the Nixon administration has admitted few H-2 workers
3^9
and. Of course, no braceros, but the problem of
illegal Mexican labor has ached new proportions,
he Johnson administration's reform image notwith-
standing. it tolerated the growing wetback problem
which faced the Nixon government in 1969.
The four types of Mexican labor
2B years. It was explained earlier that termi-
nation of the bracero program left four supplies of
Mexican labor intact. During 1965, the big contro-
versy was over the admission of H-2 workers. As we
have seen, the Johnson administration had largely
won that battle within a year after the bracero pro-
gram had ended. From 1966 through 1968. growers had
more or less resigned themselves to doing without
massive numbers of H-2 workers. There has been no
significant change in this pattern during the Nixon
administration. Growers have made no major efforts to
greatly increase the amount of H-2 Mexican labor
admitted, and the Nixon administration has shown no
sign of creating a new bracero program through this
provision. Since 1968, the largest number of Mexican
H-2 workers admitted during any single year was less
350
than one thousand,
Although not all growers would consider wet-
backs a satisfactory substitute for legal temporary
workers from Mexico, the massive growth of wetback
entry during the past few years has probably been a
major factor in the continuing low demand for H-2
labor. In annual reports issued since Nixon became
President, the INS has noted an increase in the
problem of illegal entry from Mexico. During 1969,
ov.r 201,000 Mexicans were apprehended. 121 ln
5972
, the number exceeded 390
,
000 .
*
22
There is evidence that many of the wetbacks
on farms. Over 25^ of those apprehended in 1969
been doing agricultural work in the United States.
If that proportion holds up through 1972
, it would
indicate that about 100,000 of the illegal Mexicans
apprehended were employed on farms. That is more than
half the number of Mexican nationals who entered the
120
tt q
a gay.ririjwpi. ~
121
Annual Report
. 1969, p. 12.
122
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United States as braceros during 1964.
it is commonly estimated that not more
Inasmuch as
than one-
third to one-half of all illegal Mexican nationals
are located by the INS. it is possible that by i 972>
the wetback problem had grown to proportions large
’
enough to have completely replaced the bracero
program.
Throughout much of this dissertation, we have
seen that when southwestern growers have lost a par-
ticular type of Mexican workers, they have tended to
increase their reliance on other types. This would
suggest that if a serious effort should be made to
seal the border and rid the United States of wetbacks,
growers would again seek large numbers of Mexican
laborers under perhaps a new bracero program or
under the H-2 provisions of Public Law 4i4 .
During the last year of the Johnson adminis-
tration, 442,205 "temporary visitors" from Mexico
were admitted to the United States. Since then the
numbers have grown dramatically. In 1972, over one
million entered. 12 ^
As noted earlier in this chapter, immigration
authorities have found that a substantial number of
123 Ibid
.
, p. 56.
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Mexicans admitted as temporary visitors violate the
provisions of their admission and accept jobs in the
United States.
Because of the ceiling set on Western Hemisphere
immigration by the Ervin amendment, it might be ex-
pected that immigration from Mexico would have
declined since Nixon became President. However,
there has been a moderate upward trend. 124
One reason why legislation enacting a Western
Hemisphere ceiling has not prevented an increase in
Mexican immigration is the fact that since Nixon
became President, there has been a steady decline in
immigration from Canada to the United States. 12 5
In 1971, President Nixon unsuccessfully pro
posed that Congress enact legislation authorizing
a greater number of immigrants from the Western
Hemisphere, particularly Mexico and Canada. 126
O ther Mexican labor developments during
Nixon years
. During 1969, reform interests revived
substantially. There was growing recognition that
although growers had lost the bracero program, they
12Sbid.
, p. 54. 125Ibid.
126CM. XXVII (1971), 10-A.
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had not really lost their Mexican labor. Most of
the reform initiative of i 96 9 centered around
Congress
.
During the year, three congressional committees
held hearings on migrant labor at which at least
some witnesses attempted to connect the hardships
of American farm labor with the increase in Mexican
workers. Intermittent hearings on farm labor
unionization were held by a subcommittee of the
Senate Labor and Welfare Committee in April, May,
June. Cesar Chavez, the director of the United
Farm Workers Organizing Committee, claimed that the
availability of Mexican national labor was making it
more difficult to unionize American farm workers. He
called on the government to ban Mexicans from agri-
cultural work. 127
Intermittently in July and August, 1969, a
subcommittee of the House Committee on Education and
Labor conducted hearings on the use of alien labor
during strikes. Chairman Frank Thompson, Jr. (D-N.J.)
claimed that green-carders had long been employed as
strikebreakers in the border regions of the nation. 128
127
XXV (1969), 757-58.
128 t , .Ibid., p. 759.
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A spokesman for the AFL-CIO told the sub-
committee that even when green-carders were not used
as strikebreakers
, employers sometimes took advantage
° their foreign status to intimidate them from organ-izing and joining unions. A representative of the
INS testified that over 700.000 Mexican green-
carders were living in the United States> ^ ^
Ported that another *7,315 green-carders were eligible
m Mexico and commute to jobs in the United
States. A spokesman for the State Department claimed
that the practice of employing commuters to replace
Americans on strike was likely to harm United States
relations with Mexico.
A representative of the El Paso Chamber of
Commerce told the subcommittee that few Mexicans were
used as strikebreakers. He claimed that only ten
thousand green-carders lived in Mexico and commuted
jobs in the United States. A spokesman for the
National Council of Agricultural Employers told the
subcommittee that green-carders were needed in the
Southwest due to the rapidly declining farm labor
129force
.
129
Ibid.
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Hearings on migrant farm labor problems ^held intermittently from May 21 to September ^
1569, by the Subcommittee on Migratory Labor of the
Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee. Chairman
Walter F. Mondale (D-Minn.) announced that "the
underlying theme of all our hearings is powerless-
He claimed that thousands of green-carders
were commuting to jobs in the United States each day
end that substantial numbers of wetbacks were doing
farm work in the border region.
A former Labor Department official testified
that the commuter system should be ended. He said
that all immigrants should be treated alike
.
1 31 The
director of the California Rural Legal Assistance
Program testified that Attorney General John
Mitchell was experiencing "a law and order crisis in
his own department" because of his failure to con-
trol the movement of wetbacks to the United States for
farm work. He claimed that 20 percent of the agri-
cultural work force in the United States was made
up of wetbacks. 1 -^ 2
13
°Ibid. 131 Ibid.. p. 760.
132
Ibid
.
. p. 76 2 .
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During 1969, two Senate bills concerning Mexi-
can labor were introduced. I„ March Senator
Kennedy (D-Mass. ) introduced legisiation which wQ(jld
have given the Labor Departs authority to act on
each commuter’s status every six months. If the
commuter were found to be having an adverse effect
on American labor, he would not be certified again.
The bill also provided that commuters violating the
provisions of their admission would lose their labor
certification. Thirdly, Kennedy’s bill would have
removed that section of the Immigration and Nationality
Act which exempted from criminal penalties those who
hire illegal aliens. 133
Kennedy's bill „as considered and killed by
the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 13^
During 1969, Senator Kennedy also took more
direct action to protest what he considered the misuse
of certain Mexican workers. On May 18, along with
Senator Walter Mondale (D-Minn. ) and Ralph Yarborough
a>-Tex.), he joined a march to the California border
7730 - 31 .(
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for the purpose of ashing Mexican citizens not to
enter the United States as strikebreakers. 1^
During 1969
, other legis iation aimed at
limiting Mexican labor was introduced by Senator
Mondale. His bin would have made it "an unfair
labor practice for an employer to employ an alien un-
lawfully present in the United States, or to employ
aliens whose principal dwelling places are in a
orei^n country during a labor dispute." The latter
provision was aimed at the problem of commuters being
used as strikebreakers. In a Senate speech on July 8
.
1969. Mondale charged that "commuters constitute
about 85 percent of the farmwork force in California's
Imperial Valley." He continued,
u^ed'as'strikebreakers^uring^labor™^?6
^
^
efforts to obtain collective ?rganizing
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Slr^ed Jhat 40 Percent of the
fornia area in 1 Qfift fP r?nohes in the Cali-I u m 96b were Mexican nationalgreen-card holders. 136 x
Mondale s bill died in the Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare.
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a second suit challenging the employment of
wetbacks was initiated by California Rural Legal
Assistance, an agency of the Office of Economic
Opportunity. The decision was handed down in October.
A judge in Santa Rosa Superior Court ruled that
growers could be Duni^hpri -Fm-. u •p ished for hiring wetbacks while
refusing to give jobs to American citizens. 138
Curing 1970, the wetback problem continued
to attract attention. Representative E. de la Garza
(D-Tex.) told the House that the wetback problem was
increasing dramatically. He suggested, however, that
nature of the problem had been changing. Relatively
fewer illegal Mexicans were doing farm work because
the demand for agricultural labor had been reduced by
mechanization. He said that, like Americans, more and
more wetbacks were being attracted to industrial jobs
Part 27,
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n ld make a better
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The farm labor unionization movement achieved
-me unprecedented successes during 1970 . In April
and May, Cesar Chavez’s United Fa rm w v
.
Workers Organizing
ommittee (consisting heavily 0 f Mexican-Americans
)
succeeded in signing contracts with grape farmers
representing some 4 percent of the industry. This
success came after a long emotionally charged,
nationwide boycott of non-union table grapes.
During 1970, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-Me )
introduced a bill aimed at reforming the commuter
system. It would have required all immigrants to
the United States to actually live here. 1 ^*
A second part of the Muskie bill provided for
a nonresident work permit system. Rather than becoming
immigrants, Mexicans who merely wished to work in the
United States would be issued a permit upon certifi-
cation of the Labor Department that American workers
were unava ilable. However, Mexicans living more than
139
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twenty miles from the United ^-t-o+oe. ux b ates border would be
ineligible to receive work permits. 142
Muskie
' s bill was considered by the Senate
Judiciary Committee which declined to report it out. 145
In 1971, Muskie again introduced legislation
to abolish the commuter system as such. In a speech
to the Senate on April 5, he said that daily commuters
from Mexico were only a small part of the job compe-
tition for American citizens. He claimed that
between 100,000 and h-00,000 Mexicans commuted to
the United States for several weeks or months of work
at a time, then returned to Mexico to live. Muskie
charged that many of the Mexicans were undermining the
wages and working conditions of American farm workers
and that they were often used as strikebreakers. 144
Muskie 's bill was considered by the Senate
Judiciary Committee. As during the previous year,
it did not report it to the full Senate. 145
In October, 1971, the wetback problem was spot-
lighted in a House speech by Representative
142
Ibid., pp. 595^-55.
144
D . 0
CR. 92d Cong.
,
1st Ses
Part 8, 9553.
l45CR, 92d Cong., 1st Ses
Part 37, p. 1631.
Ibid
.
,
p. 1280.
1971, CXVII,
1971, CXVII,
36i
Richard White (D-Tex ) i •He claimed that while unem-ployment rates were ri^ino- •W6 sinS the United States,
*“"* !•- ™» H,
charged that while the P lem was s °aring, the immi-gration authorities were reducing their efforts. „e
claimed that their surveillanoe had been reduced an<jthat federal officials her) a •ncia ad advised certain local
policemen to stop arresting wetbacks. 146
October 14, 1971, Representative Robert
Price (R-Tex.) introduced a bill to reinstate the
bracero program. He claimed that growers
"through-
out much of the Southwest still stand in dire need
of steady and dependable farm labor." Although unem-
ployment was high, farm work was too hard for many
Americans. He suggested that another bracero program
would help reduce the wetback problem. His bill
would have placed the new program under the Depart-
ment of Agriculture
.
lk?
it died in p-lx m committee.
The foreign labor highlight of 1972 was
passage of a bill by the House to control the wetback
problem. On September 12. the House passed (by voice
V ° te) H-R ’ 16188
' which w°uld have made it illegal to
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knowingly employ illegal allens .l 48 ^
voice vote does not permit a breakdown of support
for the measure, relevant information is contained in
a roll call vote on an earlier move to recommit the
bill to the House Judiciary Committee, which would
had the effect of killing H.R. 16188, That
m°Ve Was defeated ^ a 53-297 vote, a total of
^2 of the 53 votes for recommital came from repre-
sentatives from the southern and western states of
Alabama, Arizona. California, Florida. Kansas.
Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia
and Washington . ^9
The Senate failed to act on H.R. 16188, thus
killing it. 1 *0 However, when the Senate Labor and
Public Welfare Committee reported a minimum wage
bill on June 8, 1972, it included an amendment which
would have made it a crime to knowingly hire illegal
aliens The House had also passed a minimum wage
bUl, but it was significantly different from the
Senate version (in ways having nothing to do with the
question of illegal aliens). The House voted not to
148CQA. XXVIII (1972), 537 .
149
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send its bill to a Senate-House
to reconcile differences between
conference committe
the two. ^2
e
result was that both minimum wage bills,
the Senate-passed amendment dealing with
died. *53
including
illegal aliens
»
The paradox was that both the House and the
Senate had passed legislation prescribing criminal
penalties for the knowing employment of illegal
aliens, yet neither bill was enacted into law.
During 1973 , another effort has been made in
Congress to deal with the wetback problem. This
initiative is closely related to certain proposals
made by the Nixon administration during the previous
year. In 1972, Nixon called for legislation making
the knowing employment of illegal aliens a criminal
offense. Administration officials noted that year
that the wetback problem had grown to alarming propor-
tions. in response to the administration’s proposals,
the Immigration and Nationality Subcommittee of the
House Judiciary Committee held hearings in six cities
across the country. It was from these hearings and
extensive study of the problem by the subcommittee
152Ibid
.
, p. 370 . Ibid. PP* 370-71.
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that H.R. 982 emerged in 1973.
th
X°n admln
-stration had proposed that evenlrS °ffense hiring illegal aliens should bepunishable as a crimp r
^
nsiderable opposition to
3 ar°Se “ the » was argued that as a
matter of self-protection> employers^^ ^hire anyone who appeared to be ••Mexican." As a
result, Mexican-Amer icans might experience serious
problems of job discrimination. 1^ Predictably,
this argument came from certain growers, but it ’also
came from more liberal groups and individuals.
The subcommittee's major task was to reconcile
two mam goals. It was concerned with drying up the
wetback problem by making it unlawful to hire illegal
aliens. However, it wished +e ...1S to do this without drafting
legislation likely to result in overly cautious employers
Who would discriminate even against Mexican-Americans
Consequently, H.R. 982 was a compromise measure designed
to cope with both concerns. It met the administration’s
concern by providing that knowing employment of illegal
aliens would be a crime. However, it provided two safe-
guards des igned to prevent excessive caution on the
No. 1St SeSS -' 197^ cxix.
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part of employers which might result *•nx in discrimination
against Mexican-Americans
. First, employers getting
a signed statement from employees to the effect that
they had not entered the United States illegally
would be innocent even if they hired wetbacks. The
second safeguard took the form of a three-step set
of progressive penalties for repeated violations. A
first offender would merely receive a warning while
second and third offenders would be subject to
greater penalties.
On May 3, 1973, H.R. 982 passed the House on
a roll call vote of 297-63 . Those voting against this
legislation to make the knowing employment of illegal
aliens a crime were a mixture of liberals and con-
servatives. The liberals included Bella Abzug (D-N.Y.)
and Shirley Chisholm (D-N.Y.). Among conservatives
voting against H.R. 982 were Barry Goldwater, Jr.
(R-Calif.) and John Rousselot (R-Calif
. )
. *55 The
conservative opposition to the bill centered around
arguments concerning the need for foreign labor while
liberal opponents of H.R. 982 stressed that it might
lead to discrimination against Mexican-Americans
.
As of the summer of 1973. the Senate had not
passed anti-wetback legislation, so the possibility
155
lj?id.
. PP. H3303-H3333.
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that H.R. 982 wiu be enacted into ^ ses^or Congress is uncertain.
Summary and Conclusions
have seen that while grower pressure to
obtain foreign labor receded during 1964, it reached
a new peak during 1965. The new initiative involved
a full-scale mobilisation of pressure groups. How-
ever. the group struggle of 1965 had changed. Reform
groups were much less active than they had been during
the previous year. With some exceptions, they were
willing to let the administration fight the foreign
labor battle.
The impressive organized power which growers
mobilized during 1965 failed to secure the massive
numbers of H-2 workers which they wanted. Although
their initiative to strip Secretary Wirtz of his power
over foreign farm labor mustered an impressive vote
,n the Senate, it was not a particularly meaningful
move. Even if Congress had adopted the Holland amend-
ment and given control over H-2 workers to the
Agriculture Department, it probably would have brought
no immediate victories to the farm coalition. Unlike
the Eisenhower administration, the Johnson administration
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was unified in its commitment to the goal that the
H-2 provision should not permit a revival of the
bracero program under another name. There is no
reason to think that the Agriculture Department would
have certified more H-2 workers than did Secretary
Wirtz
.
Secretary Wirtz 's willingness to take bold
administrative steps to reduce the admission of tem-
porary foreign labor and to improve the lot of
domestic farm workers helps account for the increasing
opposition to him during 1965. The close vote on
the Bass amendment suggests that he had gone about
as far as he could in reforming the farm labor
situation without alienating a fatal number of his
supporters. Yet the fact is that he was permitted to
get away with unprecedented reforms.
The year 1965 stands by itself as a special
era m the struggle over foreign farm labor. It was
the last year that growers made a vigorous effort to
receive massive numbers of H-2 workers. By the end
of 1965, they appeared to be reconciled to the fact
that the H-2 provision of Public Law 4l4 could not be
used to resurrect the bracero program under another name
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The year 1965 was a crucial trial period for
the administration's new foreign labor policy. In
succeed
, it had to be demonstrated that
ruination of the bracero program and Wirtz's
tighter administration of the H-2 provisions of
Public Law 4 i 4 would not produce the catastrophies
predicted by many growers and their politlfial
Had the predicted losses occurred, Congress would
probably have legislated another bracero program or
forced Secretary Wirtz to greatly increase the number
of H-2 admissions.
Wirtz set out in 1965 to disprove the pessi-
mistic predictions. He was not content to merely
restrict foreign labor and count on the domestic
farm labor supply to automatically fill the vacuum.
By requiring growers to offer higher wages and better
conditions to domestic labor in order to qualify for
H-2 workers, Secretary Wirtz stimulated a greater move-
ment of Americans into farm work. That trend was
reinforced by various recruitment programs instituted
by the federal government. Consequently, one of the
grower^ moot convincing arguments was undermined. By
the end of 1965. the claim that a year without braceros
would bring a devastating shortage of farm workers was
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no longer credible.
Also, by the end of io£c; j ,
•
6 developments had
largely undermined two other key grower predictions:
that catastrophic crop losses would occur and that
the consumer price of farm goods would skyrocket.
After a year without braceros. Secretary
Wirtz’s position was stronger ThP hr* l e bracero program
had been ended without serious harm to growers or con-
sumers and the change appeared to have helped domestic
farm workers considerably.
The heavy reduction in the number of foreign
ikers during 1965 encouraged growers to turn more
to mechanization which, in turn, made them less eager
to receive H-2 workers.
Developments such as these enabled Secretary
Wirtz to deflate the foreign labor initiative. His
ty t° resist giving in to it was also aided by
the fact that the liberal Democratic Congress continued
to be concerned about rural poverty. For example,
in 1966
.
it passed legislation which included the
unprecedented provision of extending minimum wage
coverage to certain farm workers. ^ ^
156CQA, XXII (1966), 821.
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During 1966
political friends
large numbers of H
. 1967, and 1968 growers and their
made no serious effort to obtain
-2 workers. After the flurry of
pressure group activity in 1965. these latter years
are marked by the almost total lack of congressional.
media, and interest group attention to the foreign
labor issue.
Once Nixon became President, there was no
substantial increase in the number of H-2 Mexicans
entering the United States. Mexican immigration in-
creased moderately. Nixon unsuccessfully sought to
get Congress to raise the ceiling on immigration from
Western Hemisphere countries. The United States was
liberally supplied with "temporary visitors" who
sometimes illegally used the visitors' pass to enter
the United States to find jobs.
During the Nixon administration, the subdued
pressure group activity of the 1966-68 era gave way
to a more active group struggle. The initiative was
regained by reform forces which turned their attention
to the growing wetback problem and to the commuter
problem in general and the use of commuters as strike-
breakers in particular. Several bills were introduced
to deal with these problems. Those dealing with
commuters and the use of aliens as strikebreakers
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died m committee. During i Q7? v„ +v, u
.
19 2
’ both houses passed
3 malClnS the emPB°yment of illegal aliens a
crime. However, disagreement between the House and
the Senate on non-wetback issues kept the measures
from being enacted into law despite an apparently
road consensus in both houses that such legislation
was desirable. In 1973, new legislation making the
knowing employment of illegal aliens a crime was
once again passed by the House, m the summer of
1973
, that bill awaits Senate action.
Both the Johnson administration (after 1965)
and the Nixon government permitted little legal
foreign labor to enter the United States, but
neither made a major effort to control the problem
of illegal immigrants. Reminiscent of the early 1950-3,
the wetback problem had reached major proportions by
1973 . Like every administration since Roosevelt's,
the Nixon administration appeared to be guided by no
consistent policy on the wetback problem. While the
President called for even stronger legislation than
many liberals were willing to support, the Justice
Department failed to take full advantage of adminis-
trative discretion which it already had and which could
have been used to patrol the Mexican border more
vigorously. While the wetback problem grew, there was
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some evidence that the herder was being guarded less
carefully than before. Critics charged that the
administration's continued low budget requests for
the Border Patrol indicated a lac* of commitment to
dealing with the problem of illegal immigration. Also
in contrast to President Nixon's request for tough
legislation making the employment of unlawful immi-
grants a crime were recent revelations that wetbacks
were employed at the Western White House itself.
During the Nixon era, the mood of Congress
became increasingly sympathetic to passing meaningful
g' lat-on to deal with the wetback problem. How-
ever, on other matters concerning foreign labor, it
appeared to be content with the status quo. It was
apparently unwilling to accomodate the demands of
either grower interests or reformers. Liberal bills
dealing with the commuter problem and the use of
aliens as strikebreakers died in committee. But so
did legislation which would have reinstated a
traditional bracero program. Although Congress may
well take action on the wetback problem, it appears to
be unwilling to take either conservative or liberal
action on other foreign labor issues at this time.
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CHAPTER VII
A PLURALIST SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Pluralism, a Recapitulation
After outlining pluralist theory in Chapter II,
much of our discussion of the Mexican labor struggle
’
has been in terms of pressure group activity and
other variables included in the pluralist model. How-
ever, little attempt has been made to explicitly
relate these findings to theoretical considerations.
The purpose of this chapter is to summarize, in more
explicit pluralist terms, some of the developments
summarized in Chapters III-VI. The most relevant
pluralist propositions are summarized below.
In a pluralist system such as the United States,
public policy springs primarily from pressure groups
competing for government favors. Officials produce
policies which disproportionately reflect the claims
of the most powerful groups rather than abstract prin
ciples of justice. However, with few exceptions,
the claims of even the least consequential groups are
accomodated to some extent, and most policies reflect
concessions to all of the most interested parties.
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According to pluralist theory, no group win
permanently dominate a particular policy area
Countervailing, or opposing interests, will organize
and mobilize political power to reverse policies
WhlCh thSy d ° f3VOr
- Wh
- they are strong enough,
new policies will be made which more faithfully reflect
their demands, yet retain some concessions to the
new losers.
In a pluralist system, all legitimate groups
are free to compete for political power. However,
those with certain characteristics will have the
greatest impact on public policy. The favored groups.
(1) are organized. ( 2 ) have a large membership.
(3) possess money and various other resources such
as political knowledge and skillful leaders, (4) can
form alliances with other powerful pressure groups,
(5) have a high degree of accessibility to important
public officials, (6) enjoy high prestige in the
society, ( 7 ) pursue goals whioh ^ 00nsistent^
prevalent values in the broader society, and (8) are
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self-confident and pursue their goals vigorously.!
Pluralists Claim that in American society,
these favorable characteristics are possessed by agreat variety of groups. However, even interests withfew of these traits will have some impact on public
roixcy, although not a predominant one. Their in-
fluence is guaranteed because the pluralist system
values the minimisation of conflict. Giving all
important interests a say in public policy increases
them commitment to the system. The interests of
weaker groups are represented in the political arena
by certain stronger ones whose own interests overlap
with theirs.
In the political structure of the pluralist
system, there are various points of access at which
interested groups may pursue their claims. Useful
distinctions include those between the three branches
of government, between different departments within
the executive branch, and between different congressional
the ponUcll
S
powe7ofprelsuretearfiOS °°rrelated »ithfrom Darryl Baskin, American £“es e3sabtiallyCritique (New York:
~an Nostrand ko?n)3?a°r raCY!
P- 93 and David B. Truman The ' 19n) •New York: Alfred ,
™
’ Governmental Process
506 .
mit A. Knopf, lytn;), pp . 322-23, 324.
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influence at the various points of access. For
ample, a group might have major influence with the
Agriculture Department but little impact on the
Department of Labor.
the policy process, the pluralist model
identifies two important stages at which pressure
groups may wield influence. The first is at the law-
making stage. The second is at the point of law
enforcement. Groups compete not only to enact the
legislation they favor’ +- uy t vor but to have it administered with
favortism toward their political demands.
Pluralist Explanations
Ini tiation and
,
operation of the hn.npro
Many aspects of the initiation and operation of the
bracero program are explainable in terms of the
pluralist model.
As southwestern growers snnrrVa-fszu ought a guaranteed
Mexican labor program in 1941 and 1942, they measured
up very well on most of the group characteristics which
pluralists identify as sources of political power.
arge numbers of farmers actively pressured the national
government for such a program. They were strengthened
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by the fact that they worked th.y i through numerous growers
organizations, ranging from thoS0 with locai
ship only to huge powerful, national organizations such
" 6 AmSriCan Fa™ B
— organizations did
place the grower cause before Congress. Theyhaa ample funds to send Mexican labor spokesmen to
Vari °US COnSreSSi°"al around the country and
to retain full-time lobbyists in Washington. Many of
these lobbyists had gained valuable experience through
their groups- broad and long political involvement on
numerous issues. Over the years they and their
organizations had built up an impressive number of
political contacts, it was not unusual for these
lobbyists and grower-oriented congressmen to recall
their earlier warm relationships involving matters
other than Mexican labor.
Growers seeking Mexican labor further strengthened
their case by being able to win the support of many
other powerful and high ranking organizations.
Numerous non-western farm organizations, particularly
southern ones, actively pressured Congress and the
xecutive branch of government to inaugurate a bracero
program. Many non-farm, western groups, including
railroads, and chambers of commerce, joined the
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Mexican labor coalition Also supporting them were
various national groups organized around non-
agricultural interests.
AloO favoring the grower cause was their wide
access to government officials. Congress was broadly
sympathetic. Access to it was increased by the fact
that rural interests were over-represented in both
houses. Many congressmen were farmers or came from
agricultural backgrounds and were especially sym-
pathetic to the grower notii + inn ae p s tio . Assigning bracero
legislation to the two markedly pro-grower agriculture
committees of Congress strengthened the Mexican labor
cause. While President Roosevelt was interested in
improving the conditions of American farm workers, he
was receptive to inaugurating a bracero program as a
wartime necessity.
The ability of farmers to pressure the govern-
ment to institute a Mexican labor program was increased
by their high prestige in American society. They
approached Congress as respectable and important people.
Even the critics of importing foreign labor were care-
ful to pay an almost reverential respect to farmers
who were acknowledged to be "the backbone of America."
Not only did farmers, as individuals, command respect
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by C °ngreSS and the “can people. Many of their
organizations had long since established a reputation
Of utmost respectability. The American Farm Bureau
National Grange had become important American
institutions. During congressional hearings, various
spokesmen for farm groups stressed their membership in
mam-stream organizations, their commitment to capi-
talism, their patriotism, and the reasonableness of
their demands.
The attempt to import Mexican labor during the
war was relatively compatible with broader American
values. It was not generally perceived to be a radical
effort. Southwestern farmers had long used Mexican
labor, and many people thought the traditional flow of
Mexicans across the border was natural
.
2
During the
foreign labor initiative of 1941 and 1942, grower
spokesmen attempted to depict most prospective bracero-
users as poor small farmers who desperately needed
government assistance. This strategy played on the
the United
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widespread sympathy for the poverty_stricken
it - ——ened by the maS5^a the shortage of farm labor might seriously
threaten the war effort. Taken together, these facts
-ant that the initiative to get a bracero program,
was fac ilia ted by its compatibility with these
widespread concerns of the early I940 ' s .
Consistent with the pluralist advice for maxi-
e political influence, growers seeking Mexican
labor pursued their cause vigorously and self-
confidently. Belief in their ability to get a Mexican
labor program was a natural by-product of their many
policy victories during previous years, including
'nitiation of a bracero program during World War I,
keeping Mexico outside the quota system during the
1920 S and 1930’s, retaining a substantial Mexican
labor supply even during the Great Depression,
successfully resisting the unionization of farm workers,
and getting them excluded from the expanding social
legislation enacted during the 1930’s to protect
industrial labor.
Standing in sharp contrast to the powerful
grower coalition were those whose interests would be
most threatened by a brae ero program, namely American
38l
fa™ workers. Although they were ^ ^prospective bracero-users
, they were not organised
at all, The farm workers had lit+io . .n tle prestige. Many
were members of minority groups. Xived in great poverty.
t
had Uttle“^ - — r politically relevant
Public opinion was preoccupied more with
guaranteeing an adequate wartime labor supply than
with improving the conditions of agricultural laborers
and their families. Practically powerless, farm
labor had no reason for confidence that it could have
an important impact on Mexican labor policy. As a
result of all these disadvantages, farm labor, as
such, did not directly enter the group struggle over
institution of the bracero program.
The failure of farm workers to enter the group
struggle does not mean that their interests had no im-
pact at all on public policy. In accordance with the
pluralist expectation that even the weakest groups
will have their interests represented by more power-
fully organized groups, organized labor and certain
other groups introduced a number of farm worker
interests into the group conflicts of 1941 and 1942
.
Also following the pluralist model, bracero legislation
and the American agreement with Mexico were compromise
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measures which incorporated some of these worker-
related demands. Examples include ^
that braceros could be imported only to cope with
a domestic labor shortage and that they were to be
paid the prevailing wage so as not to undermine
American farm workers.
Administration of legislation governing Mexi-
can labor follows rather closely the pluralist
expectation that law enforcement will favor the most
powerful interest grouns wi-h* -pp . W th few exceptions, the
federal government did not seriously attempt to en-
force the immigration laws and stop the large-scale
entry of illegal Mexicans during the bracero years.
The fact that the government still failed to act even
after the critics of imported labor had been able to
mount a strong offensive against the bracero program
is not at odds with the pluralist model. Except
during the late 1940's and early 1950’s when they
were still weak, reform groups did not direct their
political pressure toward eradicating the wetback
problem. Although by 1961 they had grown strong by
many pluralist criteria of power, they failed to
meet the pluralist requirement of pursuing the
anti-wetback cause vigorously.
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On the wetback issue, growers were much more
actxve. Their pressure against law enforcement took
a variety of forms. When Eisenhower attempted to rid
the country of wetback labor in 1954
. farm interests
sent representatives to Washington to appeal to the
national government not to enforce the immigration
laws at the Mexican border. A number of congressmen
from states heavily dependent on wetback labor
accused the immigration authorities of unreasonable
ac tion, and they, too, asked the national govern-
ment not to enforce the law. Vice President Nixon
apparently joined their effort. It was not long
until President Eisenhower abandoned his attempt to
enforce the law and bowed to the impressive show
of grower pressure.
Grower pressure to prevent enforcement of the
immigration laws has often been directed against immi-
gration authorities. Some have testified that when
farmers have wanted more wetbacks, they have pressured
higher authorities in Washington who have then ordered
the immigration authorities to permit illegal Mexi-
can workers to enter the country. Particularly in
times of greater Border Patrol vigilance, local resi-
dents sympathetic to growers have used social pressure
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against the Patrolmen. Examples include raerc
f ^ " 3611 t0 th
- “«
—-ts charging
em higher prices than other customers.
From 1942 through at least 1960, bracero
egislation was generally administered with a pro-
r bias. This is consistent with the pluralist
assumption that the strongest pressure groups will
^om.nate not only the law-making process but the stage
0 aw enforcement as well, while the law guaranteed
braceros could be imported only in the event of
a shortage of domestic farm labor, those shortages
were not objectively determined. When growers set
low wages which failed to attract enough domestic
workers, they claimed a labor shortage and requested
braceros. The federal government permitted state
employment services whir>v., ich were generally grower-
dominated, to verify the need for braceros. They
often did little more than take the farmers' word at
face value. Consequently, farm workers had little
voice in the administration of this provision of
bracero legislation although it was of crucial importance
to their interests.
A similar example of predominant grower influence
in enforcement of Mexican labor legislation involved
the provision that braceros must be paid the prevailing
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wages, once again, officials tended to let growers
^ th<! POli^ ’«*»* of a legal guarantee
ostensibly meant to protect American farm workers
from adverse foreign competition. What typically
happened was that growers would arbitrarily set and
offer low wages well before the season began. Because
few people would be seeking farm jobs at that time,
the wages offered had no meaningful relationship to
the supply of labor and the demand for it. Yet the
Labor Department would customarily certify those wage
offerings as the "prevailing wage." If they did „ot
attract sufficient numbers of American applicants,
growers would be permitted to import braceros.
Various other provisions of the Mexican labor
program were also administered with a pro-grower bias.
Although the law forbade using braceros as strike-
breakers, they sometimes were. Provisions concerning
the food and housing of Mexican workers were not always
honored. Contrary to at least the spirit in which
bracero legislation was enacted, the men were sometimes
used in yearlong and skilled jobs.
Pluralist theory postulates that when previously
weak groups grow strong, administration of the law will
become more accomodating to their demands. As reform
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interests grew stronger during the late 1950's and
early 1960's, the pro-grower bias in law enforce-
ment diminished. During President Eisenhower's
second term, Labor Secretary Mitchell began adminis-
tering bracero legislation more rigorously. For
example, rather than merely accepting the
"prevailing
wages" arbitrarily set by growers, he began establishing
his own scale. He grew increasingly critical of grower
violations of rights guaranteed by bracero legislation.
This shift away from a pro-grower bias in
administration of the Mexican labor program grew
even more pronounced as reform groups grew stronger
during the Kennedy and Johnson eras. Like Secretary
Mitchell, Secretary of Labor Goldberg established wage
scales for particular areas. Farmers had to first
offer these wages before they were eligible to receive
braceros. Secretary Wirtz continued this policy.
Grower claims of domestic labor shortages were no longer
taken at face value. Both Goldberg and Wirtz removed
braceros from farms which were being struck by Ameri-
can farm workers.
This diminution of pro-grower bias in execution
of the bracero program under Kennedy and Johnson is
consistent with the pluralist model. During the late
38 ?
1950’s and early 1960’s,
more of the traits which
reform groups had developed
pluralists associate with
political influence.
Termination and ^ttgnnath. The pluralist
proposition that important changes in the relative
strength of competing groups will result in policy
changes is one useful perspective for explaining term!
nation of the bracero program. As the characteristics
of reform groups more closely approximated the
pluralist outline of influential group traits, public
policy toward Mexican labor changed. The bracero
program was first reformed, then terminated. These
group characteristics are discussed below in terms of
growing reform advantages during the late 1950's
and early 1960’s.
The sheer number of people opposing the
bracero program apparently increased substantially
during this era. Perhaps even more significantly,
various organizations, claiming to speak for millions
of members
,
publicly joined the reform coalition for
the first time. Far fewer newly involved organizations
opted to support the Mexican labor cause.
Each side tried to impress Congress that it
represented greater numbers of grass roots Americans
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<w«l. sp„k,„«„
organizations supporting Public Law 78 claimed to
P ak for their rank and file members. They charged
that the leaders of reform organizations had never
their membership on the question of Mexican
labor so their impractical proposals represented only
isolated pockets of opinion. Spokesmen for reform
organizations claimed +n ho i • r.a t0 be sPeakmg for their rank
and file members. Thev 0y t00k a lesson from their
opponents and warned Congress that grower groups
function oligarchically and that their leaders do not
faithfully represent the millions of farmers (especially
poorer one 0 ) for whom they claim to speak.
Although group spokesmen on each side probably
exaggerated the number of members for whom they
spoke, it is clear that the total number "belonging"
to reform organizations was far greater than the total
membership of groups actively supporting Public Law 78.
For example, there were more Catholics than farmers,
more union members than cotton ginners or bankers.
Although congressmen wishing to be re-elected are not
so naive as to assume that such an undifferentiated
head-count can determine the outcome of elections, even
some pro-grower congressmen were suggesting by 1962
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that it was the leaders of reform organizations who
could more accurately claim to speak for the grass-
roots American.
Critics of Mexican labor usage were long
dicapped by their lack of organization. For
example, during the 1920's, there was considerable
opposition to the importation of Mexican workers,
but few organizations represented this viewpoint at
congressional hearings. At the 1942 Downey sub-
committee hearings on the Mexican labor program, only
one reform organization sent a representative to testify.
At congressional hearings during the 1950's, the bulk
of testimony was given by pro-grower groups.
By the beginning of the Kennedy era. organized
opposition to the Mexican labor program had begun to
seriously challenge the grower coalition. Far more
reform organizations had become actively involved.
This unprecedently organized opposition to Public
Law 78 enabled critics of Mexican labor importation to
overcome some of their previous weaknesses. The advan-
tage of organization permitted more deliberate and
systematic consideration of problems and
else formulation of goals. It encouraged
coordination of efforts with other reform
a more pre-
greater
groups, with
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liberal congressmen. and with top offioials in ^
ennedy and Johnson administrations. No longer did
each reformer go his own way.
'ncreasing organization, the burden ofthe reform case was left more to specialists. TheCath °llC ChUrCh
’ f0r examPle
, re iied heavily on its
migrant ministry. This division of
.
l labor encouraged
8 SpeClalists t0 acquire an intimate knowledge of
-levant farm problems. Grower forces had always
tned to discredit the reformers as well meaning, but
misguided
, city people who did not understand farm
labor problems. Once reform organizations developed
their own knowledge specialists, they were less
vulnerable on this charge.
Many of the reform organizations had their own
legislative specialists and lobbyists. Most of these
groups were politically active prior to their involve-
ment in the struggle over Mexican labor. Consequently,
their legislative specialists already had substantial
political experience which could be used in the
new cause.
During the late 1950's and early 1960-3, the
reform case was more convincingly presented. Much
of the improvement was made possible by organizational
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resources which would have been beyon<j the^ ^
almost all individual reformers. Earlier emotional
arguments were replaced by detailed statistical state-
ments based on careful research. Organization money
made it possible for full-time lobbyists to remain
in Washington and for group spokesmen to travel to
congressional hearings around the country.
Since the beginning of the bracero program,
growers had been powerfully organized. This did not
change. What had changed was that by the 196o's,
they were faced by formidable opponents equally
’
well organized.
The pluralist model assigns coalition building
an important role in the acquisition of political
power by pressure groups. During the late 1950's and
early 1960's, the reform coalition grew rapidly. It
converted a number of previously uncommitted groups
and even some groups from the grower coalition. Pew
newly committed groups chose to join the Mexican
labor forces.
The net gains of the reform coalition were
encouraged by the tendency of growers and their
political allies to take rigid positions on Public
Law 7 8 and the issue of domestic farm labor reform.
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Having dominated Mexican labor policy for years, it
was as if they were unable to adjust to the new
reality of their increasingly formidable group op-
ponents
.
ginning in 1961, most reform groups followed
the lead of President Kennedy, and his position was
one of considerable flexibility. The bracero program
had problems, he argued, but it should not be termi-
nated immediately, when Congress enacted some
reforms but failed to pass nearly all he had re-
quested, the President signed the legislation anyway.
Hy 1961, increasing numbers of congressmen, even
some grower-oriented ones, were convinced that Public
Law 78 needed some reforms to protect domestic farm
workers
. The unwillingness of grower interests to com-
promise forced some members of Congress and some
pressure groups to reluctantly align themselves more
closely with groups opposing the bracero program. If
tney wanted even moderate reforms, they had nowhere
else to go.
The broad base of the reform coalition probably
increased its political influence. This was in marked
contrast to the 1920’s when sometimes unions were
practically the only organized, countervailing power
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to challenge the employers of Mexican labor. By the
early 1960*s, unions had come to include a much
greater proportion of the working force and their
to reform the Mexican labor system had been
joined by much of the news media, certain organi-
zations of minority people, many churches, consumer
groups, and others. Organisations of an unprecedented
diversity were telling Congress that the traditional
bracero program was no longer acceptable. According
to the pluralist model, politicians are more respon-
sive to this type of pressure than to the protests
of more narrow isolated groups. By 1961
, the base
of the Mexican labor coalition was not nearly so
broad.
In the United States, each of the two major
political parties is disproportionately dependent on
certain groups for its bedrock support. If the party
alienates these most consistent supporters, it will
have little chance of winning elections. Consequently,
it tends to pay special attention to them, especially
if they are well organized and have established and
vigorously articulated their priorities. During the
early 1960's, the reform coalition was fortunate to
’nclude several organizations whose memberships were
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traditionally and heavily Democratic. Organized
labor, various Catholic pressure groups. and organi .
zations representing Mexican-Americans and Negroes
were among the most outspoken critics of the Mexican
labor system. Consequently, the Johnson and Kennedy
administrations as well as many Democratic congress-
men from districts with large numbers of these people
may have found it politically expedient to lead the
assault on the bracero program.
During earlier years, the critics of Mexican
labor usage had often contradicted the arguments of
each other. Some would have banned the practice be-
cause it was allegedly racist, others because they,
themselves, were unashamed racists. Some disapproved
because they believed the United States could not
trust any foreigners, others because they felt the
rights of Mexicans were disregarded by employers.
on„equently, until at least the end of World War II,
the critics of Mexican labor usage were a coalition
less in fact than in name.
By the Kennedy era, if these contradictions re
mained, they were less articulated. The publicized
reform case had become much more internally consistent.
Claim., that the bracero program was adversely affecting
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American farm workers and small farmers, that it was
inconsistent with principles of free enterprise,
and that it was harming United States relations
’with
Mexico were not contradictory.
Before the Kennedy era, the reformers' very
limited access to government officials was a serious
handicap. Growers had enjoyed greater access to all
presidents (with the possible exception of Roosevelt),
to Congress, to the agriculture committees of the House
and Senate, and to all of the relevant cabinet
officials except Secretary Mitchell.
Reformers had initially enjoyed greater access
to President Roosevelt, but after the defeat of his
farm labor reforms by Congress in 1942
, he made little
effort to champion their cause. During Eisenhower's
second administration, the critics of Mexican labor
importation found a friend in Labor Secretary Mitchell.
However, his isolated position in the administration
limited his effectiveness.
The access enjoyed by reformers was often to
officials with limited or no direct power over the
Mexican labor issue. For example, they had friends
on the labor committees of the two houses, but the
decision had been made in 1942 to grant jurisdiction
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over bracero o + i™ + 4.u
-Legislat on to the pro-grower agricul-
ture c ommittppc; mu „tees. The reformers enjoyed good access
to President Truman's Migrant Labor Commission. but
ltS P0W6rS Were merely advisory. Their cause was
consistently supported by a substantial minority of
congressmen in both houses, but their votes were not
enough to reform the law.
'the break-through in reformers' access to
the executive branch of government came with Kennedy's
election. His sympathy for their cause gave them
access to the highest level of government. The willing-
ness of other administration officials to work with
reform forces, to listen to their ideas, to advise
them, and to coordinate a course of action with them
was encouraged by Kennedy's order for a united adminis-
tration reform initiative. This "open door" policy
did much to publicize the reform case. Cabinet level
officials, who could easily get publicity for their
own concerns, often used their public statements to
re-emphasize information or conclusions which pressure
group leaders had discussed with them.
As noted earlier, growers had long sought to
transfer control of the Mexican labor program from the
Labor Department to the Department of Agriculture.
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his Strategy became less meaningful during the
Kennedy era, because the Agriculture Secretary let itbe known that he fully approved of reforms
Y the Labor Department. Grower access to him would
been no greater than it was to Secretary Wirtz.
Critics of the Mexican labor system also
gained greater access to Congress during the Kennedy
and Johnson eras. Although the agriculture committees
“ b ° th h0US6S rSmained s°^ly pro-grower, as the
reform coalition grew stronger, its spokesmen at
committee hearings were received more courteously.
By 1961. even solidly pro-grower committee members
went out Of their way to commend testimony
given in behalf of reform organizations.
By 1961, unprecedented numbers of congressmen
were willing to support reform of the bracero program.
Many worked closely with pressure group leaders. Also,
during the 1960-s, more congressional committees than
ever before held hearings on migrant labor, and this
provided a broader forum for critics of the bracero
system to present their case.
In the political struggle over imported Mexican
labor, southwestern growers had long enjoyed the decisive
advantage of an excellent public image. The farmer was
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seen as the ideal American, hard working, frugal
honest, healthy. Feeding the op idm people was a good thing,
and he received full credit for it. It was widely
assumed that he was treated unfairly, that despite
his back-breaking work and vital services to the
country, he was poverty-stricken. Even farmers who
did not fit the image gained from it because public
pinion did not allow for rich farmers. Although
many farmers were poor, some grew very wealthy and
bore little resemblance to the stereotype. For
example, some growers owned lands so vast that the
crops could be inspected only by plane. The Bank of
America owned large farms. Some growers owned not
only vast lands but also trucks, trains, and ships
for hauling their crops to market. Some even owned
the auctions at which the crops were sold. However,
the public image of farmers was not updated to reflect
this new reality. Consequently, farmers, even those
with multi-million dollar operations, were given con-
cessions by the government that were denied to
industrial corporations. Examples include the
congressional decisions to exempt farm workers from
the right to unionize and from social security benefits
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(-en if they worked for millionaires). Long after
other corporations were denied the right to import
foreign labor, corporate farms (and others, of course)
could use Mexican workers.
Like individual farmers, the organizations they
formed likewise enjoyed high prestige. This enabled
them to achieve such impressive political power that
a grower-°rie”ted congressman admitted in l 942 that
an official of the American Farm Bureau had actually
written the bracero legislation passed that year.
The prestige of farm workers was very low.
Although they, no less than the farmer, did hard work,
helped feed the nation, and earned little, public
opinion did not grant them equal concern. Having
little education, money, or property, they were not
considered
''important" people. Their low status was
reinforced by the fact that many were members of
minority groups.
Organizations which championed the farm worker
did not initially enjoy high social prestige. Prior
to the New Deal, labor unions were perceived as radi-
cal, somewhat un-American institutions. After improving
their image during the Roosevelt era, they suffered
some loss of standing at the close of World War II when
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a number of stri.es occurs.
„aving been inoon.
vemenoed by shortages and rationing during the war
many PS0Ple W6re Unh^ -w consumer problems’
caused by these work stoppages. The result was
passage in 1948 of the uTaft-Hartley Act with its
provioiono for limiting labor unions.
Before the civil rights movement dating from
the late 1950*s. minority group organisations such
as the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People and the American GI Forum were handi-
capped by their low prestige.
By the time of the Kennedy era. several of
the pressure groups included in the reform coalition
had improved their social standing. Moving from the
generally pro-business atmosphere of the Eisenhower
years into the New Frontier, labor unions benefited
from the increasing concern with the poor and the
new climate of criticism of corporate abuse. Civil
rights activity became fashionable, and minority or-
ganizations gained social standing. Reform activity
by consumer groups became more acceptable and more
common.
Some of the
probably rubbed off
prestige of high political offices
on pressure groups in the reform
coalition. In 1961, for the first time, they were
ailied with the President himself. They enjoyed the
upport of his cabinet, most members of Congress, and
any of the most respectable newspapers and magazinesm the country, if groups are judged by ^
they keep, the critics of the bracero program had
gamed a new respectability by 1961.
While reform groups were gaining prestige
during the late 1950’s and early l 96o’s, the grower
image was being hurt. The reformers helped contribute
to this decline by documenting abuses of the Mexican
labor program and publicizing the fact that many
employers of braceros were wealthy corporate farms.
One reason why it took so long for critics of
the bracero program to get it reformed was that public
opinion did not initially support the change. The
public was more concerned about the problems of growers
than with hardships of the workers. Farmers enjoyed
many advantages in keeping it that way. Being well
organized, they were able to systematically present
their case to the public. They tended to dominate
congressional hearings (which often made good headlines
and conveyed their views to newspaper readers). Even
Democratic Presidents Roosevelt and Truman articulated
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justifications for using Mexican labor. Until at
least the late l 940's. even liberal news media
accepted so many of the grower premises that news
articles often sounded like press releases from farmers.
Congressional supporters of uoi the bracero program were
more vocal than its opponents. The cumulative effect
of these events was that the reform case was less
frequently articulated and less often communicated to
the public. The widespread pro-farmer bias probably
meant that even when the public heard facts conducive
to reform, they were not taken as seriously as facts
favoring the grower position.
Although their chance for immediate success
was small, reformers struggled patiently to change
public opinion even during the l 940's. Many of their
efforts were small, but the cumulative effect was
substantial.
Even during the World War II years of over-
whelming grower predominance on bracero policy, the
case for reform was kept alive, and sometimes it
filtered through to the public. In 1942, a minority
of congressmen opposed to initiation of a Mexican
labor program spoke forcefully against it in debate.
By the late 1940's, elements of the news media, began
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to question grower premises and *
hardships of American farm iabor. Some
Chicano critics of Mexican labor importation made
citizens- arrests of wetbacks and escorted them to
the border. Such events made dramatic news.
Two historical events helped soften the public
iderxng the reform case more seriously durin-
the latter 1940's. One was the end of World War 11.^
he supposedly temporary program justified by the war
was more vulnerable to attack in peace time. The other
event was the large-scale entry of wetbacks during the
late 1940- s. Reformers mounted a major anti-wetback
initiative, and it received widespready publicity,
eventually being championed even by President Truman.
News media began to pay much more attention to the
problem.
Also helping to publicize the reform case was
President Truman’s Migrant Labor Commission.
If the reformers had not won public opinion by
1950, they had probably changed it substantially.
However, the involvement of the United States in the
Korean War returned a decisive advantage to the growers.
With the national security aspect of farm labor again
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prevailing,
-the need for Mex-ip^n ii ica workers was given
the benefit of the doubt.
During the late 1950's, Labor Secretary
Mitchell did mUch to publicise the case for reform.
He was joined by increasing numbers of the news media.
Mexican labor critioc: ^ nm Co*gress grew more outspoken
as did pressure groups in the reform coalition. The
attempt to change public opinion was continued and
intensified by the Kennedy administration. Although
opinion on Mexican labor apparently was not studied
by pollsters, the vigor of the administration's
initiative probably increased the number of people
sympathizing with reform.
The broader climate of public opinion during
the Kennedy era was conducive to Mexican labor reform.
The civil rights movement was proceeding, and it was
publicizing the idea that the political and economic
system should be opened to the disadvantaged. A
broad theme of the New Frontier was the need for
re-assessment and change. The administration talked
much about the need to eradicate poverty. It gave a
great deal of attention to rural poverty, which it
blamed in substantial part on the use of Mexican labor.
The cumulative effect of these developments
was that from 1942 to 1963
,
public opinion probably
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' farm orSanizations lobbied intently
for the kind of Mexican labor program they wanted.
As^ the strength of reformers grew, so did their
self-confidence. By late 1961, it had become apparent
that President Kennedy and his administration would
vigorously champion their cause snu - -o and that Congress would
accept moderate reforms a o.i . As more and more pressure
P joined the coalition, as more news media offered
support, as the reformers enjoyed unusual opportunities
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to Capitalize on trends such as high unemployment and
mechanization they became increasingly self-assured.
For these reasons and others, growers were
losing confidence in their ability to keep the program
n act. Beginning in i960, some began stating publicly
that its days were probably limited. It was not just
that growers were losing power, but the loss had come
so suddenly. As recently as the late i 950-s. the
y reak in the dike had been Secretary Mitchell.
President Eisenhower was a good friend of the Mexican
labor program. Annual importation of braceros reached
unprecedented numbers. Congress consistently refused
to reform the program.
Then from i960 through late 1961, there were
two crucial developments. The pro-grower Eisenhower
was replaced by a President who, as a congressman, had
voted against the bracero program. Congress, which
had never significantly reformed Public Law 78,
suddenly agreed to liberalize it.
As the Mexican labor coalition lost power,
its vigorous effort to keep the bracero program also
slackened. Having taken a rigid, no-compromise stand
as recently as 1962, a year later many agreed to
termination of Public Law 78 after another twelve months
as the price for any extension at all. Some tra-
ditional members of the grower coalition began to
express the position +
.hat termination would create no
serious problems because Mexio^ ,ican workers could be
replaced by machines.
Another reason for the decline*. •a ing vigor with
which growers championed Public Law 7
«
11 78 was that some
had come to see it as more of a liability than an
asset, unlike its early days as a weapon against
American far™ workers, the bracero program was used
by the Kennedy administration as a wedge to improve
their conditions.
DUrinf
’ 1965, only an occasional grower organi-
zation called on Congress to re-institute the bracero
program as such. In accordance with the pluralist
proposition that legislatures do not initiate programs
unless pressured by interest groups to do so, no
serious effort was made in Congress to revive Public
Law 78.
The pluralist model provides for the continu-
ation of group conflict after Congress has either
passed or repealed legislation. During 1965, the
struggle over Mexican labor was vigorous. Grower
organizations pressured Secretary Wirtz to open wide
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the H-2 provision of the general immigration law and
the importation of massive numbers of Mexican
workers Reform groups mounted a defense, but they
fought much less vigorously than they had to end
the bracero program.
While some Mexicans were admitted under the
H-2 provision, there were far fewer than requested
by southwestern growers. The number of H-2's Emitted
Steadily declined each year during the rest of
Johnson’s administration.
Growers were unable to get the policy sought
although they mobilized more pressure for obtaining
H-2 workers than reformers did against opening that
loophole. However, the pluralist model is still of
some explanatory value. First, although growers did
not receive all the H-2 workers they wanted, Wirtz did
admit some. Secondly, pluralist theory does not claim
that the group mobilizing the greatest pressure on a
particular issue will necessarily wield predominant
influence on policy. While group pressure is an im-
portant variable determining political influence, it
IS only one of several. Impressive though grower
pressure was in 1965, many of their handicaps which
lost the bracero program remained. Public opinion
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apparently remained on its liberal course. Govern.
ment concern with poverty was greater than ever
Although re form groups were not as active as during
the previous year, any attempt to simply substitute
H-2 workers for braceros would surely have fully re _
at_d them. Also, it should be recalled that
Plural ists do not claim that public officials are
merely referees of the group struggle. While officials
tend to be responsive to it. they also develop their
own group identities. President Johnson was deeply
committed to anti-poverty reforms and any retreat on
the question of formal Mexican labor programs would
have been out of character for his administration.
Also, the 1964 congressional elections had swept
into office far more liberal Democrats, the type of
congressmen most apt to oppose bracero programs.
By the fall of 1965, Secretary Wirtz had been
able to effectively defuse the grower initiative for
H-2 workers. As more crops were cultivated and har-
vested by machinery and as the federal government
mounted a successful program to supply domestic
workers, farmers pursued the H-2 cause less vigorously.
During the post-bracero era, reform interest
groups have exerted moderate pressure on Congress to
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cope with the apparently large number of Mexican
workers who enter the United States as commuters and
border-crossers
. Faithfully reflecting the low
level of pressure. Congress has responded a little,
Ut n0t mU° h ' legislation has been introduced and
explained on the floor o-f unoo f the House and Senate but
has consistently died in committee.
rrom 1965 to 1968, reformers said little about
the growing wetback problem. No serious effort was
made in Congress to cope with it. However, since Presi-
dent Nixon's election, traditional critics of Mexican
labor programs have turned their attention more to the
wetback issue, and increasing pressure has been placed
on Congress to come up with a solution. During the past
two years, the pressure has reached something of a peak.
During that time, President Nixon has called for tough
new legislation to penalize the employers of wetbacks.
Each house of Congress has passed a wetback bill,
but because they have been unable to agree on a
compromise version, no law has yet emerged.
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Some Problems with thePluralist Explanation
In this chapter, various aspects of the
initiation, operation, termination, and afterma th ofthe bracero program have been discussed in terms of
the pluralist model. However, some of the findings of
diSSertati0n Seem consistent with certain
patterns suggested by critics of pluralism. The pur-
pose of this section is to briefly discuss a few of
these criticisms and relate them to some of the find-
ings reported in earlier chapters.
luralisto claim that unorganized interests
will have only minimal impact on public policy. How-
ever, they assume that almost all important interests
are in fact organized, and that this helps assure that
political power will be widely shared. Yet critics
have alleged that many interests are unorganized or
only minimally organized and that these groups enjoy
very little political power. They are said to be
primarily poor and disadvantaged
.
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Beginning with World War I, the national
government allowed a generous flow of Mexican workers
to southwestern growers. Although American farm
labor had the most to lose by this policy, it was
not organized so it could effectively check the in-
fluence of growers who had long been organized into
powerful groups. Nor were American farm workers
organized so they could speak for themselves as the
World War II bracero program was instituted. Only
during the l 960's did they achieve some modicum of or
ganization and begin to apply pressure in an effort
to shape the Mexican labor policy of the American
government. Even now their organizations wield only
minimal influence on the national government. Inas-
much as even this small degree of success came over
half a century after their interests began to be
threatened by the widespread use of Mexican workers,
the pluralist assumption that groups will almost
naturally organize to protect their political interests
seems exaggerated. For such organization to occur,
certain political skills, financial resources, and
awareness of interests are necessary. These are pre-
cisely the attributes that persons such as poverty-ridden
farm workers are least likely to have. The equilibrium
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postulated by pluralists is apparentlv nn+ •y ot inevitable.
At the height of controversy over the bracero
program, many domestic farm workers were Mexican-
Americans. Yet certain scholars have reported that
the Chicano subculture discourages organisational
activity. The pluralist assumption of natural joining
does not adequately account for such possibilities.
Pluralists suggest that unorganized interests
are generally defended by organized ones. They imply,
too, that this representation will adequately defend
those interests. We have seen that organized labor
and various other pressure groups attempted to repre-
sent domestic farm workers in the Mexican labor
struggle. They achieved some degree of success.
For example, bracero legislation contained the guaran-
tee that Mexicans would be imported only in the event
of domestic labor shortages. However, it is plausible
to expect that this indirect representation will some-
times be less successful than when the threatened
group is itself organized. One reason is that the
"stand-in" group has other concerns which it considers
more important and which led to its organization in
the first place. If its commitments come into conflict
with each other, it may tone down its representation of
4i4
the unorganized group. At least one author has ^gested that the reason organized labor made no serious
effort to unionize farm workers until the l 96o-s was
its unwilligness to endanger its primary commitment.
which was to industrial labor. Allegedly, unions
agreed to refrain from organizing farm labor as
the price for growers moderating their opposition to
urban unionization.
Had farmworkers been organized, it is likely
that they would have driven a harder bargain than
organized labor did in their behalf. With few ex-
P ions, unions did not call for outright abolition
of the bracero program until the 1960's. They had
been content to settle for reform, even when many
American farm workers were unemployed.
During the late 1940's and early 1950’s, a
few farm workers were organized into very weak unions.
These organizations took a considerably more militant
pooition than did national spokesmen for the AFL-CIO.
It was the leaders of these small, weak, short-lived
unions which took such unorthodox steps as making
citizens arrests of wetbacks and personally returning
them to the Border Patrol with a demand that they
enforce the law.
While pluralists suggest that powerful organ-
ised interests win voluntarily derate their political
critics such as Lowi suggest that their
demands
*, * 4 ^
appear to be «„ l..ed.„« t„ m „„tly
pluralist model. Once somp ^e initial concessions had
been made to worker interests in 1942. southwestern
growers rather consistently opposed all reform of the
racero program, no matter how minor. They often
used Mexican workers who had entered the United States
illegally. When efforts were made to enforce immi-
gration laws, they sought to force officials to ignore
those laws. To keep the bracero program intact and
unreformed, they threatened to use even more wetbacks.
Such demands, perhaps, seemed less extreme because govern-
ment often encouraged them and concocted elaborate
arrangements to give the impression that the laws were
being vigorously enforced. For example, on one
occasion, the Border Patrol made massive arrests of
wetbacks and '•paroled" them to work for Texas growers.
Pluralists emphasize that a particular public
policy will consist of compromises to the different
4
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Theodore J, Lowi, The End of Liberpiidm(New York, W.W. Norton and-C^iH7TT969K p 91 .
4i6
groups whose interests are at s+akp muSt e< TheY imply that
ese compromises are meaningful, because they are
said to increase commitment to the system. Critics
question the prevalence and meaningfulness of con-
cessions to weaker groups.
noted earlier, some concessions were made
to worker interests. They are most obvious at the
law-making stage, where they included such things
as a guarantee that braceros could enter only if
there were a shortage of domestic farm labor and
that braceros would receive the "prevailing wage."
Yet domestic labor shortages were certified even
during times of high unemployment and while the news
media were reporting that farm workers could not find
jobs. we have discussed earlier the arbitrary manner
in which "prevailing wages" were set by growers
instead of through the interplay of supply and demand
in a free labor market.
Despite all the compromises reflecting the
interests of domestic farm labor, southwestern growers
consistently received generous numbers of illegal Mexi
can workers. Even when domestic workers had received
the ultimate "concession," termination of the bracero
program, farmers never lost their Mexican labor. The
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pluralist model,
attention to the
weaker groups.
then, does not seem to pay enough
meaningfulness of concessions to
The pluralist system allegedly enjoys a high
level of commitment from all legitimate groups. This
supposedly results from its willingness to permit all
interests to compete for influence and to have an im-
pact on policy decisions. On the other hand, critics
charge that many weaker groups are seriously alienated.
It is difficult to evaluate these conflicting claims
by applying them to farm workers. The reason is that
over three decades after the bracero program was
instituted, they have still to be heard from. Even
at the height of the Mexican labor controversy during
the Kennedy era, farm workers offering testimony could
be numbered on one hand. However, it is difficult to
believe that they would perceive "justice" in the
same way pluralists do. To the pluralist, the key to
justice lies in group Bower. The strong predominate,
and that is as it should be. By this standard, it was
"just" for the United States to import braceros during
periods of high domestic farm labor unemployment. Yet
it is questionable whether unemployed Americans un
successfully seeking farm jobs during those times
considered fhai policy "to be fair.
4i8
The pluralist expectation that organized
groups will pursue selfish interests in the political
has been borne out at numerous points in this
dissertation. The bracero program, itself, sprang
basically from the growers' desire for a "dependable"
labor supply. The greatest opposition came from
groups which had no need for foreign labor. Yet
ritlcs of the pluralist model claim that it exag-
gerates the extent to which groups pursue purely
selfish goals. They argue that some groups seek
markedly selfish goals whereas others support causes
which may actually threaten their narrow self-interest.
Some groups involved in the Mexican labor struggle
were apparently motivated by certain abstract principles
of right and wrong. For example, consumer organizations
advocated farm labor reform even if it would bring
higher consumer prices. The pluralist model does not
adequately explain such cases.
Finally, critics of pluralist theory claim that
it exaggerates the extent to which public officials
are group-oriented. Some may be very responsive to
organized group pressure while others adhere more to
abstract principles of "good" public policy. Cer-
tainly, many examples in this dissertation are consistent
with the Pluralist model. President Roosevelt
sought to liberalize the bracero program and reform
domestic farm labor conditions until grower forces
aborted his plans. At that stage, he more or less
gave up the battle. President Eisenhower
to enforce the immigration laws until it became
obvious that group forces opposing him were stronger
than those supporting him.
Not all officials seem to have been so
responsive to group pressure, m 1942, the Farm
Security Administration was committed to farm labor
reform, and it never backed down although its group
critics were far more powerful than its supporters.
When President Eisenhower permitted unilateral
recruitment of Mexican workers, the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget cut off funds although grower interests
were powerfully organized and actively supported the
President. Even during years of greatest grower in-
fluence, some immigration officials pressured their
superiors to permit them to apply the law. These
examples suggest the possibility that elected
officials are more group-oriented than are bureaucrats
and that higher bureaucrats are more group-oriented
than lower ones.
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Summary and Conclusions
In this chapter, highlights of the case study
presented in earlier chapters have been rearranged
in accordance with selected aspects of pluralist
theory. It has been found that two dimensions of
the pluralist model are especially useful for order-
ing and explaining several of the findings. First,
the model outlines group correlates of political
influence. It has been found that these are useful
for explaining the initiation, operation, termination,
and political aftermath of the bracero program. So
long as grower organizations enjoyed such advantages
as prestige, political resources, and favorable public
opinion, Congress maintained the Mexican labor system
for them. When many of the advantages shifted to re-
form groups, Congress accomodated them by terminating
Public Law ?8. It has been found, too, that non-
legislative officials, over the long run. tend to be
unusually accomodating to whichever coalition of
groups enjoys the several advantages postulated by
the pluralist model.
Secondly, the pluralist model notes that law
enforcement officials enjoy some discretion. How
they enforce the law will depend in part on the
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demands of the most powerfully organised interests.
With the exception of the brief period that the
bracero program was administered by the Farm Security
Administration, it tended to be executed with a
pro-grower bias so long as the countervailing power
of reform interests was weak. As they grew stronger
Program administrators grew more responsive to their
demands
.
One of the merits of the pluralist approach
is that it alerts us to politically relevant factors
which political scientists have traditionally tended
t0 n '"'lect
’ In this dissertation, it has turned our
attention to such factors as mechanization, public
opinion toward farmers, and rural poverty. Many
such variables figured, directly or indirectly, in
the passage, reform and repeal of bracero legislation.
By exploring such less obvious roots of the
political process, the pluralist approach may prove
useful for anticipating legal changes long before a
bill is actually introduced. For some time, reform
interests have apparently been losing certain extra-
governmental advantages which they gained during the
late 1950’s and early l 960’s. Underlying and stimu-
lating these changes is a national swing toward
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conservatism. Public opinion . g apparently Qff
earlier New Frontier course. People have grown
more sceptical of reformers. The civil rights move-
ment has move! beyond its pea,, and both private and
governmental commitment to bettering the lot of
Mexican-Americans and Blacks has diminished. Both
public opinion and government officials have grown
more critical of the ooor . .T After enjoying substantial
Prestige, consumer groups have found themselves under
increasing attack. If these developments continue,
pressure groups from the old farm labor reform
coalition may find their self-confidence hard to
maintain. In an increasingly conservative society,
they may find it more difficult to enter into coa-
litions with other groups.
The above developments would suggest that re-
lnauguration of a bracero program may be a greater
possibility than the almost total lack of congressional
concern with the issue would suggest. It should be
remembered that as late as i960, Public Law 78 seemed
firmly entrenched. Had scholars of that era paid less
exclusive attention to the then recent and vast ex-
pansion of the program and more to the beneath-the-
urface shift of group advantages from growers to
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reformers, termination would have been less
surprising.
Despite its general usefulness for explaining
the polities of Mexican labor, the pluralist model
faxls t0 6XPlain S °me of findings of this disser-
tation. Even worse, it is sometimes misleading.
Perhaps the greatest weakness of the model is its
exaggeration of the extpnt u • ,e to which political power
is shared. We have seen that after more than half a
century of controversy over bracero programs and wet-
backs, the single domestic group with the most
threatened interests has still to be heard from. It
interesting to note that in the many volumes
of congressional hearings on Mexican labor, apparently
not a single bracero ever testified.
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epilogue
FUTURE AREAS OF INQUIRY
It has now been over thirty years since the
bracero program was instituted. Almost a decade has
passed since it was terminated in December. 1964. Yet
the passage of time has done little to fill the serious
gaps in the literature. This dissertation is a modest
step in that direction.
Very few political scientists have paid any
attention to the bracero program. Yet its decline
coincided with the growing emphasis on group analysis
m American political science and with a more pro-
nounced American concern with Latin America. Other
trends which might have been expected to turn atten-
tion to the politics of the bracero program, but so
far have not. include the growth of Chicano studies
programs and the increasing importance of policy
analysis in political science. Including the present
writer, only two other political scientists have
studied the bracero program.
Certain periods relevant to the Mexican labor
program have been under-studied by all disciplines,
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including political science. The second contribution
Of this dissertation lies in its attention to these
eras. Studies of the bracero program typically
ignore its roots in Pre-l 942 Mexican labor patterns
in the United States. little attention has been paid
to the program's last four years (1961-64) or to
reasons for its termination. Apparently no study
has been made of the post-1964 political struggle
over Mexican labor. The bulk of this dissertation
deals With these three neglected periods.
Only two other researchers have made any attempt
to explain bracero politics in theoretical terms. The
third contribution of this dissertation lies in its
application of the pluralist model to selected aspects
Of the Mexican labor system.
When this student sought to narrow his disser-
tation to some specific aspect of the bracero program
which needed study, there was little explicit guidance
in the literature short of reading it. Few scholars
had bothered to identify gaps or problem areas beyond
their immediate research problem. Consequently, the
remainder of this section is devoted to pinpointing
some of the many weaknesses remaining in the literature.
First
» there is a need to explain more of the
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accumulated facts in explicit theoretical terms. For
example, study of the Mexican labor program would
dily lend itself to a systems approach
.
1
Alterna-
tive organization of the factual material in terms of
Lnputs
' feedback, rewards, and deprivation
might prove useful.
Secondly, a number of historical periods be-
fore and after the brace™ ~ 4.
•
o cero era continue to need study.
Apparently no other proiect h^aJ CI nas devoted any attention
to developments since the beginning of the Nixon
presidency. Scholarly concern with the World War I
bracero program is apparently limited to a single
published study. Although the widespread repatriation
of Mexican workers during the Great Depression was an
important influence on Mexico's position during the
mo's, that movement has received very little
scholarly attention.
Thirdly, a number of in-depth studies are
needed of limited, but important, aspects of bracero
politics which have received little or no attention.
Court rulings concerning the Mexican labor system
have been almost completely ignored. As strikes by
Alfred l?
a
KnoPf?
S
197i )T^
F ° lltical S^ tPm York,
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American farm workers grew more common during the
did they affect and how were they affected
by the bracero program? Did these relationships change
as reform forces grew stronger? How was Labor Secre-
tary Mitchell able to initiate ,x x liberal reforms from
within a pro-grower administration? Did he have
some independent power base of his own which encouraged
his bold action? Material for a master’s thesis could
perhaps be found in a background study of congressmen
Which would identify those who owned farms, those who
owned businesses heavily dependent on agriculture, and
those who had grown up on farms. Correlations between
these traits and votes on the bracero program (and
related legislation) would then be calculated.
It would be useful to study the immigration
service for the purpose of identifying those officers
who insisted on rigorous enforcement of the immigration
laws and those advocating lax enforcement. What
strategies did each follow and how successful were
they? Did each side enter into coalitions with non-
immigration officials and with interest groups?
It might prove useful to ask congressmen who
switched against the bracero program why they did so.
Since it has apparently not been done, farm workers
428
should be asked how they feel about wetback labor
and whether they would oppose re-institution of a
bracero program. Cesar Chavez*- f™n s arm workers union
should be evaluated in terms nf i+= wm o its broad implications
for the politics of Mexican labor.
The bracero program also needs to be studied
in terms of Mexico's political system. What role
did her interest groups play? Were there spUts
within the government similar to those within the
American government? What has been the post-1964
political aftermath in Mexico?
Most studies of the bracero program have made
little effort to relate it to other supplies of Mexi-
can labor. How did it influence and how was it
ln-luenced by wetbacks, border-crossers
, H-2 workers,
Mexican immigrants, and commuters? It might also be
useful to relate the bracero program to other foreign
labor supplies in the United States, including the
Canadians, British West Indians. Basques, and the
Cubans in Florida.
No serious effort has been made to compare and
contrast bracero politics with the earlier successful
effort to rid American industry of foreign labor.
Arguments, interest group alignments, and strategies
429
might be compared and contrasted.
The bracero literature generally treats the pro-
gram as too unique. No serious efforts have been
made to see if political patterns surrounding the
Mexican labor system are similar to those which
have grown up around foreign labor programs of other
countries such as West Germany and England. Does
labor typically flow from less developed to more
developed countries? Do these movements intensify
nationalism in the supplier nation by highlighting
its under-developed status? Do political pressure
groups invariably arise in the host country to oppose
perceived threats from the foreign workers?
430
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